Speedy Trial


Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook

Reproduced with permission from:
Timothy E. Pierce and the Franklin County Public Defender Office

Last updated 5/18/2015

R.C. 2945.71 -- Time within which hearing or trial must be held.
R.C. 2945.72 -- Extension of time for hearing or trial.
R.C. 2945.73 -- Discharge for delay in trial.
R.C. 2941.401 -- Request for trial on pending charges by a prisoner.
R.C. 2963.30 -- Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

The Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial

Vermont v. Brisson (2009), 129 S.Ct. 1283 – Defendant went through six attorneys during the three years before he was brought to trial. Applying Barker v. Wingo the Vermont Supreme Court held he had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Reversed. The Vermont Court improperly found delays occasioned by counsel were chargeable against the state. Whether retained or appointed, defense counsel acts as the agent of the defendant. Only a systemic breakdown in a public defender system might count against the state.
State v. Major, 180 Ohio App. 3d 29, 2008-Ohio-6534 – In 1993 defendant was indicted for kidnapping, felonious assault and attempted murder. Defendant is a Michigan resident. When he was arrested there on unrelated charges Erie County failed to obtain a Governor‘s Warrant in a timely manner. When defendant later served prison time in Michigan, there was no holder at the time he was released. Nothing more was done by Ohio authorities until the warrant surfaced when he was pulled over for a traffic violation ten years after his release. Indictment was properly dismissed. Defendant had returned home to Michigan in 1993 – he did not go there to evade prosecution. He had no duty to bring himself to trial. Parties agreed prejudice was presumed.
State v. King, 184 Ohio App. 3d 226, 2009-Ohio-4551 – While in prison on other charges the defendant filed a speedy trial demand on a 2001 indictment. She was not arraigned until 2007, and subsequently entered a guilty plea. (1) Since speedy trial was not raised before trial, the appellate count will only weigh violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that will be limited to plain error review. (2) Applying Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, prejudice is presumed from the length from the delay. The state was unable to provide any explanation for the delay other tan the case having gotten lost. Though it was a case resting on documentary evidence, the length of the delay is per se prejudicial.
State v. Sears, 166 Ohio App. 3d 166, 2005-Ohio-5963 -- Trial court dismissed complaint concluding that a nine-month delay between when the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and service of the warrant during an unrelated traffic stop was a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. As delay approaches a year, postaccusation delay is presumptively prejudicial. Looking next to reasons for the delay, it is not reasonable diligence to simply allow the warrant to sit in the file without an effort to serve it or make an arrest.
State v. Mullins, 152 Ohio App. 3d 83, 2003-Ohio-477 -- Court granted defendant's motion to suppress statements 635 days after the evidentiary hearing. Constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. A court's discretion as to the time needed to rule on a defense motion is not limitless, and no explanation was given for the delay.
State v. Stringham, Miami App. No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100 -- Thirty year delay did not violate right to speedy trial. State's evidence consisted of an old fingerprint run through AFIS and the defendant's recent statements. Defendant only claimed hypothetical missing witnesses and faded memory.
Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 -- A defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be determined by any inflexible rule, but must be judged on a case by case basis, in which the conduct of the prosecution and that of the defendant are weighed. Factors to be considered include the length and reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial and the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.
United States v. MacDonald (1981), 456 U.S. 1 -- The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies only to the time during which charges are pending. Claims of prejudice relating to the period before charges are filed or the interim between dismissal and refiling must be examined under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
State v. Selvage (1997), 80 Ohio St. 3d 465 -- Syllabus: "Statutory periods of limitations are not relevant to a determination of whether an individual's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated by an unjustified delay in prosecution."
State v. Meeker (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 9 -- Paragraph three of the syllabus: "The constitutional guarantees of a speedy trial are applicable to unjustifiable delays in commencing prosecution, as well as to unjustifiable delays after indictment."
State v. Looper (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d 448 -- For purposes of evaluating a constitutional speedy trial claim, a seventy-five month delay is presumptively prejudicial. Discharge ordered where specific prejudice was not shown, but possible prejudice was. Also stated that six-year statute of limitations is indicative of legislative policy as to timeliness of proceedings.
State v. Stapleton (1975), 41 Ohio App. 2d 219 -- Unjustified delays totalling two years and four months in bringing inmate at Lima State Hospital to trial denied him his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
State v. Butler (1964), 19 Ohio St. 2d 55 -- Concerning the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as opposed to the statutory right: "An accused is not entitled to a discharge for delay in bringing him to trial unless it appears that he resisted postponement, demanded a trial, or made some effort to procure a speedier trial than the state accorded him." (paragraph one of the syllabus). Also see State v. Gettys (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 241, 244.
State v. Hill (September 30, 1980), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-289, unreported (1980 Opinions 3182) -- No denial of constitutional right to a speedy trial when during period of delay defendant was imprisoned under another name.
State v. Khong (1985), 29 Ohio App. 3d 19 -- While a defendant in criminal contempt proceedings (here an assistant prosecutor) has a constitutional right to a speedy trial, the speedy trial statutes do not apply.
State v. O'Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St. 2d 7 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "An accused's express written waiver of his statutory rights to a speedy trial as provided in R.C. 2945.71 et seq., if knowingly and voluntarily made, may also constitute a waiver of the coextensive speedy trial rights guaranteed by the United States and Ohio Constitutions."

Preindictment and Prearraignment Delay

State v. Bettes (2000), 106 Ohio Misc.2d 41 -- Welfare fraud indictment dismissed because of preindictment delay. Opinion suggests action might also have been barred by the statute of limitations if it could have been documented when information state would be charged with knowledge of went into computer database.
State v. Weiser, Franklin App. 03AP-95, 2003-Ohio-7034 -- Applying Doggett v. United States, (1992), 505 U.S. 647, the court gives little weight to an initial detention which did not lead to filing of charges or posting bond. Instead, speedy trial rights were triggered by indictment. Defendant failed to show actual prejudice. Also see State v. Pyle, Coshocton App. No. 04CA12, 2004-Ohio-6201.
State v. Marcum, Columbiana App. No. 03 CO 36, 2004-Ohio-3036 -- Defendant told the grand jury no shots were fired at a truck turning donuts in his father's front yard. Subsequently he entered a non-Alford plea to felonious assault, admitting he had fired a shot. This led to a conviction for perjury under a subsequent indictment. Perjury charge should have been dismissed as preindictment delay prejudiced the defendant by giving the prosecutor an unfair advantage, through use of the admissions required as a part of the prior plea bargain.
State v. Luck (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 150 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "An unjustifiable delay between the commission of an offense and a defendant's indictment therefor, which results in actual prejudice to the defendant, is a violation of the right to due process of law under Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."
State v. Whiting (1998), 84 Ohio St. 3d 215 -- According to State v. Luck (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 150, when a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment because of preindictment delay, he bears the burden of establishing substantial prejudice, after which the burden shifts to the state to left the delay. At the initial hearing on a motion to dismiss, the defendant met this burden, but the state elected not to present any evidence. In overruling the motion, the court mistakenly said the defense bore the burden of showing delay was caused by negligence or bad faith. Following a mistrial, the motion was sustained after a further hearing, at which the state relied on the court's previous statement as to the burden of proof and again presented nothing. At p. 218: "But since the state's misstep on the production of evidence occurred before the trial court expressed its view that the state had no burden of going forward, the state may not claim to have been misled by the court's erroneous ruling."
Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647 -- Eight and a half years elapsed between indictment and arrest. Initially the defendant was in prison in Panama, but eventually he returned to the U.S., married and found employment. Delay was due to lack of effort by the government. Marshall's Service eventually found the defendant through a routine credit check. Held that Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was denied. Defendant was not required to show actual prejudice.
State v. Williams (1997), 120 Ohio App. 3d 477 -- Person charged with welfare fraud was accepted by a diversion program and supervision was transferred to Florida. When she failed to report and was dropped from diversion, an indictment was returned, but no effort was made to execute the accompanying at the known address in Florida. Indictment was properly dismissed on Sixth Amendment grounds.
State v. Triplett (1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 566 -- Fifty-four month delay between indictment and arraignment did not deny defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial where the delay was precipitated by the defendant's failure to claim certified mail informing her of her indictment.
State v. Doksa (1996), 113 Ohio App. 3d 277 -- Five year preindictment delay warranted dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Investigation was concluded shortly after drug sales. Concerns for safety of undercover personnel were not substantiated. Officer in charge of investigation conceded he could not recall what he did on the date of the sale, and suspected the defendant would have the same difficulty.
State v. Grant (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d 28 -- Seventeen month delay between indictment and service on inmate denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Applying Doggett v. United States (1992), 505 U.S. 647, post indictment delay becomes presumptively prejudicial as it approaches one year. As to second prong of analysis, the length of the delay was unwarranted in a simple case, and could not be blamed on the defendant. Incarceration in a prison in another county was not a sufficient reason for the delay, the defendant remained ignorant of the indictment so could not press for a speedy trial, and because of delay he was unable to seek independent testing of evidence against him. Also see State v. Dixon (1996), 79 Ohio Misc. 2d 1.
State v. Behymer (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 791 -- Speedy trial rights denied by two year delay in arrest of the defendant following indictment. Defendant had remained in the community and was in regular contact with police officers through employment as a bartender. Applying Doggett v. United States (1992), 515 U.S. 647, the defendant was not required to show actual prejudice due to the delay.
State v. Collins (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 73 -- Court does not view the 18 months taken to conduct an investigation and commence prosecution as violating the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The proper method for claiming prejudice would be as a denial of due process.
State v. Glazer (1996), 111 Ohio App. 3d 769 -- Three year delay before return of indictments found not to be a per se due process violation. Speedy trial motion was not timely.
State v. Kelly (1995), 101 Ohio App. 3d 700 -- Speedy trial motion properly sustained where police delayed obtaining an indictment for six months following an unjustified internal policy, only two attempts on consecutive days were made to execute arrest warrant at the defendant's long time address, and a further fifteen month period passed before the defendant was taken into custody after a traffic stop.

Statutory Speedy Trial Rights in General

State v. Kist, 173 Ohio App. 3d 158, 2007-Ohio-4773 – Court rejects state‘s efforts to validate delays after the fact. To toll the running of time, when a sua sponte continuance leads to a date outside the prescribed time limit, it must be journalized with supporting reasons before time has run. Verbal justifications are not sufficient.
State v. Pachay (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 218 -- Syllabus: "The statutory speedy trial provisions...constitute a rational effort to enforce the constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony or misdemeanor and shall be strictly enforced by the courts of this state."
State v. Coatoam (1975), 45 Ohio App. 2d 183 -- A defendant is not required to demand that he be brought to trial within the prescribed period, nor is he required to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay. Also see Cincinnati v. Williams (175), 44 Ohio App. 2d 143.
State v. Reeser (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 189, 191 -- Compliance with the speedy trial statutes is mandatory. Also see State v. Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 104; State v. Gray (1964), 1 Ohio St. 2d 21; State v. Cross (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 270.
State v. King (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 158, 161 -- The statutory speedy trial provisions set forth in R.C. 2945.71 are coextensive with constitutional speedy trial provisions.
State v. McElrath (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 516 -- The statutory right to a speedy trial is limited to the first trial. The timeliness of a retrial must be determined according to constitutional standards. A thirty-one day delay was reasonable. Fourteen days of delay were attributable to a premature appeal.
State v. Turner (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 305 -- R.C. 2945.71 said not to apply to retrials. Also see State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St. 3d 19, 20; State v. Fields (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 123; State v. Workman (1977), 60 Ohio App. 2d 204 (mistrial); State v. Saunders (1984), 23 Ohio App. 3d 69 (mistrial); State v. McAllister (1977), 53 Ohio App. 2d 176 (no contest plea vacated); State v. Zerla (December 22, 1994) Franklin Co. App. No. 94APA03-350, unreported (1994 Opinions 6128). But see State v. Bauer (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 83 and State v. Broughton (1991) 62 Ohio St. 3d 253;
State v. Willis (1980), 69 Ohio App. 2d 128 -- Speedy trial statutes apply when a court of appeals reverses an erroneous dismissal on speedy trial grounds and remands the case for trial.

Related Offenses

Preliminary Hearing

State v. Pugh (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 153 -- When there has been a failure to conduct a preliminary hearing within the time prescribed in R.C. 2945.71(C)(1), the defendant is entitled to have the charges dismissed, but this does not invalidate any indictment which might subsequently be returned. Also see State v. Grimm (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 152.
State v. Martin (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 289 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "When, at the request of defendant's counsel, a judge extends the time for a preliminary hearing pursuant to Crim. R. 5(B)(1), this continuance extends the time the defendant is required to be brought to both a preliminary hearing and trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H)."
Styer v. Brichta (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 738 -- Habeas corpus is the proper remedy where the defendant has not been afforded a preliminary hearing within the prescribed period.


State v. Trapp (1977), 52 Ohio App. 2d 193 -- Speedy trial statutes do not apply to juveniles. Also see State v. Reed (1977), 54 Ohio App. 2d 193; In re Washburn (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 178.
State, ex rel. Williams, v. Court of Common Pleas (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 433 -- When a juvenile has been bound over for trial as an adult, the time within which he must be brought to trial begins to run at the time the juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers the case to the appropriate adult count. Also see State v. Steele (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 137; State v. Young (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 387; State v. George (January 10, 1980), Franklin Co. App. No. 79AP-552, unreported (1980 Opinions 25)

When the Right to a Speedy Trial May be Asserted

Toledo v. Sauger, 179 Ohio App. 3d 285, 2008-Ohio-5810 – Freelance photographer was arrested taking pictures of a Nazi rally from an enclosure reserved for the press and charged with criminal trespass when he said he did not have a temporary press pass issued by the Toledo Police Department. At arraignment he waived time, though he maintained he did not recall signing the waiver form. More than a year later he filed an initial motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. This revoked the open-ended waiver. No tollable event happened until the filing of a second motion 65 days after the first was denied. Nothing was done to address the judge‘s medical leave until after the 45 days allowed for trial had run. Discharge required because the court failed to bring the defendant to trial within a reasonable time. Trial finally took place two years after the arrest.
State v. Singer (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 250 -- "A defendant's failure to object to a trial date scheduled outside the 90-day limitation period of R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) and (D), before the expiration of that period, does not amount to acquiescence in the trial date." (syllabus). Also see State v. Tope (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 250, 251. Compare State v. Dumas (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 174.
State v. Siler (1979), 57 Ohio St. 2d 1 -- Because the prosecution and the trial courts have an affirmative duty to bring an accused to trial within the prescribed time, failure to set a trial date is not excused by defense counsel's statements following a suppression hearing to the effect that he would not be able to proceed with the case until a later time.
State v. Clary (1991), 73 Ohio App. 3d 42 -- There is no per se rule requiring counsel to file a motion to dismiss every time the trial date does not fall within the prescribed period, regardless of the merits of defendant's claim.


State v. Hohenberger, 189 Ohio App. 3d 346, 2010-Ohio-4053 – Speedy trial waiver on original charge of aggravated vehicular assault based on driving under the influence did not carry over to subsequently indicted count of vehicular assault based on recklessness, though both charges arose from the same incident. The initial charge was dismissed at trial, and the second charge was not a lesser included offense to the initial charge. Defendant discharged on the vehicular assault count and awarded new trial on a domestic violence count tried at the same time because of the prejudicial effect of the testimony on the vehicular assault charge. Messy facts. Couple is out celebrating an anniversary. Intoxicated wife is seen “adjusting” her clothing after being in a ladies room stall with another man. Husband may have accidentally hit wife with the family Lincoln.
State v. Kuriger, 175 Ohio App. 3d 676, 2008-Ohio-1673 – When the defendant appeared in municipal court in 2001 he executed an "irrevocable" waiver of his right to speedy trial. This was never revoked. In 2007 prosecution finally went forward. Trial court erroneously dismissed the case on speedy trial grounds. Time was tolled for purposes of statutory speedy trial rights and the period of delay was not unreasonable for purposes of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
State v. Kerby, 162 Ohio App. 3d 353, 2005-Ohio-3734 -- Attorney was not prepared to go to trial because discovery had not been completed, and because he continued to be counsel of record for codefendants. The waiver colloquy with the defendant confused tolling based on the continuance with a general waiver. Ultimately the trial was set well beyond the 90-day limit, with no explanation for further continuances. Because the exchange is construed as amounting to a general waiver of the right to speedy trial, counsel was not ineffective for failure to press for discharge on speedy trial grounds.
State v. Boles, Montgomery App. No. 18762, 2003-Ohio-2693 -- Waiver declaring itself applicable to additional charges that might be brought based on the same events as pending charges is ineffective. A defendant can not waive his right to a speedy trial on charges that have not yet been brought. Though the defendant only pled no contest to two charges initially filed the error was not harmless. Firearm specification was not attached to additional charges and plea may have been motivated by escaping life rape count that should have been dismissed.
State v. Santini (2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 396, 402 -- "(W)e hold that when the right to speedy trial has been formally asserted on the record pursuant to a motion to dismiss or similar motion, a subsequent waiver of speedy trial will have prospective application only. It will not cure any violation of the statutory time frame for trial set forth in R.C. 2945.71 that may have accrued prior to execution of the waiver."
Westlake v. Cougill (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 230 -- Defendant may waive his right to a speedy trial.
State v. O'Brien (1987), 34 Ohio St. 2d 7 -- When waiver is open ended as to duration, only requirement is that the defendant be brought to trial within a reasonable time (paragraph two of the syllabus). Also see State v. Kidd (1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 374; State v. Johnson (1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d 271.
Cleveland v. Austin (1978), 55 Ohio App. 2d 215, 227-230 -- Purported waiver written on jacket of traffic ticket was not sufficient to toll time as a court must speak through its journal in order to affirmatively demonstrate that delay was justified. Also see Columbus v. McCreary (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 216.
State v. McBreen (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 315 -- "A defendant's right to be brought to trial within the time limits expressed in R.C. 2945.71 may be waived by his counsel for reasons of trial preparation and the defendant is bound by the waiver even though the waiver is executed without his consent." (syllabus). Also see State v. McRae (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 149, 151; State v. Davis (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 95.
State v. King (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 158 -- Defense wished a continuance and contacted the judge's secretary, who informed counsel that the judge's policy was to require a time waiver before a continuance was granted. Counsel may or may not have agreed orally, however no written waiver was executed. Continuance which was granted was said to be sua sponte. Held that time was not tolled as waiver was not in writing or in open court and reasons making the continuance reasonable were not set forth in a judgment entry filed before the expiration of the prescribed period.
State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St. 3d 67 -- Syllabus: "When an accused waives the right to a speedy trial as to an initial charge, this waiver is not applicable to additional charges arising from the same set of circumstances that are brought subsequent to the execution of the waiver." Also see State v. Warf (1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d 604; State v. Wood (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 489, 492.
State v. Mintz (1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d 62 -- Defendant was placed in a diversion program for those charged with domestic violence. This entailed entering a no contest plea, waiving his right to a speedy trial and agreeing to have finding entered at a later date. Court found entry of no contest plea alone did not amount to waiver of speedy trial rights and waiver of speedy trial was void when defendant was removed from program.

Litigation of Speedy Trial Claims

State v. Maisch, 173 Ohio App. 3d 724, 2007-Ohio-6230, ¶24 – When the defendant shows he has not been brought to trial within the proper time period the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that sufficient time was tolled or extended under R.C. 2945.72.
State v. Mock, 187 Ohio App. 3d 599, 2010-Ohio-2747 – Defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for dismissal after statutory time for a speedy trial had run. While time does appear to have run, the appellate court declares “It is not so apparent to us that a violation occurred based on the record before us.” Postconviction is left as the remedy.
State v. Turner, 168 Ohio App. 3d 176, 2006-Ohio-3786 -- A speedy trial violation may not be recognized a plain error on appeal because doing so would deny the appellee the opportunity to establish tolling. Suggested that the proper remedy is a postconviction action asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. McDonald, 153 Ohio App. 3d 679, 2003-Ohio-4342 -- A defendant establishes a prima facie case that the speedy trial time has expired by showing the prescribed number of days has been exceeded. It then becomes the prosecutor's burden to demonstrate the extent to which time was tolled. Absent documentation that the defendant had other pending cases tolling triple count for days in custody, this burden was not met. State was untimely in responding to discovery request.
State v. Singer (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 103, 109 -- Factors set forth in R.C. 2945.72 which toll time are to be strictly construed against the state. Also see State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27, 28.
State v. Eberhardt (1978), 56 Ohio App. 2d 193 -- Defendant entitled to discharge even though trial date was set beyond the prescribed period due to clerical error.
State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27 -- Once the defendant has established a prima facie case for discharge on speedy trial grounds, the prosecution bears the burden of showing sufficient time was extended (or tolled) to bring time within statutory time limit.
State v. Howard (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 705, 707 -- (1) "Once a defendant has demonstrated that two hundred seventy speedy trial days have expired under R.C. 2945.71(C)(2), she has established a prima facie case for dismissal under R.C. 2945.73(B). State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27...The state then bears the burden of demonstrating any tolling or extension of time under R.C. 2945.72. State v. Bowman (1987), 41 Ohio App. 3d 318." (2) Time was tolled to the extent the defendant remained in federal custody. See dissent for discussion of undue delay where whereabouts are known.
State v. Stamper (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 431, 441-442 -- At the time the court overruled the defendant's first motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, it noted seven days remained to commence trial. However, a date beyond that time was set, and the court failed to journalize a reason for continuance beyond the prescribed time before the seven days expired. Discharge ordered.
State v. Price (1997), 122 Ohio 65 -- Trial plainly started more than 270 days after arrest. When a motion to dismiss was made, the prosecutor said he thought they were within rule, but offered no evidence in this regard. The motion to dismiss should have been granted. The failure to meet the burden of proof may not be remedied by submitting on appeal evidence which should have been submitted to the trial court.
State v. Cross (1971), 26 Ohio St. 2d 270 -- State's claim that it is immediately able to proceed to trial does not affect defendant's right to discharge (paragraph three of the syllabus).
State v. Ladd (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 197, 202 -- Court claims it is entitled to a fair degree of latitude in interpreting legislative enactments concerning court procedure as to speedy trial: "...(W)here the system is without fault, we will not enforce these rigorous time limitations when a narrowing construction or a finding of total inapplicability of the statute on the facts would better comport with presumed legislative purpose."
State v. Messenger (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 342 -- Court must state for the record its findings of fact and reasons for denying a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds. Also see Bryan v. Knapp (1986), 21 Ohio St. 3d 64.
State v. Brown (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 476 -- Syllabus: "Where a defendant makes no request to the trial court to state findings of fact in support of an order overruling a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and the trial court does not state its findings of fact, an appellate court errs in reversing a conviction on the ground that the defendant was denied a speedy trial if there is sufficient evidence demonstrating that the court's decision was legally justified and supported by the record."

Time Calculation

State v. Blackburn, 118 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2008-Ohio-1823 – Syllabus: "In calculating the time within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial under R.C. 2945.71, periods of delay resulting from motions filed by the defendant in a previous case also apply in a subsequent case in which there are different charges based on the same underlying facts and circumstances of the previous case." Compare State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St. 3d 421; State v. Adams (1989), 43 Ohio St. 3d 67.
State v. Pilgrim, 184 Ohio App. 3d 675, 2009-Ohio-5357, ¶46-48 – Defendant was arrested when found in possession of drugs, but was released after ten days, and not rearrested until an indictment was returned more than six months later. Court questions whether the defendant was “a person against whom a felony charge (was) pending” during that period as nothing in the record establishes this to have been the case.
State v. Masters, 172 Ohio App. 3d 666, 2007-Ohio-4229 -- A motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds revokes a waiver of speedy trial rights. Initial waiver accompanying a continuance was open ended, but after the motion to dismiss was overruled enough additional time passed to take the case over the 270 day limit. The court is also of the view that the defendant was entitled to additional time between the cancelled trial date resulting from the initial continuance and waiver and the date the motion to dismiss was filed.
State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St. 3d 300, 2006-Ohio-6552 -- Syllabus: "For purposes of calculating speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(C), a charge is not pending until the accused has been formally charged by a criminal complaint or indictment, is held pending the filing of charges, or is released on bail or recognizance." Defendant was arrested, photographed and fingerprinted, but was released without charges being filed. Time did not begin to run until she was indicted and rearrested.
Cleveland v. Jovanovic, 153 Ohio App. 3d 37, 2003-Ohio-2875 -- The Cleveland Municipal Court's "computerized journal" is not its official journal, as any entry not accompanied by the signature of a judge will not be acknowledged by the Court of Appeals as a judicial order or official journal entry. Looking to the actual entries, the court determines trial was timely.
State v. Bailey (2000), 141 Ohio App. 3d 144, 147 -- Time began to run on the date the defendant was in custody on an unrelated charge in another county, and the subject of an active warrant in the county where his speedy trial rights are asserted.
Amberley v. Levine (2000), 108 Ohio Misc. 2d 13 -- Instead of complying with a mayor's court rule with respect to entry of not guilty pleas, defendant showed up prepared to go to trial on the initial appearance date. Case was rescheduled outside the 30-day speedy period applicable to speeding cases. Case should have been dismissed. At p. 17: "If a mayor's court chooses as policy not to have its witnesses present at the first appearance and no specific justifiable reason for the continuance beyond the thirty-day period is clearly set out by the court, the time runs against the municipality and the case must be reset within the time prescribed by R.C. 2945.71."
State v. Steiner (1991), 71 Ohio App. 3d 249 -- In calculating whether a defendant has been brought to trial within the time prescribed by R.C. 2945.71, the date of arrest is not counted and the last day of the period in question shall be counted. Also see State v. Lautenslager (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 108.
State v. Stone (1975), 73 Ohio Ops. 2d 496 -- Time runs from the date of arrest and not the date of the incident.
State v. Justice (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 46 -- When original charge has been dismissed for want of prosecution but has since been refiled, time within which trial must begin is calculated from date of original arrest. Also see Westlake v. Cougill (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 230.
State v. Stephens (1977), 52 Ohio App. 2d 361 -- Rules for computing time when original charge has been dismissed without prejudice and is later refiled: (1) Include time during which original charge was pending. (2) Do not include time between dismissal and refiling unless defendant has continued in custody pursuant to Criminal Rule 12(I). (3) Include time awaiting trial on new charges.
State v. Adkins (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 231 -- When a defendant is extradited from another state to stand trial in Ohio, time runs from the date he is in Ohio, under arrest on an Ohio charge. Also see State v. Haynes  (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 119.
State v. McCornell (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 141, 144-145 -- Applying Crim. R. 45, when the date by which trial must commence falls on the weekend, the first following business day becomes the date by which trial must commence. Also see State v. Flowers (June 21, 1979), Franklin Co. App. No. 78AP-830, unreported (1979 Opinions 1682, 1685).
Westerville v. Williams (1975), 1 Ohio Ops. 3d 412 -- When an appeal is taken from Mayor's Court to Municipal Court, time begins to run from the date the record is certified and the appeal is docketed.
State v. Kelly (1974), 44 Ohio App. 2d 40 -- For speedy trial purposes, when a person jailed for a parole violation is interviewed by officers investigating another crime, his arrest for that crime is the date a warrant is issued and not the date he entered custody.

Triple Count

State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St. 3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534 -- Though recognizance was granted on a felony drug charge, it was not executed until shortly before the defendant posted bond on a related misdemeanor CCW which had remained pending in municipal court. The defendant is entitled to triple count for the days between arrest and the day bond was posted on the misdemeanor. Syllabus: "(1) When multiple charges arise from a criminal incident and share a common litigation history, pretrial incarceration on the multiple charges constitutes incarceration on the 'pending charges' for purposes of the triple-count provision of the speedy-trial statute, R.C. 2945.71(E). (2) Criminal charges arising out of the same criminal incident and brought simultaneously will always be deemed to have a 'common litigation history' for the purposes of establishing incarceration solely on the 'pending charge' within the meaning of R.C. 2945.71(E), even if they are prosecuted in separate jurisdictions." The opinion summarizes and endorses the court's prior speedy trial jurisprudence.
State v. Dankworth, 172 Ohio App. 3d 159, 2007-Ohio-2588 -- At ¶37: Triple count applies to unrelated offenses joined in the same indictment.
State v. Green, Ross App. No. 01CA2641, 2002-Ohio-3403 -- Defendant established a prim facie case for discharge by alleging he had been held for more than ninety days solely on the pending charge. Burden of proof shifted to the prosecution to show he was not entitled to triple count because of a valid parole holder. Simply introducing an unauthenticated copy of the holder did not meet this burden. Testimony or documentary evidence was required to show the holder was received by the Sheriff, the Sheriff acted on it, and that the holder remained in effect.
State v. MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 66 -- Triple count provision of R.C. 2945.71(D) applies only to defendants held in jail solely on the pending charge. A person also being held on unrelated federal charges must be brought to trial within 270 days. Also see State v. Gray (1964), 1 Ohio St. 2d 21 (construing former R.C. 2945.71); State v. Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St. 2d 34, 38-39; State, ex rel. Hodges, v. Coller (1969), 19 Ohio St. 2d 164.
State v. Kaiser (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 29, 33 -- Defendant held on unrelated charges arising in the same jurisdiction is not entitled to triple count. Also see State v. Swanagin (April 30, 1981), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-788, unreported (1981 Opinions 1145); State v. Holton (December 1, 1981), Franklin Co. App. No. 81AP-353, 354, unreported (1981 Opinions 3840).
State v. Baker (1993), 92 Ohio App. 3d 516, 527-528 -- Where the prosecutor claims the defendant is not entitled to triple count because of other pending charges, he must so demonstrate with appropriate evidence or records. However, it is incumbent upon defense counsel to make sure these records are preserved for appeal.
State v. Grinnell (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 124, 130-131 -- Prison inmate serving a lengthy sentence is not entitled to triple count in calculating when he must be brought to trial on new charges.
State v. Wolos (1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 361 -- No triple count for part of a day spent in detention facility pending release on bail.
State v. Brownlow (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 88 -- No triple count for period of electronically monitored house arrest.
State v. Collins (1994), 91 Ohio App. 3d 10 -- (1) When unrelated offenses are combined in a single indictment, the state may not treat them as being separate in order to avoid three for one credit for days spent in custody. Also see State v. Bowman (1987), 41 Ohio App. 3d 318; State v. Maxey (September 29, 1981), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-945, unreported (1981 Opinions 2950). (2) The defendant pleaded guilty to one charge which was set over for sentencing in the future. Bond was continued on all charges. Consequently, the defendant remained in jail in lieu of bond on all charges. Time continued to run, though it would not have if he had been sentenced.
State v. Wagner (1993), 88 Ohio App. 3d 398 -- Trial of a jailed defendant was continued for more than 100 days, sua sponte, when the state public defender withdrew because of a conflict of interest one week before trial and new counsel was appointed. Held that time was not tolled for the period of the continuance. While the continuance may have been justified to allow new counsel to prepare the defense, this rationale was not carried into the court's entry, which must state the reasons for a continuance, if speedy trial time limit is to be tolled. Though the judge offered an explanation after the fact, at page 403, the appellate court states that it is "...highly reluctant to rely on a justification that is pronounced nearly four months after the continuance is journalized rather than contemporaneously therewith."
State v. Parsley (1993), 82 Ohio App. 3d 567 -- Triple count applies when multiple charges arise from the same transaction and share a common litigation history from arrest onwards.
State v. Dunkins (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 72 -- Prisoner also being held as a parole violator not entitled to triple count. Also see State v. LeMaster (December 20, 1979), Franklin Co. App. No. 79AP-598, unreported (1979 Opinions 4015); State v. Brown (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 476; State v. Jones (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 348, 350-351. Compare State v. Sisco (June 28, 1982), Fairfield App. No. 2-CA-82, unreported, 1982 WL 5462.
State v. Hubbard (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 443 -- No triple count when there is a probation holder. While the state must prove the existence of the holder, it need not prove its service upon the defendant. Also see State v. Martin (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 207; State v. Dunkins (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 72; State v. Phillips (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 379.
State v. Thieshen (1977), 55 Ohio App. 2d 99 -- Defendant charged with aggravated riot based on conduct while in jail awaiting trial is not entitled to triple count during period after the new charge is brought.
State v. Fielder (1994), 66 Ohio Misc. 2d 163 -- Court finds defendant was not entitled to triple count on misdemeanor charges he had been granted recognizance on, though he remained in jail on related felony. Question whether result would be different if defendant did not accept or sign for recognizance bond.

Extension of Time - Continuances

State v. Pierson, 149 Ohio App. 3d 4515, 2002-Ohio-4515 -- Pretrial was continued after defense counsel's car broke down on the way to court. Record reflected reason for continuance, but entry only stated that it was at defense request. Time was tolled.
State v. Steinke, 158 Ohio App. 3d 241, 2004-Ohio-1201 -- Misdemeanor defendant agreed to a second pretrial being set beyond the time limit. Time was tolled. The court also finds it significant that counsel failed to object when he learned that after the continuance entry had been signed language was added stating that it was at the defendant's request.
State v. Adkins (2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 633, 641 -- "When a witness fails to appear, a court does not abuse its discretion by extending the trial date beyond a prescribed time period if the prosecutor has used 'due diligence' to ensure the attendance of the witness."
State v. Benson (1985), 29 Ohio App. 3d 321 -- To toll the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial, a continuance must be journalized and the journal entry must indicate the reason for the continuance and which party sought the continuance or whether the continuance was sua sponte. A bailiff's testimony that continuances were charged to the defendant according to the court's internal scheduling card may not take the place of the requirement that the court speak through its journal. Also see State v. Miller (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 727, 729; State v. Orrill (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 259.
State v. Terra (1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d 189 -- The record must affirmatively demonstrate that a court's sua sponte continuance was reasonable in order to toll the running of the time within which a defendant must be brought to trial. It is not enough to note that the judge was in trial and that the case was continued until the first available date. Entry should have reflected whether court was involved in a civil or criminal trial. Court's reasons should be stated at the time the continuance is ordered and not after the fact.
State v. Collins (1994), 91 Ohio App. 3d 10, 16 -- When an entry fails to state who made the request for the continuance or the reasons for it, the ensuing time remains chargeable to the state.
Cleveland v. Austin (1978), 55 Ohio App. 2d 215, 230 -- Time is not tolled unless the record affirmatively demonstrates sua sponte continuances were reasonable.
State v. Stamps (1998), 127 Ohio App. 3d 219 -- Though advisable, a continuance entry need not state it is at the defendant's request for time to be tolled under the speedy trial statutes. The court may look behind the journal entry to the transcript to determine whether a continuance was at the defendant's request.
State v. Roquemore (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 448, 458-461 -- Continuance authorized over the telephone by counsel tolled time, even though appointment of that attorney as counsel had not been properly formalized.
State v. Ebright (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 846 -- Continuance to secure out of state defense witness charged to the defendant. State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6 requirement reason for continuance be journalized before expiration of speedy trial time applies to sua sponte and prosecution continuances, but not to those at the request of the defense.
State v. Cutcher (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 382 -- Court may not sua sponte set trial date beyond prescribed period by characterizing such as a discretionary continuance other than upon motion of the accused.
State v. Taylor (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d 173 -- Congested court calendar by itself is not good cause for delay. Prisoner need not show he was actually prejudiced by failure to bring him to trial within the prescribed time.
State v. Wentworth (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 171 -- An order setting trial date beyond the prescribed period merely stating the continuance was necessary because of a crowded docket is not a "reasonable continuance other than upon the accused's own motion" pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(H). Also see Elmwood Place v. Denike (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 427.
Aurora v. Patrick (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 107 -- When original trial date was timely, but inadvertently set for a legal holiday, continuance to next available trial date, ninety-nine days after arrest, was reasonable.
State v. Saffell (1988), 35 Ohio St. 3d 90 -- Time is extended by virtue of a continuance based on unavailability of vacationing police officer when judge's vacation complicated rescheduling.
State v. Reeser (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 189 -- Continuance necessitated by states's lack of due diligence in securing attendance of its primary witness was not "reasonable" for purposes of tolling time.
State v. Smith (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 115 -- Time may be tolled by: (1) period of continuance necessitated by temporary absence of key state's witness; (2) reasonable period necessary to determine defendant's competency to stand trial; (3) reasonable period needed to rule on defendant's motion seeking transfer from jail to medical facility for psychiatric treatment; and (4) time needed to rule on motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds.
State v. McKinney (September 26, 1989), Franklin Co. App. No. 89AP-186, unreported (1989 Opinions 3543) -- Trial date continued beyond prescribed period not justified by (1) claim that this was the first available date when record did not establish case could not be tried before another judge, (2) defendant's refusal to waive right to jury trial, (3) unfounded belief that defendant was also being held on felony charges.

Extension of Time - Judge Unavailable or Otherwise Occupied

State v. Hudson (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 52 -- Time tolled to the extent of an eleven day extension necessitated by court being involved in another trial.
State v. Rockwell (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 157, 167 -- (1) One week's continuance because judge was ill and no other judge was available to try the case was reasonable. Time was tolled. (2) Where continuance is occasioned by delayed appointment of counsel and completion of discovery, court draws a distinction between sua sponte continuance, where time may not be tolled based on a reasonableness test, and continuances at the request of counsel where time is tolled.
State v. King (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 669 -- Sua sponte continuance of the trial of a minor misdemeanor at 4:55 on a Friday found reasonable.
Boston Heights v. Weikle (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 165 -- When defendant arrived for trial on speeding ticket he learned case was to be tried to a referee and refused to agree to this being done. Time was not tolled for the period leading up to a trial before a judge.
State v. Webb (1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d 808, 813 -- Sua sponte continuance due to congested docket not viewed as unreasonable because the court failed seek assistance from an acting judge.
State v. Haar (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 244, 248 -- In order for a sua sponte continuance based on a crowded docket to extend time, the court must: (1) record the continuance through its journal entry prior to the expiration of the speedy trial requirements, (2) identify the party to be charged with the continuance, or that the court is so charged. Also see State v. Reuschling (1986), 30 Ohio App. 3d 81, 82-83.
Cleveland v. Jones (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 791 -- Speedy trial statutes must be strictly construed against the state. Dismissal required as entry putting on continuance was inadequate. Defendant police officer was charged with threatening to cut an 11-year old's tongue out with his pocket knife.
State v. Bumbalough (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 408 -- Time tolled during period of continuance needed for defendant to elaborate upon basis for suppression motion which was overly general as initially filed.
State v. Wirtanen (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 604, 609 - While initial 21 day continuance occasioned by officer's vacation was reasonable, further 109 day delay was not.
State v. Daugherty (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 103 -- Continuance for more than one month of a speeding case because of the court's policy in scheduling traffic cases denied appellant his right to a speedy trial.
State v. Montgomery (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 78 -- When a court on its own extends the trial date beyond the prescribed period, it must do so before the end of the statutory period. Also see State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6 (syllabus); State v Pudlock (1975), 44 Ohio St. 2d 104, 105; State v. Lee (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 208; State v. Mincy (1982), 2 Ohio St. 3d 6; Oakwood v. Ferrante (1975), 44 Ohio App. 2d 318.

Extension of Time - Competency and Insanity

State v. Prim (1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 142, 156-157 -- Defendant claimed court-ordered competency evaluation was a ploy to delay trial after he had refused to waive right to speedy trial in accordance with the request of one of his attorneys. Court finds "unexplained refusal" and defendant's quote of a passage from the Bible as having "inspired" the homicide supported the court's referral for an evaluation.
State v. Palmer (1998), 84 Ohio St. 3d 103 -- Syllabus: "(1) Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(B), the time within which an accused must be brought to trial is tolled from the date the accused files a motion challenging his or her competency to stand trial. (2) The tolling of R.C. 2945.72(B) continues until the trial court makes a competency determination and does not end when a competency examiner fails to issue a report within the time limits imposed by former R.C. 2945.371(D)." Also see State v. Jones (1997), 119 Ohio App. 3d 59, 65.
North Olmstead v. Cipiti (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 549, 553 -- Time was tolled for the period defendant was held in contempt for refusing to undergo competency evaluation. Sentence upon conviction vacated though, as he had been in custody longer than he thirty day maximum sentence.
State v. Spratz (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 61 -- Time is tolled by defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
State v. Walker (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 157 -- Time is tolled for the period between the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity through when the defendant is found competent to stand trial.

Extension of Time - Pending Motions

State v. Ford, 180 Ohio App. 3d 636, 2009-Ohio-146 – (1) State took 67 days to respond to a motion for a bill of particulars. No reason was offered for the delay. In State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St. 3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374 the defendant took 60 days to respond to a prosecution discovery request. The Supreme Court found 30 days would have been reasonable and limited tolling accordingly. (2) The court took five months to rule on a motion to sever. Allowing 30 days to rule, or even 60, the case was over time.
Bloate v. U.S. (2010), 130 S.Ct. 1345 – Under the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974, time granted for the preparation of motions does not automatically extend the 70-day time limit. Time is extended to the extent it is needed for determination of a motion, or when the trial date is continued to allow preparation of motions. In this case it was not extended between the date the defendant sought additional time for preparation of pretrial motions and the date he waived his right to file such motions.
United States v. Tinkleberg (2011), 131 S.Ct. 2007 – In federal court time is tolled automatically even though trial is not delayed by pending motions.
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St. 3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "A motion in limine filed by a defendant tolls speedy-trial time for a reasonable period to allow the state an opportunity to respond and the court an opportunity to rule. (R.C. 2945.72(E), applied.)" Reverses State v. Sanchez, 162 Ohio App. 3d 113, 2005-Ohio-2093.
State v. Brown, 98 Ohio St. 3d 121, 2002-Ohio-7040 -- Syllabus; "A demand for discovery or a bill of particulars is a tolling event pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E)."
State v. Palmer, 112 Ohio St. 3d 457, 2007-Ohio-374 -- Syllabus: "(1) The failure of a criminal defendant to respond within a reasonable time to a prosecution request for reciprocal discovery constitutes neglect that tolls the running of speedy-trial time pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(D). (2) The tolling of statutory speedy-trial time based on a defendant's neglect in failing to respond within a reasonable time to a prosecution request for reciprocal discovery is not dependent on the filing of a motion to compel discovery by the prosecution. (Lakewood v. Papadelis (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138, reaffirmed and followed.) (3) A trial court shall determine the date by which a defendant should reasonably have responded to a reciprocal discovery request based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, including the time established for response by local rule, if applicable."
State v. Dankworth, 172 Ohio App. 3d 159, 2007-Ohio-2588, ¶42-46 -- Reciprocal discovery was provided at arraignment. New counsel's subsequent discovery motion did not toll time as there was nothing new to turn over. Updated witness list was provided only pursuant to the prosecutor's continuing duty to disclose.
State v. Riley, 162 Ohio App. 3d 730, 2005-Ohio-4337 -- A verbal waiver of speedy trial rights until the next pretrial is sufficient without being made a part of a journal entry. Court finds a "reasonable time" to respond to a discovery request may extend to three months or longer.
State v. Santini (2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 396, 405 -- "(W)w hold that a motion filed by or on behalf of an accused may extend the time period in which an accused has to be brought to trial as contemplated by R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.72 if (1) the motion is of such a nature that the court cannot reasonably proceed with trial plans until the motion has been decided, and (2) the period of time the motion is pending is of a reasonable duration." Footnote cites State v. Stamps (1998), 127 Ohio App. 3d 219, 228, and State v. Willey (1981), 5 Ohio App. 3d 86, 89.
State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "When a criminal defendant files a pretrial motion and the state later files against the defendant additional, related criminal charges, R.C. 2945.72(E) does not extend the time within which the defendant must be brought to trial on those additional charges."
State v. Vera, Logan App. No. 8-03-15, 2004-Ohio-921, ¶4 -- "A motion for a pretrial conference made after the setting of a trial date outside the statutory time limits cannot be used to extend the statutory time limits."
State v. Beam (1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d 200 -- Time is tolled for a reasonable period of time needed to dispose of defense motion.
State v. Lacy (1975), 46 Ohio App. 2d 215 -- Time is tolled by the filing of a motion for a change of venue. Also see State v. Wiley (1981), 5 Ohio App. 3d 86.
State v. Bunyan (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d 190 -- Defendant's motion to dismiss indictment tolls time. Also see State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 62.
State v. Jacot (1993), 97 Ohio App. 3d 415, appeal dismissed as improvidently granted 71 Ohio St. 3d 1217 (1995) -- Per se and impaired driving violations of the OMVI statute are said to be distinct for purposes of double jeopardy as each requires proof of an additional fact the other does not. Case arises in the context of a speedy trial claim resolved in the defendant's favor. Per se charge was filed while impaired driving charge was already pending and both were continued pending determination of a motion to suppress test results. Court found time was not tolled on the impaired driving charge, which the motion did not relate to, and rejected the state's claim double jeopardy considerations required the cases be tried together. Note that if separate convictions had resulted, they would have merged under R.C. 2941.25.
State v. Wyde (1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d 471 -- Time tolled during period needed to dispose of a second defense motion to suppress, even though the case had already been dismissed and refiled after the state was unable to proceed on the same motion filed in conjunction with the earlier proceedings.
State v. Arizola (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 72 -- Time is not tolled when court takes an excessive amount to time to rule on pretrial motions filed by the defense (seven months in an OMVI case).
State v. Keith (1998), 130 Ohio App. 3d 456 -- Pro se defendant's "Legal Notice of Revocation of Unauthorized Plea" and "Dilatory Plea to Quash" tolled time.
State v. Collura (1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d 364 -- Period of delay beyond due date for prosecutor's brief in response to a defense motion is charged against the state.
University Heights v. Dachman (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 26 -- Time tolled for period needed to rule on jury demand in minor misdemeanor dog feces case.

Extension of Time - Defendant Unavailable or Absent

State v. Stokes, 193 Ohio App. 3d 549, 2011-Ohio-2104 – Time was tolled for the period the defendant was in Florida and failed to provide his attorney or the court an address where he could be contacted.
State v. Counts, 170 Ohio App. 3d 339, 2007-Ohio-117 -- When a defendant fails to appear for a pretrial conference and a bench warrant is issued, time accrued up until that date no longer counts tin calculation to time allowed under the speedy trial statutes. State v. Bauer (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 83, followed. Concurring judge believes failure to appear at a status conference is distinguishable from failure to appear at trial, but would affirm as error was invited by trial counsel's concession time did not count.
State v. Bailey (2000), 141 Ohio App. 3d 144 -- To toll time while the accused is confined elsewhere, the prosecution must exercise reasonable diligence to secure his availability. These efforts need not be successful, but must be made. Time began to run when Bailey was arrested in Hamilton County on an unrelated charge. Merely filing a detainer was not reasonable diligence. Dissenting judge believes the reasonable diligence language is limited to extradition.
State v. Koester, Wyandot App. No. 16-03-07, 2003-Ohio-6098 -- Time is tolled only as long as the defendant is unavailable. The state must continue to exercise reasonable diligence to bring the defendant to court once proceedings in another state have concluded. An order stating time is tolled is not open-ended. Lodging a detainer alone is not reasonable diligence.
State v. Reitz (1984), 26 Ohio App. 3d 1 -- Time is tolled during time defendant is unavailable because of incarceration in another jurisdiction.
State v. Soto (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 743 -- Defendant unsuccessful in having period of continuance charged to the state, even though it was at his own request because he had a hearing set in another town before another branch of the same municipal court.
State v. Bauer (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 83, 85 -- "(A) defendant who fails to appear at a scheduled trial, and whose trial must therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives his right to assert the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time which elapses from his initial arrest to the date he is subsequently rearrested." Also see State v. Gibson (February 12, 1987), Franklin Co. App. No. 86AP-406, unreported (1987 Opinions 137).
State v. England (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 149 -- Where there is a lack of a clear showing of delay occasioned by an act of the accused which would extend the time within which he must be brought to trial, the court commits reversible error and violates R.C. 2945.73(D) when it vacates its prior entry discharging the defendant on speedy trial grounds.
State v. Langhorn (April 24, 1980), Franklin Co. App. No. 79AP-616, unreported (1980 Opinions 1220) -- At page 1223: "We hold that a person against whom a felony charge is pending and who flees from the jurisdiction, is rearrested and returned to the jurisdiction, must be tried upon his return to the jurisdiction within the periods of time prescribed by R.C. 2945.71."
State v. Hengstler (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 400 -- Time is not tolled where there is no delay setting a case for trial though the defendant and counsel failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. Compare State v. Gibson (1992), 75 Ohio App. 3d 388 where the defendant's failure to appear for hearings and failure to remain in contact with his attorney did contribute to delay.

Extension of Time - Other Reasons

State v. Marbury, 192 Ohio App. 3d 210, 2011-Ohio-879 – M-3 sexual imposition case dragged on for about a year. At one point the defendant demanded a jury trial, ten days before the date the case was set for bench trial. Time tolled as delay was due to the defendant’s own motion.
State v. Sanchez, 110 Ohio St. 3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "A detainer filed by the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement that does not purport to hold the defendant in custody does not nullify the triple-count provision of Ohio's speedy trial statute. (R.C. 2945.71(E), applied.)" Affirms State v. Sanchez, 162 Ohio App. 3d 113, 2005-Ohio-2093.
State v. High (2001), 143 Ohio App. 3d 232, 242-245 -- Delay at the state's request to complete testing after defendant consented to withdrawal of saliva sample was reasonable, and tolled speedy trial time count. See dissent. Only when a court sua sponte orders a continuance must it identify the party against whom speedy trial time will run.
State v. Easley, Scioto App. No. 03CA2910, 2005-Ohio-767 -- Inmate faced trial for offenses committed at Lucasville. Following the departure of his fourth attorney the case appeared to be forgotten for nine months. Conviction vacated.
Brecksville v. Cook (1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 53 -- Syllabus: "The transfer of a case pursuant to R.C. 1905.032 from the mayor's court to the municipal court is a 'removal' within the meaning of R.C. 2945.72(F), and the period of delay necessary to the removal is the time from arrest or summons to the date the mayor's court certifies the case to the municipal court." Also see Gahanna v. Partlow (1985), 27 Ohio App. 3d 267.
Johnstown v. Tullos (1993), 63 Ohio Misc. 155 -- Case dismissed for speedy trial violation because of ninety-six delay in delivering papers to Municipal Court, following appeal from Mayor's Court.
State v. Mays (1996), 108 Ohio App. 3d 598, 609-614 -- Chief Justice took ten months to rule on affidavit of disqualification filed by the prosecutor. Held that the time within which the defendant must be brought to trial was tolled, even though there was no express stay order. Court construes R.C. 2701.03 which relates to the disqualification procedure as an express statutory requirement for purposes of R.C. 2945.71(G).
State v. Comstock (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 416 -- Prosecutor took an unsuccessful appeal under Crim. R. 12 (J), certifying that an adverse ruling on a pretrial motion destroyed the possibility of effective prosecution. While speedy trial time is usually tolled during such appeals, defendant claimed it should not be here as prosecutor testified he intended to proceed regardless of outcome of appeal. Court found time was tolled. Though prosecutor may have feared acquittal, probable cause was all that was required to go forward.
State v. Bonarrigo (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 7, 11 -- When a felony charge has been indicted after a lesser-included misdemeanor offense has been nolled, time during which misdemeanor charge was pending is to be deducted from the 270 days within which a felony charge is to be brought to trial.
State v. Cox (May 15, 1980), Franklin Co. App. Nos. 80AP-03, 79AP-918, unreported (1980 Opinions 1413) -- Time tolled between entry of nolle prosequi and reindictment. Also see State v. Bonarrigo (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 7; State v. Spratz (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 61, 61 fn. 2.
State v. Lewis (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 624 -- Speedy trial time is tolled after grand jury rejected initial attempt to secure an indictment. It was not tolled for additional time beforehand based on prosecutor's claim that the defendant suborned perjury and attempted to intimidate witnesses in order to forestall indictment.
State v. Austin (1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d 329, 335 -- Time tolled for period of reasonable continuance on the court's own initiative to secure DNA testing. Results could have been either exculpatory or inculpatory.
Westerville v. Williams (1975), 1 Ohio Ops. 3d 412 -- Time is not tolled during delay between waiver of right to jury trial and date case is tried to the bench.
State v. Scott (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 155, 159-161 -- Time tolled by virtue of defendant's refusal to be tried jointly with codefendants.
State v. Smith (1976), 47 Ohio App. 2d 317 -- Time is not tolled based on the unavailability of counsel when substitute counsel appears.
Columbus v. Bonner (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 34 -- Court's neglect in appointing counsel does not extend time.
State v. Gowe (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 358 -- Defendant's request for discretionary (as opposed to routine) pretrial may toll time.
State v. Maxey (September 29, 1981), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-945, unreported (1981 Opinions 2950) -- Time not tolled by detainer relating to civil (paternity) case pending in another county.
State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27 -- Time not tolled by defendant's petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
State v. Long (1990), 70 Ohio App. 810 -- Defendant's application for a diversion program available to those charged with OMVI extended time within which she had to be brought to trial.

Inmate's Demand for a Speedy Trial

State v. Centafanti, 120 Ohio St. 3d 275, 2008-Ohio-6102 – An inmate of a federal prison located in Ohio may not assert his speedy trial rights pursuant to R.C. 2941.401. Remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination what statute properly applies and whether the requirements of that statute were satisfied. Two paragraph opinion does not state whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers or Ohio‘s general speedy trial statutes are controlling.
State v. Dillon, 114 Ohio St. 3d 154, 2007-Ohio-3617 -- For unknown reasons a warden failed to meet his statutory duty to give an inmate written notice of a pending indictment and of his right to request final disposition. The question was whether the defendant's independent knowledge of the indictment cuts of his right to discharge. Syllabus: "An inmate's awareness of a pending indictment and of his right to request trial on the pending charges does not satisfy the notification requirements of R.C. 2941.401, which requires a warden or prison superintendent to notify a prisoner 'in writing of the source and contents of any untried indictment' and of his right 'to make a request for final disposition thereof.' (R.C. 2941.401, construed and applied." Time runs from the date the warden is asked to give notice.
State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St. 3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969 -- R.C. 2941.401 does not place a duty of reasonable diligence on the state in determining the whereabouts of an incarcerated defendant against whom charges are pending.
State v. Roulette, 163 Ohio App. 3d 775, 2005-Ohio-5435 -- When an inmate is aware of pending charges, and fails to file written notice requesting disposition pursuant to R.C. 2941.401, the state's duty of reasonable diligence under R.C. 2945.72(A) is not triggered. Time is tolled until release from prison.
Cleveland v. Adkins, 156 Ohio App. 3d 482, 2004-Ohio-1118 -- Defendant did not appear on trial date because he was in a state prison. Time was tolled. The city's duty to have him returned for trial was not triggered until a written demand was filed pursuant to R.C. 2941.401.
State v. Smith (2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d 81 -- 180-day period began to run when inmate's demand for disposition of charges was received by the prosecutor and the court. Time was tolled by continuance of the pretrial conference to permit the parties to discuss the case and by the time during which the defendant was unavailable because he was being tried on other charges in a different county. Flight prior to imprisonment is a barrier to claims under R.C. 2945.71 et seq. and the state and federal Constitutions.
State v. Turner (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 305 -- To claim the benefit of 180 day period to be brought to trial defendant must show he delivered written notice to both the prosecuting attorney and to the trial court.
State v. Drowell (1991), 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 623 -- Though a defendant must substantially comply with the requirements of R.C. 2941.401, strict compliance is not required. Failure to include the warden's certificate did not prevent trial court from losing jurisdiction.
Daugherty v. Solicitor for Highland County (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 192 -- Federal inmate's letters to judge requesting trial or dismissal on pending charge constituted a request for a speedy trial.
State v. Fitch (1987), 37 Ohio App. 3d 159 -- Warden's failure to pass on to prisoner information concerning untried charges works to the detriment of the prosecution. Prosecution can not rely upon failure to make a demand and 180 day period begins at time there was an obligation to notify prisoner. Also see State v. Rollins (November 17, 1992), Franklin Co. App. No. 92AP-273, unreported (1992 Opinions 5304).
State v. Cloud (1997), 122 Ohio App. 3d 626 -- The 180-day period allowed for bringing a prisoner to trial on outstanding charges begins to run when the demand is received by the prosecutor and court, not when it is handed over to the prison authorities for forwarding.
State v. Martin (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 172 -- R.C. 2941.401 imposes a duty of reasonable diligence upon the state to attempt to locate and notify an accused of charges pending against him. Absent the exercise of such diligence, state may not rely upon defendant failure to demand he be brought to trial. Also see State v. Carter (June 30, 1981), Franklin County No. 80AP-434, unreported.
State v. Brown (1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d 387 -- State offered no evidence of efforts to serve inmate with indictment. Warrant was forwarded to a detective for service, but two and a half years passed before an arrest was made. Indictment properly dismissed because the state failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
State, ex rel. Bowling, v. Court of Common Pleas (1970), 24 Ohio St. 2d 158 -- Proper remedy when prisoner has not been brought to trial within the prescribed time is a motion to dismiss and not a mandamus action.
State v. Miller (1996), 113 Ohio App. 3d 606 -- Inmate's case dismissed for not being brought to trial within 180 days, though notice of pending indictment had not been sent to the institution. Information sheet furnished to the Sheriff when the warrant was issued indicated address as Lorain Correctional. At p. 610: "The state cannot circumvent the application of R.C. 2941.401 by failing to notify the warden of the pending charges, where, as here, the state clearly knew that the accused was imprisoned in this state."
State v. Grinnell (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 124, 130-135 -- Prison inmate serving a lengthy sentence is not entitled to triple count in calculating when he must be brought to trial on new charges. Nor was administrative detention following the Lucasville riots the equivalent of arrest for purposes of commencing the 270 day countdown. Opinion appears to accept that an inmate charged with new offenses must be brought to trial within 270 days, with the date of indictment as the triggering event. R.C. 2941.401 does not apply absent the filing of a request for disposition of an untried indictment. Record did not establish waiver of right to speedy trial, but defendant failed to establish allotted time was exceeded.
State v. Crawford (January 16, 1996), Franklin Co. App. No. 95APA07-864, unreported (1996 Opinions 100) -- Dismissal for failure to bring in-state prisoner to trial within 180 days affirmed. After the defendant failed to appear for arraignment, the prosecutor's office followed routine practice and sent his name to the Ohio Bureau of Records, which mistakenly reported he was not an inmate in a state prison. Though the prosecutor's office exercised reasonable diligence, that duty extended to other state agencies as well.

Interstate Agreement on Detainers

State v. Black, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2015-Ohio-513, ___ N.E.3d. ___ -- The term “penal or correctional institution of a party state” in Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act includes jails, so long as the prisoner has begun serving his or her sentence.
State v. Barrett, 191 Ohio App. 3d 245, 2010-Ohio-5139 – Defendant failed to appear for trial in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. While held in the Mahoning County Jail as a federal prisoner, enroute to a federal prison in Kentucky he sent notice of his availability and a request his case move forward to both the court and prosecutor in Cuyahoga County. Opinion doesn’t mention whether or not a detainer was ever filed. Substantial compliance is required for relief under the Interstate Compact on Detainers Though his request was not submitted through the warden of his federal prison, he did everything that could be expected, and was entitled to relief when not brought to trial in a timely manner.
State v. Anderson, 189 Ohio App. 3d 697, 2010-Ohio-5068 – Even when the prosecutor knows the whereabouts of an inmate who might make use of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, there is no duty to lodge a detainer set forth in the statute.
State v. Golden, 177 Ohio App. 3d 771, 2008-Ohio-3227 – Defendant was brought to trial on the 124th day after being returned from Florida. Since counsel had agreed to a trial date set beyond the 120-day limit, his rights were waived. Otherwise tolling events would be calculated applying the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, and tolling events such as a defense motion would have brought the trial date within rule.
State v. Baranski, 173 Ohio App. 3d 410, 2007-Ohio-4072 – Inmate was brought from Pennsylvania to stand trial on theft charges, but they were dismissed when he was not brought to trial within 120 days. Subsequently he was reindicted for RSP based on the same property. The trial court dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. This is deemed to have been in error since jeopardy never attached. Nor may an allied offenses of similar import claim be raised until there have been multiple convictions. Is this a due process violation?
Alabama v. Bozeman (2001), 121 S.Ct. 2079 -- The Interstate Compact on Detainers does not permit shuttling inmates back and forth between the jurisdiction where they are serving time and a jurisdiction where they have outstanding charges, unless the inmate agrees to such transfers. A federal inmate was taken from Florida to Alabama for arraignment, then returned to Florida the following day. When he returned for trial a month later he moved for dismissal of the Alabama charges. Dismissal was required. There is no de minimis exception to the requirement that the inmate remain in the receiving jurisdiction and be brought to trial within 120 days.
State v. Mouery (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 482 -- Syllabus: "(1) The one-hundred-eighty day time period set forth in R.C. 2963.30, Ohio's codification of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, begins to run when a prisoner substantially complies with the requirements of the statute set forth in Article III(a) and (b) thereof. (2) A prisoner substantially complies with the requirements of Article III(a) and (b) of R.C. 2963.30 when he or she causes to be delivered to the prison officials where incarcerated, appropriate notice or documentation requesting a disposition of the charges for which the detainer has been filed against him or her."
State v. Quinones, 168 Ohio App. 3d 425, 2006-Ohio-4096 -- Arizona inmate sought disposition of an Ohio charge through a motion to dismiss, which the prosecutor admitted receiving, and a request to the prison authorities to process disposition of his detainer, which he was told would be done but was not. The omission was not the defendant's fault. Thus he substantially complied with his obligations under Article III and was entitled to discharge.
State v. Keeble, Greene App. No. 03CA84, 2004-Ohio-3785 -- The Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply to unresolved probation revocation proceedings. Carchman v. Nash (1985), 473 U.S. 716, followed.
State v. Wyer, Cuyahoga App. No. 82962, 2003-Ohio-6926 -- The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is not triggered when time is being served in a county jail.
State v. Denkins, Hamilton App. No. C-030518, 2004-Ohio-1696 -- Repeated continuances mainly at the defendant's request, waived the IAD's statutory time limit.
Fex v. Michigan (1993), 507 U.S. 43 -- The 180 day period within which a prisoner must be brought to trial begins when the demand for a speedy trial is delivered to the court and prosecutor which lodged the detainer.
New York v. Hill (1999), 528 U.S. 110, 120 S.Ct. 659 -- A prisoner's right to be brought to trial within the prescribed 180 days may be waived. Counsel's express agreement at a scheduling conference to a trial date set beyond the prescribed period constituted waiver.
State v. Black (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 440 -- The 180 day period begins to run after the detainer has been lodged at the institution and after the notice and request for disposition has been received.
State v. Barnes (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 351 -- Interstate Compact applies only to untried charges and not defendants awaiting sentence.
Carchman v. Nash (1985), 473 U.S. 716 -- Interstate compact does not apply to detainers based on probation violation charges.
State v. Ferguson (1987), 41 Ohio App. 3d 306 -- (1) In making a demand that he be brought to trial, a defendant must substantially comply with the Interstate Compact on Detainers. Rather than being required to strictly comply with the compact, he must do everything that may be reasonably expected to do so. Once this has been done, the burden is on the prosecution to cooperate and bring the defendant to trial within the prescribed 180 day period. (2) The 180 day period within which an accused must be brought to trial begins to run when the defendant files the request for disposition of the detainer. Also see State v. Reitz (1984), 26 Ohio App. 3d 1. Compare State v. York (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 149 where substantial compliance was not found.
State v. Wells (1994), 94 Ohio App. 3d 48 -- (1) Fax to California authorities concerning pending charges in Ohio construed as a detainer for purposes of the IAD, even though that word was not used. (2) Where demand for a speedy trial was addressed to the Municipal Court, prosecutor may not interpose subsequent indictment in common pleas court, not known to the defendant, as a basis for the demand being insufficient. (3) When return receipt is returned to the sender, a prima facie case of delivery is established. Claim that signor was not an employee of the prosecutor's office is to be addressed at further hearing, as is possibility signor was an employee of the county mail room. (4) Demand does not reach counts of the indictment which were not the subject of the detainer. (5) Since it was not journalized, judge's initial indication he would sustain motion to dismiss was without legal effect. Also see State v. Wells (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 275.
State v. Brown (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 445 -- Michigan inmate had pending indictments in both Ohio and Kentucky and made demand for trial on both under the Interstate Compact. Michigan authorities released him to Kentucky but failed to follow proper procedures on the Ohio demand. Discharge was properly ordered. Inmate had made proper demand and failure of sending state authorities to follow through was beyond his control.
State v. Holt (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 676 -- Letter from attorney to prosecutor concerning disposition of pending charges found not to be sufficient to constitute Article III request for trial.
Mott v. Hamilton County Sheriff (1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 84 -- Writ of habeas corpus is not the remedy for prisoner's claim that Ohio has been dilatory in bringing him to trial. Remedy is demand under the Interstate Compact on Detainers.
Helm v. Jago (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 168, 169 -- "The release of an accused by one sovereignty to another, so that the receiving sovereignty may enforce its criminal laws against him, does not constitute a waiver of jurisdiction over the accused, not does it estop the releasing state from subsequently either enforcing a previously imposed sentence or subjecting the accused to further criminal proceedings." Also see Helm v. Jago (6th Cir. 1979), 588 F. 2d 1180.
State v. Thompson (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 261 -- Once defendant has been released from custody by other state, Interstate Compact no longer applies and defendant's speedy trial rights are governed by R.C. 2945.71 - 2945.73.


State v. James, 179 Ohio App. 3d 633, 2008-Ohio-6139 – Appeal bond was revoked when conviction was affirmed. Sentence included both an 11-month prison sentence and community control. Forty-four months went by before the court ordered execution of sentence. During that time the defendant served terms on other convictions which were ordered served concurrently. While speedy trial rights do not apply in these circumstances, and delays do not generally render sentences unenforceable, the delay here constituted a denial of due process. Prison term deleted from sentence.
State v. Hull, 110 Ohio St. 3d 183, 2006-Ohio-4252 -- Syllabus: "(1) R.C. 2945.72 does not apply to criminal convictions that have been overturned on appeal. (2) The time limit for bringing a person to trial whose conviction has been overturned on appeal is governed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. (3) When an appellate court vacates a first-degree misdemeanor conviction entered pursuant to a plea of no contest and remands the case for further proceedings, the adjudication of the case 149 days thereafter is not presumptively prejudicial and is constitutionally reasonable.
State v. Thompson (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 183 -- To preserve the issue for appeal, a speedy trial claim must be raised by motion prior to commencement of trial. Where counsel has failed to do so, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the motion would have been sustained, had it been raised, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See concurring opinion for why this outcome is not fair.
State v. Kelley (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 127 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "A plea of guilty waives a defendant's right to challenge his or her conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2). (Montpelier v. Greeno [1986], 25 Ohio St. 3d 170..., applied and followed.)"
State v. Barnett (1991), 73 Ohio App. 3d 244 -- Where counsel failed to raise speedy trial issue, guilty plea may not have been knowing and voluntary.
State v. McCormick (1988), 41 Ohio App. 3d 158 -- No contest plea preserves right to appeal speedy trial issue.
Worthington v. Oglby (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d 25, 27 -- Speedy trial issue cannot be raised for the first time before appellate court.
Middletown v. Jackson (1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 431 -- Ruling on a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds is not a final appealable order. Also see State v. Cinema X Bookstore (1976), 49 Ohio App. 2d 164; State v. Lile (1974), 42 Ohio App. 2d 89.
State, ex rel. Dix, v. Angelotta (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 115 -- Mandamus is not available for pretrial review of ruling on motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds. Also see State, ex rel. Woodbury, v. Spitler (1974), 40 Ohio St. 2d 1.
State, ex rel. Bell, v. Blair (1975), 43 Ohio St. 2d 95 -- Prohibition does not lie to prevent court from proceeding to trial after overruling motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds.
In re Jackson (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 189 -- Appeal and not habeas corpus is proper remedy to challenge alleged violations of right to speedy trial. Also see In re Singer (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 130.
State v. Sonnie (1975), 46 Ohio App. 2d 164 -- State may appeal dismissal on speedy trial grounds.
State v. Bound (1975), 43 Ohio App. 2d 44 -- When the state has appealed a ruling on a motion for discharge on speedy trial grounds, a remand to the trial court is required when the court has failed to state for the record its findings of fact and reasons for the dismissal. Also see State v. Packard (1988), 52 Ohio App. 3d 99.
State v. Willis (1980), 69 Ohio App. 2d 128 -- When the appellate court has reversed the trial court's dismissal on speedy trial grounds, the prosecutor upon remand is responsible for bringing the defendant to trial, and delays by the clerk's office in returning the file do not obviate this duty. Also see State v. Geraldo (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 27.
Akron v. Downey (1984), 24 Ohio App. 3d 225 -- Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(I) time is tolled until the end of the period for filing a motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court when appeal has been taken by the state.
In re Hester (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 458 -- Time tolled during state's appeal of ruling on suppression motion, if undertaken in good faith.
State v. Perry (1990), 67 Ohio App. 3d 775 -- Time not tolled where prosecutor did not meet jurisdictional or procedural requirements for appeal of adverse ruling.
State v. Patton (1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d 86 -- Almost two year delay between the refusal of Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction and receipt of notice by trial court, and the enforcement of sentence, did not implicate speedy trial rights since trial had been had. Nor on these facts does the court find a due process violation.
State v. Girts (1997), 121 Ohio App. 3d 539, 553-555 -- Court refuses to characterize state's attempt to have reversal reviewed by the Supreme Court a delaying tactic, and finds delay before case was retried reasonable and without prejudice.
State v. Scolaro (1992), 73 Ohio App. 3d 555 -- Though defendants had waived speedy trial rights indefinitely pending decisions by appellate court which would affect the prosecution, the ultimate delay of over two years without further activity was unreasonable. Defendants properly discharged.

Other issues

Columbus v. Bryan, Franklin App. No. 03AP-1136, 2004-Ohio-3885 -- Regardless of whether there is time remaining to bring the defendant to a speedy trial, those charged with misdemeanors are entitled to discharge once they have spent as much time in jail, in lieu of bond, as the maximum sentence for the most serious offense charged.
Euclid v. Brackis (1999), 135 Ohio App. 3d 729 -- Twenty-one month delay in resentencing following reversal constitutes a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation.
State v. Brown, 152 Ohio App. 3d 8, 2003-Ohio-1218 -- Three year delay in sentencing defendant who had been transported to Colorado on other charges was unreasonable. Rather than fully dismiss charges, conviction stands but sentence is reversed.
State v. Adams (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d 492 -- Double jeopardy violation found where state pursued criminal forfeiture action against a bobcat carcass after related criminal charges had been dismissed on speedy trial grounds. At p. 498: "...(T)he dismissal of a criminal complaint for speedy trial violations amounts to a dismissal with prejudice, or an acquittal, and bars any further punitive actions by the state based on the same act or omission." Civil forfeiture would not have been banned, though opinion does not address whether it would have been available.
State v. Jarvis (1997), 121 Ohio App. 3d 105 -- R.C. 2945.71(A) allows 30 days for cases to be brought to trial in a mayor's court. Where a case was initially filed in municipal court, but dismissed and refiled in mayor's court, the time the case was pending in municipal court is to be added to the time it was pending in mayor's court.
State v. Carreker (1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d 112 -- Probation revocation proceedings must be disposed of with reasonable diligence, on appeal it must demonstrated that the delay caused prejudice. Also see United States v. Lee (7th Cir. 1991), 941 F.2d 571; Simon v. Mosley (10th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 306; United States v. Gernie (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 228 F. Supp. 329.

Publishing Information

Published by Timothy E. Pierce
Copyright © Franklin County Public Defender and Timothy E. Pierce, 2015
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