Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook

Reproduced with permission from:
Timothy E. Pierce and the Franklin County Public Defender Office

R.C. 2911.01 -- Aggravated robbery
R.C. 2911.02 -- Robbery

Force; Harm to Victim

State v. Thomas, 106 Ohio St. 3d 133 -- Defendant put down two bags of stolen groceries soon after leaving the store. An off duty cop followed him to a laundromat, then escorted him back to the store. Near the door there was a struggle and the officer was hit in the face. Held that this did not take place while the defendant was committing a theft offense as the groceries had been abandoned, nor did it happen while the defendant was fleeing immediately after committing a theft offense. Also see State v. Turner (Sept. 27, 1983), Franklin App. No. 83AP-226.
State v. Frunza, Cuyahoga App. No. 82053, 2003-Ohio-4809 -- Though pushing a stroller against a store employee blocking exit could not reasonably be construed as an attempt to inflict physical harm, subsequent assaults could.
State v. King (August 27, 1981), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-968, unreported (1981 Opinions 2699) -- Use of force in a robbery must be for the purpose of depriving the owner of his property, not merely to escape detention.
State v. Cohen (1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 182 -- Force not proved where defendant and another approached a man sleeping on the steps of the courthouse, rolled him over and took his watch and wallet. Victim remained asleep throughout.
State v. Carter (1985), 29 Ohio App. 3d 148 -- Removal of purse from elderly victim's firm grasp was sufficient proof of force to sustain robbery conviction. Also see State v. Pace (September 16, 1980), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-200, unreported (1980 Opinions 2926); State v. Camp (December 23, 1982), Franklin Co. App. No. 82AP-575, unreported (1982 Opinions 3915, 3918-3919).
State v. Johnson (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d 204 -- Considered along with the rest of the charge, instruction relating force to purse snatching did not remove the question of force from the jury's consideration.
State v. Bush (1997), 119 Ohio App. 3d 146 -- Defendant ignored clerk's demand he return beer to cooler, then returned a half hour later, made sure the store was empty, then escorted clerk to cash register, taking cash, food stamps, and on his way out of the store, another 6-pack. (1) Testimony as to first incident was properly admitted as went to element of force or threat of force. (2) Clerk's state of mind may be relevant as to proof of force. (3) It was error to instruct the jury "the force element of robbery is satisfied if the fear of the alleged victim was of such a nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with property against her will..."
State v. Furlow (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 146 -- The force element of robbery requires a showing of actual or potential harm to a person. Simply taking a wallet and bills from the firmer than usual grip of the victim (who the defendant had asked for change) was insufficient to establish the element of force. Also see State v. Grubbs (1998), 129 Ohio App. 3d 730, 733.
State v. McSwain (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 600 -- (1) In an aggravated robbery prosecution based on violence, it is not necessary to prove that the victim actually suffered serious physical harm. Rather it must be proven that the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict such harm. (2) The mens rea element of the theft element of aggravated robbery is knowingly. Since no culpable mental state is specified for the harm element, recklessness applies.
State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 169 -- To prove aggravated robbery, serious physical harm does not have to have been the actual result. It is sufficient that the jury have a basis for reasonably concluding that there was an attempt to inflict serious physical harm as defined by R.C. 2901.01(E).


State v. Holmes, 181 Ohio App. 3d 397, 2009-Ohio-1241 – Defendant and her cousin were waiting outside a KFC with a gun to commit a robbery. Evidence did not support aggravated robbery conviction, because the element of brandishing, display, use or indication of possession had not yet been committed. Furthermore, the evidence supported a one-year firearm specification, but not a three-year spec.
State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St. 3d 320, 331 -- Stealing a gun and fleeing with it amounts to aggravated robbery with a firearm specification.
State v. Vondenberg (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 285 -- Syllabus: "For purposes of establishing the crime of aggravated robbery, a jury is entitled to draw all the reasonable inferences from the evidence presented that the robbery was committed with the use of a gun, and it is not necessary that the prosecution prove that the gun was capable of firing a projectile." Also see State v. Jordan (1987), 31 Ohio App. 3d 187; State v. Price (1989), 52 Ohio App. 3d 49.
State v. Edwards (1976), 50 Ohio App. 2d 63 -- Aggravated robbery conviction upheld where the defendant was shoplifting with a gun in his pocket.
State v. Meek (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 35 -- Syllabus: "The use of an unloaded gun in the course of a robbery subjects the robber to conviction for aggravated robbery."
State v. Hicks (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 25 -- Because a toy gun may be used as a bludgeon, it may be a deadly weapon for purposes of aggravated robbery. Also see State v. Marshall (1978), 61 Ohio App. 2d 84; State v. Maynard (June 24, 1976), Franklin Co. App. No. 75AP-676, unreported (1976 Opinions 1887, 1892-1893). Compare State v. Luckey (1974), 69 Ohio Ops. 2d 111 -- Starting pistol held not to be a deadly weapon. No attempt was made to use it to strike any of the victims.
State v. Green (1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d 644 -- Aggravated robbery conviction upheld where teller did not see gun, but robber's words and actions suggested a gun was in an envelope covering his hand. See dissent.
State v. Bonner (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 815 -- Broken cap pistol was used in a robbery. Defendant struck the defendant with his fist, but not the gun. Circumstances allowed inference toy was a deadly weapon.
State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d -- Defendant was convicted of robbery because he had a gun in his car when he left a gas station without paying. Syllabus: "(1) The deadly weapon element of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), to wit, '[h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under his control[,]' does not require the mens rea of recklessness. (2) To establish a violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), it is not necessary to prove a specific mental state regarding the deadly weapon element of the offense of robbery."
State v. Davis (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 91 -- Positioning a hand in one's clothing to simulate possession of a weapon is sufficient to proved the force element of the offense of robbery. Also see State v. Bentley (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 33 (demand for wallet, raised fists, reached into shirt as if for weapon).


State v. Jones, 181 Ohio App. 3d 435, 2009-Ohio-1500 – Motion to certify a conflict denied. Court ruled in the defendant‘s favor that the mens rea element for the use of a weapon element in the aggravated robbery statute is recklessness, but against the defense on the assignment of error involving that claim. Though the court‘s ruling was in conflict with the decisions of other courts, certification is not in order as the defendant did not suffer from the court‘s determination of the subordinate issue. ¶5: "When the conflicting reasons are not dispositive of both cases, a conflict need not be certified."
State v. Manns, 169 Ohio App. 3d 687, 2006-Ohio-5802, ¶13-14 -- The aggravated robbery statute does not specify a culpable mental state applicable to the infliction of serious physical harm. Thus the state must prove recklessness in that regard and the culpable mental state of the underlying offense, here theft which requires a knowing act.
State v. Wallen (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 45 -- Intent to rob following drunken brawl may be inferred from victim being left tied up with wire when defendant and his girlfriend left apartment, taking $50 from victim's wallet.
State v. Bumphus (1976), 53 Ohio App. 2nd 171 -- Though the aggravated robbery statute does not set forth a culpable mental state, the reference to a theft offense incorporates the mens rea requirement of that offense - knowingly in the case of plain theft. To avoid the issue of which mens rea requirement applies to the possession of a deadly weapon while committing a theft offense, the court endorses the standard OJI instruction which simply presents to the jury the issue whether or not the defendant was in possession of a deadly weapon.
State v. Crawford (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 207 -- (1) Headnote 1: "Since R.C. 2911.01(A)(2), aggravated robbery, does not specify any degree of culpability, R.C. 2901.21(B) requires that recklessness be the standard which the prosecution must meet in proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict, serious physical harm on another. However, in proving the theft element of R.C. 2911.01(A)(2) the prosecution must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it was done knowingly." Compare State v. Bumphus (1976), 53 Ohio App. 2nd 171. (2) Assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. Felonious assault may be a lesser included offense when serious physical harm has been inflicted, but not when merely attempted. (But see State v. Preston (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 64, finding felonious assault and aggravated robbery not to be allied offenses of similar import based upon on the facts of that case where the felonious assault took place after the robbery had been completed, and State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 205.)

Other Proof Issues

State v. Frost, 164 Ohio App. 3d 61, 2005-Ohio-5510 -- Though the defendant did not have a weapon, he was culpable as an aider and abettor, even though the indictment charged him as a principal. There was ample evidence to sustain conviction, but the court instructed the jury the defendant must be found to have had a weapon, and declined to instruct on aiding and abetting. Reversed, but a new trial is allowed as the basis for reversal was trial error, not insufficiency.
State v. Ballard (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 59 -- The elements of robbery must occur simultaneously. Conviction reversed where defendant grabbed former girlfriend's hand bag so she would remain and talk to him. After finding a gun inside, the defendant returned the purse but kept the gun.
State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App. 3d 672 -- Robbery conviction upheld where victim was forced to reveal combination to a safe containing cash. The combination to a safe constitutes property for purposes of establishing a theft offense.
State v. Furlow (1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d 699 -- Court of appeals reversed a robbery conviction and remanded for resentencing on the lesser included offense of theft. At the resentencing, the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant for grand theft, since the element of value, necessary to elevate the degree of the offense, had not been submitted to the jury at the robbery trial.

Lesser Included Offenses

State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St. 3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974 – Syllabus: "(1) Robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.019(A)(1). (2) In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another, a court shall consider whether one offense carries a greater penalty than the other, whether some element of the greater offense is not required to prove commission of the lesser offense, and whether the greater offense as statutorily defined cannot be committed without the lesser offense as statutorily defined also being committed. (State v. Deem (198), 4 Ohio St. 3d 205, 533 N.E. 2d 294, clarified."
State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St. 3d 1260, 2008-Ohio-1260 – Syllabus: "(1) In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense of another when a statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of committing the greater offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the test established in State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 205, 533 N.E. 2d 294, paragraph three of the syllabus, to each alternative method of creating the greater offense. (2) Theft, as defined in R.C. 2913.02, is a lesser included offense of robbery, as defined in R.C. 2911.02." From the body of the opinion it appears this does not apply to robbery premised on attempted theft which is a mutually exclusive way of committing the greater offense. The degree of the theft conviction is not limited to M-1 theft as the court views value as a special finding to determine the degree of the offense and not a part of the definition of the crime.
State v. Jones, 193 Ohio App. 3d 400, 2011-Ohio-1717 – Defendant was indicted for F-2 robbery premised on the threat of harm, but the jury was instructed only on F-3 robbery premised on force. The F-3 offense is a lesser-included. Instructing on only the lesser offense constitutes a partial acquittal. This was the apparent understanding of the parties. Conviction may be entered only on the F-3. Ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to recognize the problem. Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on petty theft by force.
State v. Watson, 154 Ohio App. 3d 150, 2003-Ohio-4664 -- Robbery premised on the threat or use of immediate force is a lesser included offense to some, but not all, alternative theories of culpability for robbery premised on threat, infliction or threat of physical harm. Applying Whalen v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 684 to preempt stricter Ohio views on lesser-included offenses and allied offenses of similar import, court applies analysis to individual theories of culpability. Result here is conclusion defendant was properly convicted of a lesser included offense, but same analysis might undermine Rance analysis concerning allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Merriweather (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 57 -- Robbery is not a lesser-included offense to aggravated robbery premised on the use of a deadly weapon. [Former version of statutes.] Also see State v. Washington (1978), 56 Ohio App. 2d 129.
State v. Washington (1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 314 -- Robbery is a lesser included offense to aggravated robbery premised on harm to the victim. [Former version of statutes.]
State v. Johnson (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d 693, 696-700 -- Where the prosecutor has proceeded to trial on counts of aggravated robbery predicated on the use of a deadly weapon, it is error to reduce the offense to plain robbery at the time a Rule 29 motion for acquittal is made as robbery is not a lesser included offense to aggravated robbery premised on the use of a deadly weapon. Note that reduction would be proper if trial proceeded only on claim defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict serious physical harm. [Former version of statutes.]
State v. Gates (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 485 -- Attempted theft by threat is a lesser-included offense of robbery.


Last updated 3/1/2016
State v. Cartwright, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 26150, 2015-Ohio-5165
Because defendant's two Aggravated Robbery offenses were based on conduct targeting only one victim, without identifiably separate harm, were not committed separately, or committed with separate animus, the trial court erred by failing to merge the two offenses for purposes of sentencing.
State v. Barkley, 185 Ohio App. 3d 686, 2009-Ohio-5549 – Keeping victims taped to chairs in their hotel room while the defendant waited for his ride meant risk to them was prolonged and kidnapping counts did not merge with robberies.
State v. Harris, 122 Ohio St. 3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323 – Paragraph one of the syllabus: "Robbery defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) and aggravated robbery defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) are allied offenses of similar import, and therefore a defendant cannot be convicted of both offenses when both are committed with the same animus against the same victim." Remanded for determination whether the offenses were committed separately.
State v. Palmer, 178 Ohio App. 3d 192, 2008-Ohio-4604 – In 2002 the First District affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences for related counts of robbery and aggravated robbery, relying on State v. Rance. In the wake of Cabrales the court grants a motion for consideration though the time prescribed by rule has long passed, and rules the counts merge.
State v. Winn, 121 Ohio St. 3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059 – Syllabus: "The crime of kidnapping, defined by R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and the crime of aggravated robbery, defined by R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), are allied offenses of similar import pursuant to R.C. 2941.25." Strict textual comparison of elements is not required. Majority and dissenting justices split on how narrowly "necessarily" is to be interpreted when comparing elements. Also see State v. Sidibeh, 192 Ohio App. 3d 256, 2011-Ohio-712, ¶54.
State v. Winn, 173 Ohio App. 3d 202, 2007-Ohio-4327 – Aggravated robbery and kidnapping merge where restraint was incidental to the robbery and the victim remained in her bedroom.
State v. Stevenson, 181 Ohio App. 3d 292, 2009-Ohio-901 – Complicity to commit robbery and receiving stolen property are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Lee, 190 Ohio App. 3d 581, 2010-Ohio-5672 – In a pre-Johnson home invasion case the court concludes aggravated robbery and felonious assault counts were committed separately regardless of whether they were allied offenses of similar import. For one defendant, kidnapping and aggravated robbery counts did merge.
State v. Howard, Hamilton App. No. C-020389, 2003-Ohio-1365 -- Defendant took money from a safe in a flower shop office and ran from the store pursued by three employees. Consecutive sentences for three counts of robbery reversed. Counts merged. There was not a separate act of force against each employee. Nor was there more than one animus.
State v. Philpot (2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d 231, 239-240 -- Theft is an allied offense of similar import to aggravated robbery.
State v. Parker (1986), 31 Ohio App. 3d 128 -- Robbery and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import and only a single sentence may be imposed when the restraint of the victim is merely incidental to the robbery.
State v. Gore (1999), 131 Ohio App. 3d 197 -- Aggravated robbery and kidnapping did not merge where victim was transported to a different location to facilitate escape.
State v. Parker (1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d 456, 461-463 -- Aggravated robbery premised on the use of a deadly weapon and kidnapping are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Johnson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 420 -- Aggravated robbery and theft are allied offenses of similar import. Also see State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 442, 446; State v. Nelson (1977), 51 Ohio App. 2d 31 (robbery and petty theft). State v. Harris (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 257 -- Grand theft and robbery merge. (Decided as a double jeopardy case.)
State v. Lundy (1987), 41 Ohio App. 3d 163 -- Aggravated robbery and theft of drugs are allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 62 -- Aggravated robbery and aggravated murder are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Frazier (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 253 -- Aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery are committed separately and do not merge.
State v. Houston (1985), 26 Ohio App. 3d 26 -- Headnote 2: "Aggravated robbery, possession of criminal tools, and unlawful possession of a dangerous ordinance are allied offenses of similar import within the contemplation of R.C. 2941.25, where a shotgun was used to commit an aggravated robbery and the shotgun was the subject of the possession of dangerous ordinance charges."
State v. Byrd (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 79, 84-85 -- Robberies of clerk and cash register were separate acts committed each requiring a separate animus.
State v. Fields (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 337 -- Out of a single incident, defendants were convicted of the aggravated robbery of a fast food outlet and for robbery of the restaurant and an employee. (2) Offense with regard to the employee did not merge. (2) Robbery and aggravated robbery of the restaurant did merge. (3) Though the issue was not raised before the trial court, reversed as plain error. Error is prejudicial even though concurrent sentences had been imposed. (4) Plain error reversal moots ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Also see State v. Lang (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 243.
State v. Gest (1995), 108 Ohio App. 3d 248, 261-263 -- Aggravated robbery, theft, and receiving stolen property charges arising from the same carjacking merged.
State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St. 3d 632 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of similar import."
State v. Ferguson (1991), 71 Ohio App. 3d 342, 346-357 -- Felonious assault and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 239, 197-198 -- When separate death penalty specifications are based on aggravated robbery and kidnapping, and those offenses would merge, the specifications should be merged to be considered as a single aggravating factor at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Compare State v. Rogers (1985), 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 180-181 where the rape and kidnapping specifications did not merge.

Other Issues

State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St. 3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830 – Syllabus: “(1) An indictment that charges an offense by tracking the language of the criminal statute is not defective for failure to identify a culpable mental state when the statute itself fails to specify a mental state. (State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St. 3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 843 N.E.2d 1162, reaffirmed; State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26, 2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E. 2d 917, overruled; State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2008-Ohio-3749, 893 N.E. 2d 169, overruled in part.) (2) When the General Assembly includes a mens rea element in one discrete clause, subsection, or division of a statute but not in another discrete clause, subsection, or division of that statute, courts must apply the analysis in State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 84, 22 O.O. 3d 299, 428 N.E. 2d 428, and State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St. 3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E. d 242, to determine the mental state when none is specified. (3) By failing to timely object to a defect in an indictment, a defendant waives all but plain error on appeal. (Crim. R. 12(C)(2) and 52(B) followed; State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26, 2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E. 2d 917, overruled)” The “serious physical harm” version of aggravated robbery is a strict liability offense.
State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26, 2008-Ohio-1624 – Syllabus: "When an indictment fails to charge a mens rea element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment." Robbery indictment failed to allege recklessness as the culpable mental state with regard to the harm element. State conceded this made it defective. Majority opinion turns on the constitutional importance of the grand jury and indictments, notwithstanding Crim.R. 12(C)(2) stating defects are waived if not raised before trial. Moreover, the court finds structural error. But see State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2008-Ohio-3749 backing away from structural error to plain error and declaring Colon 1 applies prospectively. As to application of Colon see State v. Robertson, 180 Ohio App. 3d 365, 2008-Ohio-6909. For cases where Colon I and II were followed and conviction reversed, see State v. Buford, 178 Ohio App. 3d 640, 2008-Ohio-5505; State v. Summers, 182 Ohio App. 3d 139, 2009-Ohio-1883.
State v. Lester, 123 Ohio St. 3d 396, 2009-Ohio-4225 – Strict liability is the culpable mental state within the crime of aggravated robbery for the element of brandishing, displaying, using, or indicating possession of a deadly weapon. Indictment was not defective. State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 375, followed. ¶8 reiterates Colon II‘s limitation of Colon I to pervasive failure to address mens rea. See concurring opinion for further discussion of Colon, calling those cases "aberrant."
State v. Smith, Lucas App. No. L-07-1346, 2009-Ohio-48Colon I does not apply to guilty pleas. Also see cases cited at State v. Mickens, Franklin App. Nos. 08AP-743, 744, 745, 2009-Ohio-2554, ¶59.
State v. Jones, 182 Ohio App. 3d 183, 2009-Ohio-1742Colon doesn‘t apply where the error does not permeate the entire course of proceedings. Here the court instructed the jury with respect to the culpable mental state for the underlying theft offense.
State v. Haney, 180 Ohio App. 3d 554, 2009-Ohio-149Colon does not apply to aggravated robbery indictments. Applying State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 375, the state must prove the culpable mental state of the underlying theft offense, but the deadly weapons element is a matter of strict liability. Accord: State v. Lee, 180 Ohio App. 3d 739, 2009-Ohio-299 of guilt or innocence. Also see State v. Mickens, Franklin App. Nos. 08AP-743, 744, 745, 2009-Ohio-2554, ¶61-69 reaching the same conclusion with respect to aggravated robbery and burglary, further noting that the mens rea element of a predicate offense need not be alleged in the indictment, citing State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St. 3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, ¶11.
State v. Rogers, 178 Ohio App. 3d 332, 2008-Ohio-4867 – Applying State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26, 2008-Ohio-1624, robbery counts premised on inflicting physical harm was defective for failing to allege recklessness. But counts premised on the use of a deadly weapon are not. The culpable mental state for theft was included in the indictment and the added deadly weapon element is a matter of strict liability. Court also concludes a hammer qualifies as a deadly weapon.
State v. Philpot (2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d 231, 239-240 -- Theft is an allied offense of similar import to aggravated robbery.
State v. Mullins (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d 192 -- Sentencing both for aggravated robbery committed with a firearm and a related firearm specification is neither double jeopardy nor cruel and unusual punishment. Also see State v. Vasquez (1984), 18 Ohio App. 3d 92; State v. Hughley (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 77.
State v. Chapman (1986), 21 Ohio St. 3d 41 -- Syllabus: "An individual indicted for and convicted of R.C. 2911.01, aggravated robbery, and R.C. 2941.141, a firearm specification, is subject to a mandatory three-year term of actual incarceration under R.C. 2929.71, regardless of whether he was the principle offender or an unarmed accomplice. (State v. Moore [1985], 16 Ohio St. 3d 30, followed.) Also see State v. Sims (1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d 287.
State v. Hughley (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 77 -- Robbery of multiple victims in a single incident may lead to multiple sentences.
State v. Gartrell (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d 588 -- Double jeopardy did not bar prosecution for robbery following M-4 disorderly conduct conviction arising from the same incident. Though minor misdemeanor disorderly might have barred subsequent prosecution, M-4 violation had the additional element of persistence. See concurring opinion on bumbling bifurcation of prosecutions.

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