Habeas Corpus


Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook

Reproduced with permission from:
Timothy E. Pierce and the Franklin County Public Defender Office

Coverage is primarily of state habeas corpus proceedings.
Revised Code Chapter 2725 -- Habeas corpus.


Maples v. Thomas (2012), 132 S.Ct. 912 – Alabama death row inmate was represented in state post conviction by attorneys from a prominent New York law firm, appearing pro hac vice through the motion of local counsel who undertook no responsibility to provide actual representation. When the attorneys left the firm they failed to notify the court, continue representation, or make arrangements for their former firm to continue. As a result when state post conviction was denied no notice of appeal was filed and in habeas proceedings procedural default was interposed. The extraordinary facts are found to excuse the default.
Swarthout v. Cooke (2011), 131 S.Ct. 859 – Two prisoners contended that the some evidence standard applied to review of some parole decisions did not satisfy due process. There is no right to conditional release under federal law. Assuming there was a liberty interest at stake under California law, the Due Process Clause does require fair procedures for its vindication. But the Due Process Clause does not require a legally correct decision by California courts weighing the claims of state inmates.
Wilson v. Corcoran (2010), 131 S.Ct. 13—Federal habeas is available only to redress noncompliance with federal law. Defendant complained trial court considered non-statutory aggravating factors. Habeas petition asserted this was contrary to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Seventh Circuit granted relief, but appeared to rely on state law. “under these circumstances it was improper for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ without first concluding that a violation of federal law had been established.”.
Munaf v. Geren (2008), 128 S.Ct. 2207 – American citizens detained in Iraq by coalition forces under U.S. command brought a habeas action in the D.C. Circuit to forestall being turned over to Iraqi officials for prosecution. Court had jurisdiction, but could not grant the relief sought. Other post 911 cases: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), 542 U.S. 507; Rasul v. Bush (2004), 542 U.S. 466; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557; Boumediene v. Bush (2008), 128 S.Ct. 2229.
Harbison v. Bell (2009), 129 S.Ct. 1481 – Counsel appointed to represent a state court defendant in federal habeas may also represent that defendant in state clemency proceedings.
Renico v. Lett (2010), 130 S.Ct. 1855 – The Michigan Supreme Court determined that a mistrial declared after four hours of deliberations was a matter of manifest necessity, but the Sixth Circuit found otherwise. Applying deferential AEDPA review, Supreme Court reverses. Determination whether the state court’s interpretation of federal law was reasonable here hinges on there being plausible alternative views of the circumstances. Opinion rehearses the Supreme Court’s prior jurisprudence on mistrials.
Felkner v. Jackson (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1305 – Under AEDPA federal courts must defer to state court decisions that are not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Trial court’s reasons for rejecting Batson challenges were good enough. Cert. granted and reversed.
Cullen v. Pinholser (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1388 – Under AEDPA the federal court is to weigh the claim on the basis of what was known to the state court at the time it reached its decision. Pursuing an ineffective assistance claim the defense had presented additional information in state court, and at an evidentiary hearing in the district court. The latter was weighed in granting the writ.
Bobby v. Dixon (2011), 132 S.Ct. 26 – Formulation of AEDPA review standard stated as whether the state court “erred so transparently that no fair-minded jurist could agree with that court’s decision.”
Greene v. Fisher (2011), 132 S.Ct. 38 – AEDPA looks to “clearly established federal law.” That means the law in effect at the time the state court reached its decision. Here the petitioner hoped to benefit from a subsequent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Lockyer v. Andrade (2003), 123 S.Ct. 1166 -- In a habeas action, California's three strikes law is found not in violation of the Eighth Amendment through application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The Court concludes that its prior decisions do not provide a clear and consistent path for courts to follow in determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, under AEDPA, the determination by California courts that there was no violation cannot be concluded to be contrary to or inconsistent with clearly established law as determined by the Supreme Court. In a companion case not coming to the court as a habeas, thus not falling under AEDPA, no Eighth Amendment violation was found. Ewing v. California (2003), 123 S. Ct. 1179.
Daniel v. State, 98 Ohio St. 3d 467, 2003-Ohio-1916 -- Former inmate is unsuccessful in his attempt to raise a statute of limitations claim in a habeas action. (1) Generally habeas lies when immediate release from confinement is at issue. Loss of right to own a firearm, vote, or other civil disabilities are not enough. The state writ is no coextensive with the federal writ. (2) Lost liberties were not of sufficient severity to warrant habeas relief. (3) A statute of limitations violation does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction. The statute is one of jurisdiction, not repose. (4) Habeas is not a substitute for appeal or postconviction.
Hughes v. Scaffide (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 85 -- Syllabus: "Where a petition is filed which states a proper cause of action for a writ of habeas corpus, and there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Sections 2 and 3, respectively, of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution require the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to exercise their original jurisdiction in habeas corpus; and in such a case, these courts cannot refuse to exercise that original jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. (State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Industrial Commission, 11 Ohio St. 2d 141, applied.)
State, ex rel. Baker, v. Troutman (1990), 50 Ohio St. 3d 270, 273: "To be adequate a remedy must be beneficial and speedy as well as complete. State, ex rel. Liberty Mills, Inc., v. Locker (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 102..."
Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 380 -- An evidentiary hearing, discovery, and the physical presence of the defendant are not always required in habeas corpus proceedings after allowance of the writ. Lower court properly dismissed action when return included an entry rebutting claims in the petition, and petitioner had raised nothing otherwise rebutting the presumption of regularity accorded judicial proceedings. In addition, petitioner was concluded to have an adequate remedy at law. Compare State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 193.
Zanders v. Anderson (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 269, 271 -- "Habeas corpus relief is available to redress a nonjurisdictional claim when there is no adequate remedy at law." It affords a speedy remedy which is available if the time needed to pursue alternative remedies makes such alternatives inadequate.
In re Hopple (1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 54 -- If a defendant may still appeal as a matter of right habeas may not be used as a substitute of appeal. (In this case there was a question whether the decision of the court had become formalized so as to become a final appealable order.)
Gerhart v. Tate (1987), 33 Ohio St. 3d 120 -- A habeas action is properly dismissed as failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted where the defendant has not exhausted the remedies afforded by delayed appeal or a postconviction action. Also see Noble v. McMaken (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 236; Freeman v. Maxwell (1965), 4 Ohio St. 2d 4; Bellman v. Jago (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 55; Padavick v. Cleveland Heights (1973), 34 Ohio St. 2d 15. As to whether a state habeas must be brought in order to exhaust state remedies for purposes of federal habeas, see Brewer v. Dahlberg (6th Cir. 1991), 942 F. 2d 328.
Mott v. Hamilton County Sheriff (1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 84 -- Habeas lies only to contest present confinement. Consequently, a Kentucky prisoner may not bring an action in Ohio challenging an Ohio detainer lodged at his place of incarceration.
Stahl v. Shoemaker (1977), 50 Ohio St. 2d 351 -- Habeas lies only to challenge unlawful incarceration. Consequently, it does not lie to challenge the actions of the Adult Parole Authority with regard to an otherwise lawful incarceration.
Swiger v. Seidner (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 685, 687 -- "When a petitioner is incarcerated for several crimes, the fact that the sentencing court may have lacked jurisdiction to sentence him on one of the crimes does not warrant his release in habeas corpus."
Hudlin v. Alexander (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 153 -- The doctrine of res judicata applies to successive habeas corpus actions.
Harshaw v. Farrell (1977), 55 Ohio App. 2d 246 -- A habeas corpus action may be brought as a class action pursuant to Civil Rule 23.
In re Hua (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 227 -- (1) A habeas action may be referred to a referee pursuant to Civil Rule 53(C). (2) Paragraph two of the syllabus: "In a habeas corpus action filed by a natural parent who seeks the return of her child from a third party, it is error for the court to issue the writ of habeas corpus without first conducting an inquiry into the suitability of the natural parent."
Burton v. Reshetylo (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d 35 -- The respondent in a habeas action retains the right to appeal the granting of a writ, event though the petitioner is no longer in his custody.
Engle v. Isaac (1983), 456 U.S. 107 -- Failure to enter contemporaneous objection to jury instruction waives issue for purposes of federal habeas review as well on direct appeal. Overrules Isaac v. Engle (6th Cir. 1980), 646 F. 2d 1129.

Procedural Issues

Walker v. Martin (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1120 – California does not have a fixed time limit for filing state habeas, but petition may be dismissed as untimely if there has been “substantial delay.” Dismissal on such basis constituted an independent state ground, barring federal habeas.
Holland v. Florida (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2549 – Equitable tolling applies to the deadline for filing habeas under AEDPA. Death row inmate nagged counsel to act in a timely manner, identified issues to be raised, and unsuccessfully sought removal of counsel. He filed pro se soon after the deadline passed. The Supreme Court rejects the 11th Circuit’s overly restrictive view of when equitable tolling would be available.
Wood v. Allen, 130 S.Ct. 841 -- Three attorneys represented the defendant at a capital trial in Alabama. Junior member of the team was in charge of mitigation. At issue was whether the decision not to advance low IQ in mitigation was a strategic decision or whether it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Focus is on the mechanics of AEDP review, with the bar being set towards the only a little evidence end of alternative interpretations of ¶2254.
Magwood v. Patterson (2010), 130 S.Ct. 2788 – Defendant prevailed in first habeas, was resentenced, then brought a second habeas in which he raised a claim which could have been raised previously. Claim allowed to go forward.
Beard v. Kindler (2009), 130 S.Ct. 612 – Under the adequate state grounds doctrine a federal court will not consider claims in a habeas action where the decision of the state courts rests on an adequate basis in state law. This applies even when the state court has discretion to consider or reject a claim. Pennsylvania resident convicted of capital murder escaped to Canada. Pennsylvania courts denied relief on post-verdict motions applying the state‘s fugitive forfeiture law. Back in custody petitioner unsuccessfully sought to reinstate the post-verdict motions. State court ruled the trial judge had not abused his discretion when motions were dismissed.
Wall v. Kholi (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1278 – In addition to conventional state postconviction Rhode Island provides for collateral review of sentences. Time for filing federal habeas runs from the conclusion of whichever action is decided last.
Lawrence v. Florida (2007), 127 S.Ct. 1079 -- The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition is not tolled while a petition for a writ of certiorari is pending from the denial of postconviction relief by state courts.
Fuqua v. Williams, 100 Ohio St. 3d 211, 2003-Ohio-5533 -- Syllabus: "A habeas corpus action is a civil action and therefore the provisions of R.C. 2969.21 through 2969.27 are applicable to such action."
Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St. 3d 323, 2001-Ohio-49 -- (1) At. p. 326: "(T)he burden of proof in a case alleging excessive bail is, as in other habeas corpus cases, on the petitioner." (2) At P. 327: The Supreme Court has plenary power to consider an action seeking an extraordinary writ as if it had been filed in that court. Remand upon finding of error is not always necessary. (3) At. p. 328: A habeas action must be dismissed if neither petitioner nor counsel has verified the petition by swearing the truth of the facts contained therein. (4) Superseding indictment alleging additional offenses committed while defendant was released on bail justified increase in the amount of bail.
Clinkscale v. Carter (6th Cir. 2004), 375 F.3d 430, cert. denied 2005 WL 407121, 73 USLW 3363 -- It was ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital case to file a notice of alibi after the jury was empaneled. The trial judge refused to allow the testimony of three witnesses who would have placed the defendant in Youngstown at the time of a homicide in Columbus. The exhaustion requirement was satisfied by the direct appeal and an attempt at review by the Supreme Court. The court of appeals' suggestion the defendant pursue his claim in a postconviction action had no bearing on the exhaustion determination. The court of appeals refusal to address the constitutional claim on its merits means the merits are addressed de novo in federal court. AEDPA deference doesn't apply. Nullifies State v. Clinkscale (December 23, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1586.
Cornell v. Schotten (1994), 69 Ohio St. 3d 466 -- The failure to attach a copy of the cause of detention to a petition for habeas corpus results in the petition being fatally defective. See R.C. 2725.04(D); State ex rel. Parker v. Ohio Parole Board (1993), 68 Ohio St. 3d 23; Hadlock v. McFaul (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d 24.
State ex rel Gilmore v. Mitchell (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 302 -- Petition properly dismissed because of failure to attach a copy of the challenged juvenile court bindover entry. Also should have attached common pleas court sentencing entries.
Freeman v. Tate (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 440 -- The doctrine of res judicata applies to successive habeas corpus petitions. Also see State ex rel. Childs v. Lazaroff (2001), 90 Ohio St. 3d 519.
Gaskins v. Shiplevy (1995), 74 Ohio St. 3d 149 -- Civil Rules may apply to habeas actions when not clearly inapplicable by their nature. Thus, petitioner in habeas proceedings was entitled to add an additional cause of action pursuant to Civil Rule 15(A), which allows amendment of pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is filed.

Claims Which may be Raised

Thompson v. Gansheimer, 116 Ohio St. 3d 349, 2007-Ohio-6666 – The five days allowed for transporting convicts to prison is merely advisory. The failure to do so is not cognizable in habeas corpus.
State ex rel. Golson v. Moore, 116 Ohio St. 3d 308, 2007-Ohio-6434 – Habeas is not a viable avenue for a Foster claim.
Patterson v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 120 Ohio St. 3d 311, 2008-Ohio-6147 – Habeas does not lie to challenge placement on postrelease control upon notice from the Adult Parole Authority. In the court‘s view appeal from the sentence provided an adequate remedy at law.
State ex rel. Anderson v. Wichtman, 160 Ohio App. 3d 585, 2005-Ohio-1882 -- Community control violator could not be sent to prison because the trial court had not stated a potential maximum prison term at sentencing, but he was subject to being held for up to six months in a community based correctional facility. Habeas lies to challenge confinement beyond this term. Writ granted. Petitioner was not challenging the sentence itself.
Smith v. Leis, 165 Ohio App. 3d 581, 2006-Ohio-450 -- After the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction based on an incorrect ruling on a motion to suppress evidence the trial court set a "$500,000, no 10%" bond pending the state's effort to take the case to the Supreme Court. Court concludes that the defendant was entitled to release on recognizance. Sheriff's appeal dismissed as moot since the defendant had been released and no charges were pending. Smith v. Leis, 111 Ohio St. 3d 493, 2006-Ohio-6113. The opinion provides a primmer on excessive bail habeas actions. Related case: State v. Smith, 163 Ohio App. 3d 567, 2005-Ohio-5204.
Yutze v. Copelan (1923), 109 Ohio St. 171 -- Syllabus: "A writ of habeas corpus will not lie, to test the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, in favor of one who has been convicted, where the criminal court wherein conviction was obtained had jurisdiction or power to determine the question of constitutionality. In such case the writ cannot be made a substitute for proceedings in error." Also see Ex parte Elicker (1927), 117 Ohio St. 500.
In re Jackson (1988), 36 Ohio St. 3d 189 -- Appeal and not habeas corpus is proper remedy to challenge alleged violations of right to speedy trial. Also see In re Singer (1976), 45 Ohio St. 2d 130. Appeal has also been held the appropriate remedy for the following claims: double jeopardy [Foran v. Maxwell (1962), 173 Ohio St. 561]; sufficiency of an indictment [Kroger v. Engle (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 165; Chapman v. Jago (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 51]; irregularities at trial [Cantrell v. Maxwell (1962), 174 Ohio St. 51]; questions relating to evidence [State, ex rel. Burch, v. Morris (1986), 25 Ohio St. 3d 18; Saulsbury v. Green (1964), 175 Ohio St. 433; Spence v. Sacks (1962), 173 Ohio St. 419]; guilt or innocence [Simpson v. Maxwell (1964), 1 Ohio St. 2d 71]; perjury by witnesses and separation of the jury [White v. Maxwell (1963), 174 Ohio St. 186]; sentencing errors [Blackburn v. Jago (1988), 39 Ohio St. 3d 139; Ex parte Van Hagan (1874), 25 Ohio St. 426]; competency of counsel [Rodriguez v. Sacks (1962), 173 Ohio St. 456]; failure to furnish a bill of particulars [Douglas v. Maxwell (1962), 174 Ohio St. 92]; validity of prior convictions used in an habitual criminal proceeding [Cook v. Maxwell (1964), 177 Ohio St. 18]; failure of counsel to appear [Henderson v. Maxwell (1964), 176 Ohio St. 187]. Note that these issues may be raised on direct or delayed appeal or in a post conviction action.
State ex rel Larkins v. Baker (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 658 -- Failure to strictly comply with R.C. 2945.05, by placing a properly executed jury waiver in the file but not having it file stamped and formally made a part of the record, is not a jurisdictional defect cognizable in habeas corpus and did not affect the court's authority to proceed with a bench trial. See dissent.
Jackson v. Dallman (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 261 -- When a properly executed waiver of the right to trial by jury does not appear in the file, a court is without jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial. Writ of habeas corpus granted. Affidavit by the prosecutor that the defendant signed a waiver is of no consequence. Also see State ex rel Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 185.
State ex rel. Bruggeman v. Leonard (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 298 -- (1) At 299: "Habeas corpus will not issue to raise claims of insufficiency of evidence or erroneous jury instructions." (2) OK for court of appeals to assess costs to petitioner since records showed he averaged $1.31 per week on pizza and ice cream.
Kaiser v. Hall (1970), 24 Ohio St. 2d 23 -- Grand jury witness was found in contempt and jailed for refusal to answer questions. Habeas action became moot upon his release.
Luna v. Russell (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 561 -- Habeas corpus is not available to attack the validity or sufficiency of an indictment. The remedy lies in direct appeal. Also see State ex rel. Wilcox v. Seidner (1996), 76 Ohio St. 3d 412; Marshall v. Lazaroff (1997), 77 Ohio St. 3d 443; State ex rel. Massie v. Rogers (1997), 77 Ohio St. 3d 449.
Brown v. Leonard (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 593 -- Habeas does not lie to assert a speedy trial claim or a sentencing error. Also see Prather v. Brigano (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 609.
Styer v. Brichta (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 738 -- Habeas does lie where accused has not been afforded a preliminary hearing within the time specified by R.C. 2945.71.
In re Zilba (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 258 -- Writ granted where after defendant began serving term of probation the judge decided probation had been ill-advised and imposed prison sentence.
Wenzel v. Enright (1993), 68 Ohio St. 3d 63 -- Syllabus: "(1) The decision of a trial court denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy is not a final appealable order, and is not subject to judicial review through an action in habeas corpus or prohibition, or any other action or proceeding invoking the original jurisdiction of an appellate court. (2) In Ohio, the proper remedy for seeking judicial review of the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy is a direct appeal to the court of appeals at the conclusion of the trial court proceedings." Also see Borsick v. State (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 258.
Harpster v. Ohio (1997), 128 F.3d 322 -- Since Ohio law does not provide for interlocutory appeal of double jeopardy claims, such matters may be raised through habeas corpus in federal court.
Beatty v. Alston (1975), 43 Ohio St. 2d 126 -- Habeas relief denied in the following circumstances: Defendant was tried before one judge but failed to appear for sentencing. When he appeared in arraignment court with new charges, the presiding judge disposed of both the new charges and the charge on which sentence had not been imposed. When the first judge found out, he vacated this sentence and imposed one that was more severe.
In re Petition for Mallory (1985), 17 Ohio St. 3d 34 -- Probation was revoked on the basis of a CCW conviction which was reversed on appeal and subsequently dismissed in the trial court. Writ of habeas corpus granted and defendant ordered released. Once the second conviction was nullified, revocation was outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
In re Petition of Brown (1989), 49 Ohio St. 3d 222 -- Habeas does not lie to raise claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as appeal provides an adequate remedy at law. [Remedy is provided by App. R. 26(B).]
State ex rel. Frazer et al. (1996), 107 Ohio App. 3d 245 -- Habeas corpus does not lie to challenge a contempt finding. Appeal is the proper remedy.
Roden v. Hubbard (1981), 65 Ohio St. 2d 37 -- Notwithstanding R.C. 5122.30, habeas relief is not available to a person who is involuntarily hospitalized after being found not guilty by reason of insanity who has an adequate remedy through periodic review.
Reid v. Morris (1990), 70 Ohio App. 3d 807 -- Habeas lies to challenge the jurisdiction of the court to order continuing confinement (here of person found NGRI), regardless of the availability of an appeal.
State, ex rel. Dixon, v. Gold (1991), 76 Ohio App. 3d 518 -- Habeas action contesting confinement of person hospitalized after being found NGRI lies in county of confinement and not county where trial was held.

Juveniles and Child Custody

In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St. 3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, ¶6 -- "Like other extraordinary-writ actions, habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St. 3d 412, 2003-Ohio-4128 -- Mother who claimed to have missed termination of parental rights hearing because of lack of notice brought a habeas action. Held that she had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a previous unsuccessful appeal. Also held she would not necessarily have been entitled to custody as it would not have been in the child's best interest to release him to a crackhead who had stopped visiting.
Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper 93 Ohio St. 3d 614, 2001-Ohio-1803 -- State v. Hanning 89 Ohio St. 3d 86, 2000-Ohio-436 applies retroactively because it states the law as it is deemed always to have been, and does not state a new rule of law. It applies for the benefit of a juvenile who pleaded guilty in adult court and did not pursue an appeal or postconviction relief since the faulty bindover procedure deprives the adult court of jurisdiction. Also see Agee v. Russell 92 Ohio St. 3d 540, 2001-Ohio-1279.
In re Black (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 124 -- The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have original jurisdiction in habeas actions concerning juveniles. The exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court as to matters concerning minors concerns only statutory, as opposed to constitutional jurisdiction.
Lemley v. Kaiser (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 258 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "A writ of habeas corpus may properly issue, directing the return of a child to its parent, or, in the alternative, to reveal the location of the child to the juvenile court, to those respondents (here two attorneys who had arranged a private adoption) who are the last known persons to have knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and who facilitated the illegal custody resulting from the unlawful placement of such child with unknown custodians."
Marich v. Knox County Dept. of Human Services (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 163 -- Habeas corpus lies to effect a minor parent's right to custody of a child permanently surrendered to the custody of a child welfare agency as the result of undue influence.
McNeal v. Miami County Children Services Board (1992), 64 Ohio St. 3d 208 -- In very limited circumstances involving child custody where time is of the essence, habeas corpus may be an alternative to appeal (but not in this case). For a case where habeas was allowed to proceed see Marich v. Knox County Dept. of Human Services (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 163.
Barneby v. Zschach (1995), 71 Ohio St. 3d 588 -- Habeas is not available to natural mother contesting adoption proceedings, even though she appears likely to prevail. Proceeding by motion in the probate court is an adequate remedy to regain physical custody.
State ex rel Fryerson v. Tate (1999), 84 Ohio St. 3d 481 -- Juvenile was bound over for crimes against A, but convicted only for crimes against B. Majority and dissenters split on whether the issue is jurisdictional and thus the proper subject of a habeas action. The minority finds that the controlling version of R.C. 2151.26 effectively overruled State v. Adams (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 120, and limits jurisdiction to those offenses bound over by the juvenile court. Majority sidesteps merits by finding defendant had an adequate remedy at law in the form of direct appeal raising this issue.


In re Rowe (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 115 -- Extradition to another state may be contested by means of habeas corpus. Under federal law. a demanding state is not entitled to the return of one who was not corporally present in that state at the time the offense was committed (Ohio law is broader). The accused bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state. Also see State v. Barone (1984), 21 Ohio App. 3d 97; Bradley v. Hickey (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 277.
In re Hollander (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 282 -- In a habeas action contesting extradition, the court may not consider the merits of the case or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Also see In re Terry (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d 133.
Carpenter v. Jamerson (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 308 -- Syllabus: "A proceeding in habeas corpus brought in an asylum state by a fugitive from justice arrested on a warrant of extradition is a summary proceeding and very limited in scope. (2) The term 'fugitive from justice' as contemplated by the extradition statutes includes an individual who violates the conditions of his probation."
Ruther v. Sweeney (1956), 75 Ohio Law Abs. 385 -- Bail may be set during pendency of habeas action contesting extradition unless the underlying offense is not bailable. Also see R.C. 2963.14 (bail).

Parole and Release

Wilkinson v. Dotson (1005), 125 S.Ct. 1242 -- Inmates may pursue a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming Ohio's parole eligibility procedures violate the federal constitution. Inmates are not limited to habeas relief. Section 1983 remains available where success would not necessarily lead to immediate release. Claims for future relief do not necessarily imply current confinement is invalid.
State ex rel. Bray v. Brigano 93 Ohio St. 3d 458, 2001-Ohio-1587 -- (1) APA's failure to follow its own guidelines does not entitle an inmate to release from prison. (2) An inmate has no due process right to have errors excised from records used to determine parole eligibility. (3) Morrissey v. Brewer standards do not apply to determination of parole eligibility. (4) Failure to include required attachments meant petition was defective.
Spencer v. Kemna (1998), 523 U.S. 1 -- Federal habeas relating to parole revocation no longer presented a case or controversy once petitioner was released. Though wrongful conviction has been presumed to have continuing collateral consequences, more than possible adverse consequences must be demonstrated with respect to parole matters.
State ex rel Jackson v. McFaul (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 185, 187 -- "Due process rights are involved in parole revocation, and there is no appeal from an APA decision. Therefore, while the most common situation in which the writ of habeas corpus will issue is when the petition successfully attacks the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, see R.C. 2725.05, habeas corpus will also lie to challenge a decision of the APA in extraordinary cases involving parole revocation."
Hattie v. Anderson (1994), 68 Ohio St. 3d 232 -- Inmate had been approved for release on parole, but this was rescinded when he wrote to his parole office questioning some of the conditions. (1) Habeas corpus does not lie in these circumstances since the authority of the sentencing court was not challenged. (2) Mandamus does provide a remedy. (3) A declaratory judgment action is the proper remedy to challenge terms of release.
Coleman v. Stobbs (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 137 -- Syllabus: "A court should apply a two-part test in determining whether the delay of the Adult Parole Authority, in not commencing a final parole revocation hearing, entitles an alleged parole violator to habeas corpus relief. First, it must be determined that any delay was unreasonable. Second, if the delay is found to be unreasonable, it must be determined whether the delay somehow prejudiced the alleged parole violator." Also see Horton v. Collins (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 287; State ex rel. Williams v. McMackin (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 480.
Brewer v. Dahlberg (6th Cir. 1991), 942 F. 2d 328, 340 -- "(T)he Ohio writ of habeas corpus...is available to petitioner to review an action taken by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority where petitioner claims: (1) that his sentence and parole have already been served, (2) that because the judgment of the sentencing court has already been satisfied, it no longer has jurisdiction over him, and (3) therefore, the OAPA no longer has custody over him and did not have the authority to reincarcerate him under his satisfied state sentence." Also see King v. Dallman (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 43.

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