About the Office
Mission, Vision, and Values
Death Penalty Department
Clemency and Schedule
Mitigation & Investigation
Wrongful Conviction Project
Policy & Outreach
Policy & Outreach
Forensic Training Unit
OPD Training Materials
Welcome To The Library
Criminal Law Casebook
Pro Se Resources
Immigration Reference Guide
Standards & Guidelines
Attorney Billing Program
Contact the Office
Contact our Staff
Criminal Law Casebook
Probation and Community Control
Probation and Community Control
Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from:
David L. Strait
Franklin County Public Defender Office
-- Community control.
-- Residential sanctions.
Criminal Rule 32.3 -- Presentence Investigation.
Criminal Rule 32.3 -- Revocation of probation.
State v. Jacobs
, 189 Ohio App. 3d 283,
– For a felony a court may not impose both a prison term and community control. Upon remand, if the defendant has completed the prison term, he may not be sentenced to community control. A court may not impose a lifetime ban from the premises of a shopping mall as community control sanctions are limited to five years. While an indigent may be fined, the record must demonstrate the court considered ability to pay.
State v. Walton
(2000), 137 Ohio App. 3d 450, 457 -- "...(A) misdemeanor offender has no right to refuse probation and to demand to serve her sentence of imprisonment." Unlicensed driver was headed to prison for eight months and wanted six month traffic sentence served concurrently. Instead, the judge put her on probation. Outcome might have been different if conditions of probation were onerous. Dissent would limit duration of "suspended" sentence to prison term.
State v. Preston
, 155 Ohio App. 3d 367,
-- A felon may not be placed on community control without the completion of a presentence investigation, even when community control is jointly recommended.
State v. Ramsey
, Wood App. No. 01-CR-287,
-- Blended sentences are permitted. Defendant received prison on one count, community control on another.
State v. Smith
(1989), 42 Ohio St. 3d 60 -- Syllabus: "(1) The courts of common pleas do not have inherent power to suspend execution of a sentence in a criminal case and may order such suspension only as authorized by statute. (
Municipal Court v. State, ex rel. Platter
(1935), 126 Ohio St. 103...paragraph three of the syllabus, approved and followed.) (2) The unequivocal prohibition contained in
precludes the trial court from granting probation where actual incarceration is a mandated aspect of the defendant's sentence."
State v. Roberts
(1986), 33 Ohio App 3d 201 -- In felony cases,
permits the court to suspend the sentence and place the offender on probation at any time prior to when he is delivered into the custody of the institution, even when the defendant has been released for an extended period while his appeal was pending.
State v. Ervin
(1994), 93 Ohio App. 3d 178 -- If the defendant is found guilty of an offense committed with a firearm, he is ineligible for probation, even though the jury has acquitted him on a firearm specification. See dissent. Also see
State v. Nowlin
(1996), 115 Ohio App. 3d 778 (non-probationable though pleaded to offense without specification);
State v. Hawk
(1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 296;
State v. Jones
(1989), 65 Ohio App. 3d 282;
State v. Theiss
(1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 251. Different result under post 1996 sentencing laws.
State v. Barnett
(1999), 131 Ohio App. 3d 137 -- CCW exception did not make defendant also convicted of weapon under a disability eligible for probation. Pre 7-1-96 case.
State v. Luckett
(1995), 101 Ohio App. 3d 330 -- The provision in
that when a person is convicted of a drug abuse offense, the court shall take into consideration whether he cooperated with the authorities in furnishing information in making its determination whether to grant probation, does not mean that a person becomes ineligible for probation when such information is not forthcoming.
State v. Smith
(1986), 31 Ohio App. 3d 26 -- A conviction for a prior offense is only prima facie evidence that a person is a "repeat offender" and ineligible for probation. Other factors may be considered and such a person is not automatically disqualified from receiving probation.
State v. Cole
(1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 288 -- Court committed plain error by finding defendant a "dangerous offender," ineligible for probation under former
, relying on two offenses arising from a single incident and an arrest record, unsupported by underlying facts.
North Olmstead v. Cipiti
(1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 549, 553 -- Where defendant has already served time in excess of the maximum sentence awaiting trial, he may not be sentenced to probation.
State v. Shainoff
(1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d 129 -- Attempted rape is a probationable offense. Also see
State v. Long
(1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 663.
Terms and Conditions
Last updated 3/1/2016
State v. Intihar
, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-05-046,
Trial court's decision prohibiting appellant from purchasing, owning, possessing, using, or having under his control, any deadly weapons or firearms as part of the conditions of his probation at all times and under any circumstances reversed and remanded so that the trial court may determine whether such a restriction serves the statutory ends of probation or whether it is so overly broad that it unnecessarily impinges upon appellant's liberty as a guardsman with the Ohio National Guard.
State v. Andrasak
, 194 Ohio App. 3d 838,
– Defendant was sentenced to five years of community control on drug charges. In court she was ordered to have no contact with two men, one of whom she claimed was her husband. Initial entry stated she was to have no contact with “codefendants.” Purported nunc pro tunc entry stated she was to have no contact with three individuals designated as codefendants. One was the purported husband, the other her son. (1) As to the husband, there was no objection in court, and the Court of Appeals refuses to reverse as plain error as it is not convinced the individual named is a husband. (2) As to the son, generally no contact with a spouse or child is not an acceptable term of probation. Basis for reversal though is failure to mention no contact with the son when sentence was pronounced. Late addition is not an appropriate use of a nunc pro tunc entry.
State v. Bowser
, 186 Ohio App. 3d 162,
– Defendant was indicted for gross sexual imposition of a mentally impaired person. Victim was his former stepdaughter who claimed sexual intercourse took place. Plea was to misdemeanor child endangerment. Terms of community control included supervision by a sex offender specialist and participation in a program for male sex offenders. Court rejects claim this was an abuse of discretion because of the non-sexual nature of the offense pled to. A court may broadly consider the underling facts. Nor do the conditions violate substantive due process.
State v. Eversole
, 182 Ohio App. 3d 290,
– As a condition of judicial release the defendant was required to have potential sex partners come to the probation department with him and obtain "court approval" upon providing a notarized statement they were aware the defendant had HIV/AIDS. Majority declines review of the appropriateness of this condition as the defendant failed to appeal when it was imposed. Dissent finds it inappropriate. Defendant was claimed to have engaged in sexual relations with another couple. Only the woman had been to the probation office. Man may or may not have been credible and allegedly came forward when the woman left him for the defendant. Majority finds revocation was appropriate.
State v. Aberegg
, 191 Ohio App. 3d. 345,
– Defendant was convicted of telecommunications harassment based on calls to city hall. As a condition of community control defendant was ordered to stay off the property of the City of Wadsworth. Condition was overly broad. App.R. 26(B) case.
In re D.S.
, 111 Ohio St. 3d 361,
-- A full disclosure polygraph examination is not a reasonable term of juvenile community control absent evidence it is particularly suited to the facts of the offense. ¶19: "The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a person on community control who claims privilege to give answers that might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), 465 U.S. 420, 426." Reverses
In re D.S.
, 160 Ohio App. 3d 552,
State v. Cowen
, 167 Ohio App. 3d 233,
-- M-4 defendant was given mostly suspended jail time, but was ordered to serve more than the maximum jail term under electronic home detention. EHDP is not the equivalent of jail time. No statutory provision controlling EHDP limits the term
State v. Talty
103 Ohio St. 3d 177,
-- As a condition of community control the defendant was ordered to "make all reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving another child." Such an antiprocreational order is overbroad and invalid. The court avoids determining whether procreation is a fundamental right, adopting a two-step review, beginning with the reasonableness test stated in
State v. Jones
(1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 51. Only if a condition passes this test, and a fundamental right is involved, will the court apply a strict scrutiny test. For reasonableness review, community control is no different from probation. Citing
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
(1973), 411 U.S. 778, 782, community control is not an "act of grace" permitting restrictions comparable to imprisonment.
State v. Lake
, 150 Ohio App. 3d 408,
-- Defendant was convicted of domestic violence. Court found he was an alcoholic and as a community control sanction ruled he should not have driving privileges. (1) No appeal was taken from the initial order, but the court allowed a delayed appeal and granted relief. (2) The court was without authority to terminate the license pursuant to
. For such suspensions the controlling definition requires three or more OMVI convictions within the immediate three year period. The defendant had none. (3) Denial of driving privileges was not reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the offender. (4) The court incorrectly determined it was without authority to modify the conditions of community control previously imposed. (5) The Department of Motor Vehicles does not have authority to modify the terms of community control.
State v. Geiger
, 169 Ohio App. 3d 374,
-- Defendant convicted of personating an officer was unhappy about an order that he stay off the grounds of a retirement home where a relative had become a resident. Order was improper because it did not meet the requirement that a community control sanction have a specified duration not exceeding five years.
State v. King
, 151 Ohio App. 3d 346,
-- Maintaining a conventional haircut and remaining clean-shaven were not appropriate conditions of community control. Community service was appropriate in view of acknowledgment it would have to be suitable for a paraplegic.
State v. Robinson
, Greene App. No. 2003 CA 101,
-- Record did not demonstrated curfew and drug testing conditions were reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender and had some relationship to the protection order violation offense he was convicted of.
State v. Craft
, Greene App. No. 2001-CA-128,
-- Conditions of community control banning even fleeting, unintended, contact with juvenile females and frequenting any park where a minor might be present are overbroad. Compare
Lakewood v. Dorton
, Cuyahoga App. No. 81043,
where it was held proper to bar only unsupervised contact with children under 18.
State v. Jahnke
, 148 Ohio App. 3d 77,
-- Defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. As a condition of probation he was ordered to have no contact with his pregnant fiance for five years. Condition had no relationship to the crime, was not reasonably related to rehabilitation, did not serve the statutory ends of probation, and encroached upon the defendant's fundamental rights.
State v. Thompson
, 150 Ohio App. 3d 641,
-- As a condition of community control, defendant was to have no contact with minors without the approval of the probation department. He was found a violator after marrying a sixteen-year old. Condition held to have unlawfully interfered with a lawful relationship. Marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. See dissent finding the violation lay in failing to notify the probation department he was seeing someone in a proscribed manner before the marriage.
State v. Paxton
(2000), 139 Ohio App. 3d 48 -- Defendant was sentenced to community control including orders to serve sixty days in jail and up to sixty additional days at the discretion of the probation officer in the event of minor infractions. Delegation to the probation officer in this manner is a denial of due process. Court sidesteps determining whether it also violates separation of powers.
State v. Sturgeon
(2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d 882 -- Community control sanction that defendant have no contact with his children for four years is invalid, amounting to a termination of parental rights without due process. Also see
State v. Burton
, Hamilton App. Nos. C-020014, C-020203,
State v. McClure
, Hamilton App. No. C-040099,
where a mother included her children in her attempt to commit suicide.
State v. Robinson
(2001), 146 Ohio App. 3d 344 -- Defendant was convicted of interference with custody after travelling to Indiana with his underage girlfriend. Condition of probation that he stay away from the victim was valid only until her eighteenth birthday.
State v. Wright
(2000), 137 Ohio App. 3d 737 -- Condition that defendant convicted of felony OMVI stay out of places where alcoholic beverages are sold, distributed, served or given away is vague and overbroad.
United States v. Knights
(2001), 122 S.Ct. 587 -- The Fourth Amendment does not limit searches pursuant to a condition of probation to those undertaken with a probationary purpose. Deputy who was aware of the condition conducted a warrantless search of the apartment of a person believed linked to acts of vandalism at utility company facilities. The search was supported by reasonable suspicion, which is sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. Court does not decide whether consent to the condition by itself would validate such searches.
State v. Drew
, Cuyahoga App. No. 83563,
-- A court may not order repayment of attorney fees without affirmatively determining on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to pay some or all of the expense of legal services rendered.
State v. Owens
(November 21, 1978), Franklin County App. No. 78AP-374, unreported (1978 Opinions 3214) -- At page 3217: "Although a trial court may not impose arbitrary and offensive conditions, which would significantly burden the defendant in the exercise of his liberty and those that would bear only a remote relationship to the crime committed, and bear little or no relationship to the probation objectives of education and rehabilitation of the defendant, still a court may exact reasonable conditions." Also see
Tabor v. Maxwell
(1963), 175 Ohio St. 373;
State v. Maynard
(1988), 47 Ohio App. 3d 76;
State v. Livingston
(1976), 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 196.
State v. Jackson
(1997), 123 Ohio App. 3d 22 -- Defendant was placed on probation and immediately taken for a drug test, which she flunked. The judge resentenced, still granting probation, but with additional conditions. Court was without authority to vacate original sentence. Drugs were taken before sentencing and probation could not be violated until sentence was journalized.
State v. Shelton
(1989), 63 Ohio App. 3d 137 -- A court may not make reimbursement of the cost of appointed counsel a condition of probation, nor may such expense be taxes as costs. Compare
State v. McLean
(1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 392 upholding such a condition and furnishing some discussion of consequences should failure to pay become an issue in probation revocation proceedings.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker
(1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 92 -- Public reprimand to former judge who made marriage a condition of probation in several domestic violence cases.
State v. Richard
(1996), 113 Ohio App. 3d 141 -- Tubal ligation and birth control are matters beyond the reach of the judiciary, and may not be made conditions of probation.
State v. Mueller
(1997), 122 Ohio App. 3d 482 -- A court may not make it a condition of probation that a defendant convicted of domestic violence execute a quit claim deed turning over to the victim his interest in jointly owned real estate.
State v. Conkle
(1998), 129 Ohio App. 3d 177 -- Husband convicted of domestic violence was ordered to have no contact with wife, her residence or property during the term of probation. Affirmed. Also see
State v. Brillhart
(1998), 129 Ohio App. 3d 180, decided by the same panel. -- Same condition upheld with respect to wife, but not as to children, even though one child saw the assault.
State v. Moine
(1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d 584 -- It is improper to make no arrests for OMVI or driving under suspension a condition of probation. Mere arrest may not be a basis for violation of probation.
State v. Kidwell
(February 16, 1995), Franklin Co. App. No. 94APA06-883, unreported (1995 Opinions 558) -- (1) A court may not make it a condition of probation that there be no further arrests for domestic violence. (2) A defendant is not required to immediately appeal imposition of such a condition. The doctrine of
does not bar litigation of the validity of the condition following probation revocation proceedings.
State v. Rigg
(1994), 92 Ohio App. 3d 113 -- Adult was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor after becoming sexually involved with Wireman, a 17 year old friend of her son, who had been released into her custody under house arrest. As Wireman was now of age, it was improper to make it a condition of her probation that she have no contact with him.
Casdorph v. Kohl
(1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d 294 -- A condition of probation that the probationer leave the state and not return for five years is unconstitutional.
State v. Williams
(1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 70 -- Former school board member was convicted of theft based on welfare fraud. Condition of probation that she not hold public office during term of probation held to have been proper.
State v. Graham
(1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 751 -- For a CPA convicted of a securities violation, it was not error to impose a condition of probation that he cease operation of his accounting business and not perform general accounting services for the public for five years.
State v. Donnelly
(1996), 109 Ohio App. 3d 604 -- It was proper to make it a condition of probation that city finance official pay costs of an audit related to convictions for theft in office and tampering with records.
In re Miller
(1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 81 -- Juvenile was found guilty of domestic violence following an altercation with his brother. Terms of probation that the defendant not dress as a female, not associate with Joe Wicks, and not go to Caesar's were invalid as they bore no relationship to the original charge, did not relate to conduct in itself criminal, did not serve the statutory ends of probation, and infringed upon First Amendment freedoms.
State v. Bush
(1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 717 -- As a term of probation, defendant could be ordered to pay as "restitution" the cost of counselling for the victims. Court acknowledges this could not be ordered except as a term of probation.
State v. Demosthene
(1992), 78 Ohio App. 3d 421 -- It was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant who pleaded guilty to an assault arising from a bar fight to stay out of places serving or selling intoxicants. (What if second fight had taken place outside a restaurant with a liquor license?)
State v. Krug
(1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 595 -- It was improper to suspend the operator's license of a defendant convicted of domestic violence who in the process of the offense had driven his wife from a convenience store to their home. (1) Suspension was not authorized under
allowing suspension when an auto is used in the commission of a felony as that section only applies where an auto has been used as a weapon, to transport contraband, or is the subject of the crime charged. The section does not apply to mere use for transportation. (2) The suspension could not be justified as a special condition of probation pursuant to
. Also see
State v. Watkins
(1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 195.
Lakewood v. Hartman
(1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 275 -- Installation of an ignition interlock device held to be a proper term of probation for a defendant convicted for driving without a license in view of four prior OMVI's and eight convictions for driving under a suspension during the previous four years.
State v. Pessefall
(1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 222 -- Generally worded requirement that the defendant obtain and use a speed control device was improperly imposed as a condition of probation.
Columbus v. Harmon
(September 27, 1990), Franklin County App. No. 89AP-1412, unreported (1990 Opinions 4327) -- Suspension of driving privileges and order not to drive are not proper terms of probation when the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct, reduced from public indecency.
State v. Maynard
(1988), 47 Ohio App. 3d 76 -- Probation condition restricting contact with Department of Corrections and related agencies on behalf of other prisoners held unreasonable. Also see
State v. Bilder
(1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d 135.
Columbus v. Davis
(May 30, 1991), Franklin County App. No. 90AP-1423, unreported (1991 Opinions 2536) -- Court may not impose a five year driver's rights suspension as a condition of probation when by statute (
) no more than a one year suspension could be imposed for that offense.
Columbus v. Barnes
(April 27, 1989), Franklin County App. Nos. 88AP-968 through 971, unreported (1989 Opinions 1418) -- When the court has imposed consecutive jail sentences reaching the eighteen month limit specified by
R.C. 2929.41(D) and (E)(4)
, it may not suspend an additional term of incarceration as a condition of probation.
State v. Jones
(1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 51 -- Probation condition that defendant have no contact with juveniles who are not relatives was not unreasonable following conviction for multiple counts of contributing to the delinquency or unruliness of minors.
State v. Friend
(1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 241 -- Order that the defendant complete payment on accident settlement agreement from an tangentially related incident was an unreasonable condition of probation.
Extension; Modification of Terms
State v. Shelton
, 165 Ohio App. 3d 142,
-- In resolving revocation proceedings, the court was permitted to extend the term of community control from three years to five, and to increase the indicated prison term as well.
State v. Fanti
147 Ohio App. 3d 27,
-- In 1989 defendant pled guilty to eight counts. He was sent to prison on four and granted probation on the rest, to begin after release. Probation revocation proceedings later on resulted in the defendant being sent off to serve a prison term, first on two of the remaining counts, and later on two more. Reversed.
tolls running of probation only during incarceration for offenses committed after commencement of the probationary period.
State v. Brooks
, 163 Ohio App. 3d 241,
-- The version of the sentencing statutes in effect at the time of the offense remains in effect unless the defendant is entitled to beneficial amendment pursuant to
. An amended version of
tolls time when a person sentenced to community control is in prison. The version under which the defendant was sentenced did not. Ex parte order tolling running of community control was an unlawful modification of the sentence, following ex post facto reasoning.
Davis v. Wolfe
92 Ohio St. 3d 549,
-- Habeas relief for inmate who claimed revocation of his probation came after his term of probation had expired. While the probationary period was tolled during the time he was in custody on a domestic violence charge, it began to run again after he was released on bond.
State v. Bolden
, Montgomery App. No. 19907,
-- Due process and double jeopardy violations found in shift from non- reporting to reporting probation without a hearing and proof original terms of probation were violated. State conceded as well that courts do not have absolute authority to revoke probation upon nonpayment of fines and costs. Also see
State v. Mohamed
, Cuyahoga App. No. 84615,
(transfer to supervision by the sex-offender unit).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Wichtman
, 160 Ohio App. 3d 585,
-- Community control violator could not be sent to prison because the trial court failed to state a potential maximum prison term at sentencing, but he was subject to being held for up to six months in a community based correctional facility. Habeas lies to challenge confinement beyond this term. Writ granted. Petitioner was not challenging the sentence itself.
State v. Daugherty
, 165 Ohio App. 3d 115,
-- Before the expiration of one year of probation, defendant was jailed for contempt for failure to perform any of the hours of community service ordered. While the proceedings may have satisfied the requirements for probation revocation, a failure to perform community service would be indirect contempt,. The court did not properly charge him with indirect contempt and the proceedings resembled those punishing direct contempt.
State v. Ham
, 170 Ohio App. 3d 38,
-- Under former misdemeanor probation statutes courts could not revoke probation, impose jail time, then extend probation.
Cleveland v. Clemons
(1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d 212 -- A court may not add a condition of probation without the defendant being present. In open court a drug test requirement was added to terms of probation for a number of probationers, none of whom were present. The defendant submitted to testing and had his probation revoked based upon the results. Reversed. Condition was not valid.
State v. Hayes
(1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 110 -- Court is without authority to add conditions of probation, without the consent of the probationer, after he has begun to serve his sentence.
State v. Griffin
(1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d 696 -- Six weeks after imposing a split sentence of jail time, to be served concurrently with 11 years of prison time, and community control, court
and without notice to the defendant tolled the period of community control until after release. Without a violation of the original terms, the court was without authority to do so.
State v. Hooks
(1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d 750 -- After GSI defendant received five years of community control sanctions, but without any violation of their terms, the court added a requirement that he vacate his home within seven days, out of concern for the family which had moved into an upstairs apartment. Reversed.
Columbus v. Todd
(1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d 774 -- (1) Probation may not be extended where the defendant has agreed to perform community service. (2) A court may not extend probation without a rational basis. Only reason apparent upon the record was the judge's misunderstanding of the law applicable to the transfer of license plates to a newly purchased vehicle.
State v. McMullen
(1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 244 -- Syllabus: "A judge may, pursuant to
, impose a longer sentence after revocation of a defendant's probation without violating the defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy. (
United States v. DiFrancesco
, 449 U.S. 117, followed.)" Also see
State v. Emerick
(1995), 108 Ohio App. 3d 401 Same does not apply to shock probation. See
State v. Draper
(1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 81.
State v. Meyer
(1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 4 -- When shock probation is revoked, the court may change the original term of incarceration to one of actual incarceration.
State v. Draper
(1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 81, distinguished. See dissent.
State v. Simpson
(1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 40, 440 N.E. 2d 617 -- Probationer must be declared an absconder to toll running of period of probation. Court may not validly extend period of probation without notice to probationer.
In re Townsend
(1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d 136 -- The term "absconds" as used in
can include a probationer who willfully fails to report to his probation officer even though he may have remained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In order to toll the running of the probationary period the state need not prove that the defendant left the jurisdiction.
Conditional Probation of a Drug Dependent Person
Treatment in Lieu of Conviction
State v. Lampkin
(1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 341 -- A hearing on eligibility for conditional probation for treatment is required when the request is made in a timely manner. Compare
State v. Baker
(1995), 99 Ohio App. 3d 718 where passing consideration was given conditional probation at sentencing, and this was found enough to satisfy the hearing requirement of
State v. Bush
(1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 407 -- To be eligible for conditional probation for treatment, an offender must otherwise be eligible for probation under the terms of
. Numerous prior convictions and probation violations rendered defendant ineligible as a repeat offender
State v. Riley
(1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 420 -- It was error not to advise a defendant who asked that he be placed on probation for aggravated trafficking that he had the right to request conditional probation for treatment. At p. 423: "The trial court has a mandatory duty to advise an eligible defendant of his right to request conditional probation under
if the court has reason to believe that the defendant is or may become drug dependent, and there is no statutory limit on the way a reasonable belief may be engendered." Also see
State v. Pruitt
(1984), 18 Ohio App. 3d 50. Compare
State v. Boyd
(1994), 95 Ohio App. 3d 679 (Harmless error not to advise where D was aware of conditional probation and it was considered and rejected by the judge.)
State v. Stevens
(1978), 58 Ohio App. 2d 6 -- Decision whether or not to grant conditional probation must be made at time eligibility for regular probation is determined. Also see
State v. Wheeler
(1976), 49 Ohio Misc. 41 for the proposition that once the defendant has been delivered into the custody of the institution, the court's power to suspend execution of sentence is limited to shock probation.
State v. Ramey
(1975), 46 Ohio App. 2d 184, 188 -- While court may not grant conditional probation for treatment once the defendant has been delivered to the institution, it may utilize shock probation to accomplish the same objectives.
State v. Cooper
(1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 340 -- Court may impose conditions of probation in addition to enrolling in a treatment program. Defendant may be found in violation of terms of probation at the behest of the probation department even absent a complaint by program.
State v. Gledhill
(1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d 372 -- No due process or equal protection violation found in denial of reference for medical and psychiatric evaluation.
State v. Nagle
(1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 185 -- Syllabus: "When a defendant's sentence has been suspended and he has been placed on conditional probation pursuant to
, and later violates the terms of such probation, the trial court is not required to credit time spent in a rehabilitation facility against any sentence originally imposed.
Last updated 7/12/2016
State v. Heinz,
. Ohio Supreme Court concluded that prosecutors had a right to be there to represent the state in revocation proceedings and rejected the views of both the trial court and the appellate court, that the probation officer can represent the state in such hearings, were patently wrong because generally probation officers are not attorneys and they cannot be compelled to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.
State v. Malone
, Lucas App. No. L-03-1299,
-- Crim. R. 11 does not apply to community control revocation proceedings.
State v. McKinney
, Fairfield App. No. 03CA083,
-- Community control may not be revoked once the term has run, even if revocation proceedings commence before time has run.
State v. Smith
, Mahoning App. No. 01 CA 187,
-- Municipal court treated failure to comply with terms of probation as contempt rather than a violation of probation. The proper action would have been a motion to terminate probation. Even if contempt proceedings were appropriate, due process notice and procedural requirements for indirect contempt of court are comparable to those for probation revocation.
State v. Weaver
(2001), 141 Ohio App. 3d 512 -- Defendant was granted community control but never reported. Judge treated the initial sentence as a nullity and imposed the maximum prison sentence. (1) Formal revocation proceedings were required. (2) Conventional due process standards applied. (3) Failure to object did not waive those rights. (4) Imposition of sentence had to be in accordance with SB 2 standards, including consideration of statutory factors and findings supporting more than the minimum sentence and imposing the maximum sentence. Also see
State v. Hinton
, Franklin App. Nos. 03AP-473, 474,
State v. McConnell
(2001), 143 Ohio App. 3d 219 -- Defendant was given concurrent prison terms and later granted judicial release. Upon revocation she was given consecutive prison terms. (1) Court was without authority to do so as granting judicial release suspended original sentence, and was not the equivalent of an initial grant of community control. (2) Fleeting inquiry whether an attorney was desired was insufficient compliance with the Crim R. 32.3(B) and Crim. R. 44(C) requirement there be a written waiver of counsel.
State v. Young
, 154 Ohio App. 3d 609,
-- A prosecutor may request a hearing to determine whether there have been community control violations.
State v. Simpkins
, 120 Ohio Misc. 2d 56,
-- A prosecutor does not have standing to initiate probation revocation proceedings.
Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden
(2000), 88 Ohio App. 3d 454 -- Probation revocation proceedings must be commenced during the probationary period, which begins on the date being placed on probation is journalized.
State v. Mynhier
(2001), 146 Ohio 217 -- Failure to provide probationer with a copy of supplemental rules until after a violation was charged found to be a statutory violation, but not a violation of due process as he had previously been advised of the no contact order at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment entry, and admitted he knew he was to have no contact with his stepdaughter. Court also excuses a legion of other omissions before remanding for a new sentencing hearing because findings were not made in support of consecutive sentences. See dissent.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
(1973), 411 U.S. 778 -- A probationer facing revocation, like a parolee, is entitled to both a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions set forth in
Morrissey v. Brewer
Morrissey v. Brewer
(1972), 408 U.S. 471 -- Minimum due process standards applicable to parole or probation revocation are: (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the individual; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer finds good cause for not allowing such confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing officer; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the revocation.
State v. Delaney
(1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d 231 -- Counsel's failure to insist on compliance with due process standards may prevent relief on appeal.
State v. Jones
(1997), 123 Ohio App. 3d 144 -- Before the end of the probationary period, an order of arrest was filed by the probation department, but no judicial warrant was issued. The running of the probationary period was not tolled, thus the court was without jurisdiction to conduct a hearing after its expiration.
State v. Murr
(1987), 35 Ohio App. 3d 159 -- The judge who initially placed a defendant on probation may preside at revocation proceedings, absent a showing of undue bias, hostility or absence of neutrality.
State v. Hamm
(October 8, 1992), Franklin Co. App. No. 92AP-216, unreported (1992 Opinions 4779) -- (1) Judge should have recused himself from revocation hearing after listening privately to tapes made by complaining party and presented for ex parte review by probation officer. (2) Calls to ex wife's home, where children resided, found not to provide basis for revocation.
State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio
(1993), 82 Ohio App. 3d 52 -- Under the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers (
), Ohio court lacked authority to set bond for probationer picked up in Ohio at the request of Pennsylvania authorities.
State v. Grigsby
(1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 291, 303 -- At the time sentence is passed for a subsequent offense, the court may not summarily reactivate a previously dismissed probation violation claim and impose sentence. Compare
State v. Woods
(1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 606 finding it was sufficient that the defendant was given the opportunity to speak.
State v. Sanders
(1992), 78 Ohio App. 3d 672 -- Improper suspension of execution of sentence following revocation of probation may deprive court of jurisdiction to pursue later revocation proceedings.
State v. Frost
(1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 772 -- Defendant's inability to retain counsel during the twenty-nine day period leading up to a final probation revocation hearing not construed as an implied waiver. Defendant was incarcerated after initial appearance and never made an express waiver.
State v. White
(1995). 100 Ohio App. 3d 62 -- Revocation hearing proceeded with appointed counsel, despite references to "my regular attorney." No error found since record doesn't establish existence or identity of retained counsel. App. R. 9(C) or (D) statement should have been pursued.
State v. Wallace
(1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 262 -- If probation revocation proceedings are initiated in a timely manner, they may be pursued even though the probationer is not arrested until after the specified period of probation has expired. Also see
State v. Cass
(1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d 697.
State v. Carreker
(1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d 112 -- While probation revocation proceedings must be disposed of with reasonable diligence, on appeal it must demonstrated that the delay caused prejudice. Also see
United States v. Lee
(7th Cir. 1991), 941 F.2d 571;
Simon v. Mosley
(10th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d 306;
United States v. Gernie
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), 228 F. Supp. 329.
State v. Dockery
, 187 Ohio App. 3d 798,
– Community control was terminated after the defendant tested positive for alcohol and failed to make payments on financial sanctions. His terms of community control required abstaining from the use of controlled substances. Alcohol is not a controlled substance, nor was abstention from its consumption made a condition. As to nonpayment, the trial court did not have before it sufficient information to determine whether the failure was willful, nor had it explored alternative punishments such as community service.
State v. Wagner
, 179 Ohio App. 3d 165,
– At a community control revocation hearing the state has the burden of proof by preponderance. Basis for violation was failure to comply with Rule One which required the defendant refrain from committing criminal acts and to report to P.O. promptly is arrested or questioned. Fact the defendant may have been charged with DV doesn‘t establish he violated the law. Nor was a failure to report shown. Evidence did not support revocation.
State v. Toler
, 154 Ohio App. 3d 590,
-- Court sidesteps the propriety of an indigent's inability to pay fine, costs and restitution as the basis for revoking community control by finding failure to report by itself was sufficient basis.
State v. Perkins
, 154 Ohio App. 3d 631,
-- Court erred by locking defendant up for failure to pay fines and costs without first conducting a hearing on ability to pay.
Black v. Romano
(1985), 471 U.S. 606 -- Basis for revocation need not relate to nature of original charge defendant was placed on probation for.
Zanders v. Anderson
(1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 269 -- Syllabus: "A reversed criminal conviction may serve as the basis for probation revocation unless the probationer pleads and proves that reversal removes all factual support for the probation revocation. (
State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots
, 45 Ohio St. 3d 324...
Flenoy v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority
, 56 Ohio St. 3d 131...and
State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul
, 73 Ohio St. 3d 185...followed.
In re Petition of Mallory
, 17 Ohio St. 3d 34...overruled to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion."
In re Petition for Mallory
(1985), 17 Ohio St. 3d 34 -- Probation was revoked on the basis of a CCW conviction which was reversed on appeal and subsequently dismissed in the trial court. Writ of habeas corpus granted and defendant ordered released. Once the second conviction was nullified, revocation was outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
State v. Craig
(1998), 130 Ohio App. 3d 639 -- Community control may be revoked though new charges were dismissed. Reversed nonetheless as defendant was denied his right to confrontation. Victim of new domestic violence charge did not appear, court made no finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation and arresting officer's testimony did not fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule or otherwise carry indicia of reliability.
Columbus v. Bickel
(1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d 26 -- (1) The required minimum term of probation that the defendant abide by the law refers to the criminal law. The court need not wait until there has been a conviction to revoke probation. The condition does not validly extend to compliance with Domestic Relations Court support orders. (2) Criminal nonsupport could be the basis for revocation. (3) While the rules of evidence may be relaxed somewhat in probation revocation cases, evidence admitted must still be properly authenticated, marked and admitted into evidence in order to be considered.
State v. Whitt
(1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 211 -- Probationer attempted to have doctor phone supposedly lost prescription into one Wal-Mart after it had already been filled at another. Court concludes that probation was not revoked because of status as a drug dependent person, but because of behavior in misrepresenting that prescription had been lost in order to illegally obtain drugs.
Columbus v. Beuthin
(1996), 108 Ohio App. 3d 651 -- "Because appellant's rules of probation did not prohibit him from being intoxicated, the mere fact that he reported to the work release program under the influence is an insufficient basis for revoking his probation. Due process requirements mandate that the trial court identify the probationary rule which appellant violated and the supporting evidence."
Bearden v. Georgia
(1983), 461 U.S. 660 -- Probation may not be revoked solely because defendant was unable to pay fine or restitution and without consideration of alternative means of punishment. Also see
Tate v. Short
(1971), 401 U.S. 395;
State v. Scott
(1982), 6 Ohio App. 3d 39;
State v. Crawford
(1977), 54 Ohio App. 2d 86.
State v. Woods
(1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 81 -- Headnote states: "Revocation of probation for failure to pay costs and make restitution does not constitute a denial of equal protection to a person claiming to be indigent, who has not sustained her burden of presenting evidence indicating she has made a good-faith effort within the limits of her ability to comply with the terms of her probation order."
Revocation, Adjudicatory Hearing Issues
State v. Frey
, 166 Ohio App. 3d 819,
-- While probation revocation hearings are not subject to the rules of evidence, the admission of hearsay may violate the defendant's due process right to confront adverse witnesses. It is reversible error when such hearsay is the sole evidence presented and is crucial to the determination of a probation revocation. Here there was only hearsay to the effect the defendant violated the requirement he not share a household with children. Consideration of those statements was error, but not a basis for reversal as there was acceptable evidence as to other violations.
State v. Mingua
(1974), 42 Ohio App. 2d 35 -- Headnote two: "Although the quantum of evidence required to support probation revocation need not be 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it must be 'substantial,' and such evidence must meet the test of competency."
State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority
(1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 82 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "Evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and seizure is generally admissible in probation and/or parole revocation proceedings. (
State v. Burkholder
, 12 Ohio St. 3d 205...overruled.)" See dissenting opinions.
State v. Cossin
(1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d 79 -- Statement made to probation officer without Miranda warnings was admissible in revocation proceedings. Statements would not be admissible in new criminal proceedings. Also see
Minnesota v. Murphy
(1984), 465 U.S. 420.
State v. Qualls
(1988), 50 Ohio App. 3d 56 -- Headnote 2: "Insanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised," Also see
State v. Bell
(1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 52, 57 -- "...(T)he true focus of the probation revocation probation proceeding is whether a condition of probation has been violated, and if so, what should be done."
State v. Zeiszler
(1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d 138 -- A defendant in revocation proceedings has the right to confront adverse witnesses, unless there is a finding of good cause not to allow confrontation.
State v. Miller
(1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 102 -- Rights to confrontation and due process denied where the probation officer who prepared the entries in the records of the probation department relied upon to revoke probation did not appear and testify.
Columbus v. Lacy
(1988), 46 Ohio App. 3d 161 -- Due process standards violated where: (1) Probation officer who prepared statement of violations did not testify. (2) Court summarily revoked probation at second hearing, relying only on evidence presented at first hearing. (3) Court relied on urine test results not properly demonstrated to be trustworthy.
State v. Colvin
(April 22, 1993), Franklin Co. App. No. 92AP-1256, unreported (1993 Opinions 1496) -- Due process denied where revocation was based on reading of excerpts from letter received from supervision probation officer in Texas and where it was uncertain whether the defendant had been advised of additional conditions of probation. While live testimony of the out of state probation officer might not have been necessary, affidavits and probation records should have been introduced.
Revocation, Other Issues
In re J.F.
, 121 Ohio St. 3d 76,
– Syllabus: "A court may order a juvenile to serve a previously suspended commitment after probation supervision has been terminated when the juvenile violates a separate, unexpired condition of community control." In the majority‘s view though probation had ended the juvenile remained subject to community service and monitored time conditions of community control. Dissenters believe court‘s termination of probation terminated all conditions of community control.
State v. Thompson
, 193 Ohio App. 3d 44,
– In stating the potential prison term faced in the event community control was revoked, use of the word “may” was permissible.
State v. Schlecht
, Champaign App. No. 2003-CA-3,
-- Substantial credit for time served is not justification for imposition of the maximum sentence upon revocation of community control. ¶ 24: "(I)f jail credit must be given for time spent in an alternative facility, the credit cannot be erased through the process of imposing sentence for a community control violation." First determining that the maximum sentence was not warranted, the court goes on to conclude no more than the minimum was justified and modifies the sentence accordingly.
State v. Rice
, Hamilton App. No. C-020464,
-- To revoke community control of a felony drug offender
requires finding either (1) the offender has continued to use drugs after reasonable participation in a drug treatment program, or (2) imprisonment is consistent with the general purposes of sentencing set forth in
State v. Saunders
(2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d 221 -- Upon revocation of community control the court may impose a prison sentence. However, it may not impose the maximum sentence without making findings as required by
State v. Edmonson
(1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d 324 applied.
State v. Toner
, Greene App. No. 02CA60,
-- Consecutive, non-minimum sentences imposed following revocation of community control require findings, as would have been required in support of such an initial sentence.
State v. McPherson
(2001), 142 Ohio App. 3d 274, 281-283 -- Upon revocation of community control imprisonment is not the only option.
State v. Brooks
, 103 Ohio St. 3d 134,
-- Syllabus: "(1) Pursuant to
, a trial court sentencing an offender to a community control sanction is required to deliver the statutorily detailed notifications at the sentencing hearing. (
State v. Comer
, 99 Ohio St. 3d 463,
, 703 N.E. 2d 473, applied and followed.) (2) Pursuant to
, a trial court sentencing an offender to a community control sanction must, at the time of sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation." Pronouncement must be in court. Inclusion in judgment entry is not enough. A specific term must be stated, though the court has the option of imposing less time if there is a violation.
State v. Campbell
, 162 Ohio App. 3d 413,
-- If consecutive sentences may be imposed upon violation of community control, the defendant must be advised accordingly at the initial sentencing hearing. Also see
State v. Thompson
, Fairfield App. No. 01CA62,
State v. Sutton
, 162 Ohio App. 3d 802,
-- Motorist convicted of OMVI was sentenced to community control pursuant to
. Upon revocation it was claimed the court was obliged to have stated a presumptive maximum term, thus limiting additional jail time upon violation. Though that is the rule of
State v. Brooks
, 103 Ohio St. 3d 134,
in felony cases, in imposing community control for misdemeanors the court is only required to advise of the possibility of imposing a term within the range of jail terms authorized for the offense. The court is also required to advise that it may impose longer or more restrictive community control sanctions upon a violation, but failure to do so is harmless when this has not been done.
State v. See
, Franklin App. No. 04AP-518,
, merely informing the defendant that up to twenty-four months could be imposed for violation of community control is not enough.
State v. Marvin
(1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 63 -- (1) If at the time of sentencing the court fails to advise the defendant that he can be imprisoned upon violation of community control sanctions, in the process mentioning the length of such term, that defendant may not be sent to prison as the result of revocation proceedings. Also see
State v. Carter
(1999), 136 Ohio App. 3d 367;
State v. Brown
(2000), 136 Ohio App. 3d 816;
State v. Virasaychak
(2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d 570;
State v. Grodhaus
(2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 615;
State v. McPherson
(2001), 142 Ohio App. 3d 274. Compare
State v. Nutt
(October 19, 2000), Franklin Co. App. No. 00AP-190, unreported (reference to 1-5 years enough notice);
State v. Miller
(December 30, 1999), Tuscarawas Co. App. No. 1999AP-02-0010 (reference to "up to the maximum term" sufficient). (2) Upon revocation, any prison term imposed may not exceed the term stated at the original sentencing hearing. (3) If the court fails to make required findings in passing sentence, once the case is on appeal the court lacks jurisdiction to remedy such error by further action.
State v. Sutherlin
, 154 Ohio App. 3d 765,
-- (1) Though the court failed to state a presumptive term at the initial sentencing hearing, at an initial community control revocation hearing the defendant was told he would get the maximum if there was a further violation. Since this was by nature a sentencing hearing, imprisonment is allowed upon subsequent revocation. Followed:
State v. Fraley
, 105 Ohio St. 3d 13,
. (2) Double jeopardy violation found where revocation was based on testimony of the victim of a subsequent offense the defendant had been acquitted on at trial.
State v. Hatfield
, 164 Ohio App. 3d 338,
-- Presumptive prison term was not mentioned at all at the initial sentencing and only in the entry continuing community control after violation proceedings.
was not satisfied and defendant is entitled to its benefit since his case was not resolved until after the
decision was issued.
State v. Baccus
, Hamilton App. No. C-040028,
-- The initial terms of community control were continued following an initial revocation hearing. This did not amount to a resentencing, though there was reference to possible imprisonment if there was a further violation. Absent resentencing, the initial failure to advise continues to preclude imprisonment upon a subsequent violation.
State v. Nutt
(October 19, 2000), Franklin Co. App. No. 00AP-190, unreported -- (1) "If a trial court fails to notify an offender of the specific prison term that could be imposed, the court may not sentence an offender to prison following a violation of the terms of a community control sanction." But the opinion suggests that the duty to notify the defendant of potential imprisonment upon violation of community control may be discharged at the guilty plea hearing. (2) Violation of community control need not itself be a felony for a prison sentence to be imposed. No contact violation was sufficient.
State v. Bradley
, 151 Ohio App. 3d 341,
-- Where the trial court failed to notify a defendant placed on community control as to the specific term of imprisonment which might be imposed upon violation, it was without authority to impose any prison sentence as a sanction upon revocation. Court rejects substantial compliance claim based on advice as to possibility of imprisonment and maximum term at the time of the plea hearing.
State v. Adams
, Champaign App. No. 2003-CA-18,
-- Having initially failed to state a prison term in the event community control was violated, court did so at the resentencing hearing. Appeal of that order held to be premature, as defendant had not yet received a sentence for a further violation.
State v. Barnhouse
, 102 Ohio St. 3d 221,
-- Defendant convicted of multiple counts of nonsupport had not been notified he faced a term of imprisonment upon violation of community control. Trial court believed it could not send him to prison, so instead imposed consecutive jail terms. Syllabus: "
does not authorize a trial court to impose consecutive jail sentences." ¶12: Jail time on a felony pursuant to
qualifies as imprisonment.
State v. Friesel
, 168 Ohio App. 3d 198,
-- Court did not state a presumptive prison term at sentencing. Since time in a community based correctional facility is not the equivalent of prison time, CBCF time was an option upon violation of the terms of community control.
In re Nowak
(1999), 133 Ohio App. 3d 396 -- Juvenile was found in contempt
for what was essentially a probation violation. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings since there is no authority for proceeding in contempt in such circumstances, and probation violation proceedings require the presence of the defendant. Dissenting judge would find no violation based on the facts of the case.
State v. Curtis
(2001), 143 Ohio App. 3d 314 -- In confusing circumstances, court upholds imposition of a 12 month sentence upon violation of community control, though original sentence was 11 months of imprisonment with six months to be served locally. See dissent.
State ex rel. Gadsden v. Lioi
93 Ohio St. 3d 574,
-- Mandamus action properly dismissed where inmate challenged outcome of probation revocation proceedings. Motion for delayed appeal (previously denied) or motion to vacate judgment provided adequate remedies at law.
State v. Bay
(2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d 402 -- Community control violator is entitled to credit for time served in jail on the same charge. Also see
State v. Napier
(2001), 93 Ohio St. 3d 646;
State v. Murray
(2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d 217 reaching the same conclusion as to CBCF time.
State v. Murray
(2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d 217 reaching the same conclusion as to CBCF time.
State v. Deener
(1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 335 -- Probationer may be validly arrested relying on a teletyped order to arrest based on probation violation.
Carchman v. Nash
(1985), 473 U.S. 716 -- Art. III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (
) does not apply to disposition of detainers based on probation revocation charges.
State v. Jackson
(1995), 106 Ohio App. 3d 345 -- Even if information furnished the judge at the revocation hearing proves to have been false, once probation is terminated, the court may not rescind that order and revoke probation. When a period of probation ends, the subject matter jurisdiction of the court terminates. Also see
State v. Jackson
(1988), 56 Ohio App. 3d 141;
Lakewood v. Davies
(1987), 35 Ohio App. 3d 107;
State v. O'Leary
(1987), 43 Ohio App. 3d 107.
State v. Hummer
(1995), 107 Ohio App. 3d 296 -- Defendant was sentenced to the Department of Corrections but referred for placement in a community based correctional facility and probation. He was accepted before being transferred to a state facility. Since he had not been transported to the state facility, upon revocation, his sentences could be ordered served consecutively instead of concurrently.
State v. Draper
(1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 81, applied. Also see
State v. Grujicic
(1996), 116 Ohio App. 3d 289 where same court finds no error in making sentences consecutive upon revocation of probation and shock probation in separate cases.
Bowling Green v. Luda
(1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 799 -- A court may not separately fine a defendant for violation of the terms of probation. Payment of any additional amount is limited to the amount of the fine initially imposed and suspended, conditioned on probation.
State v. Smith
(May 15, 1979), Franklin Co. App. No. 78AP-661 (1979 Opinions 1293) -- Credit for time served calculated upon revocation of probation must include time previously spent in jail as a condition of probation.
State v. Gregory
(1996), 108 Ohio App. 3d 264 -- Defendant absconded during probation, then spent time in jail awaiting disposition of new charges and probation revocation. Following acquittal on new charge, defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in jail against sentence imposed on probation revocation. In view of acquittal, court could not allocate all of that time to the new charge. (2) It is the duty of the court and not the Department of Corrections to calculate jail time credit.
State v. Jones
(1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 178 -- Defendant's agreement to extension of probation defeats later claim that hearing did not comply with full due process standards.
State v. Zorns
(1997), 120 Ohio App. 3d 360 -- Postconviction is not available to attack probation revocation proceedings as irregularities is such proceedings do not affect the validity of the original judgment of conviction. Also see
State v. Armstrong
(1988), 56 Ohio App. 3d 105.
David L. Strait
Copyright © Franklin County Public Defender and David L. Strait, 2015
Contents may not be duplicated without express permission.