Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
Allen V. Adair and the Franklin County Public Defender Office
Force; Harm to victim
Other proof issues
R.C. 2911.01 -- Aggravated robbery.
R.C. 2911.02 -- Robbery.
Harm to victim
State v. Thomas, 106 Ohio St. 3d 133 --
Defendant put down two bags of stolen groceries soon after leaving the store. An
off duty cop followed him to a laundromat, then escorted him back to the store.
Near the door there was a struggle and the officer was hit in the face. Held
that this did not take place while the defendant was committing a theft offense
as the groceries had been abandoned, nor did it happen while the defendant was
fleeing immediately after committing a theft offense. Also see State v.
Turner (Sept. 27, 1983), Franklin App. No. 83AP-226.
State v. Frunza, Cuyahoga App. No. 82053,
2003-Ohio-4809 -- Though pushing a stroller against a store employee blocking
exit could not reasonably be construed as an attempt to inflict physical harm,
subsequent assaults could.
State v. King (August 27, 1981), Franklin
Co. App. No. 80AP-968, unreported (1981 Opinions 2699) -- Use of force in a
robbery must be for the purpose of depriving the owner of his property, not
merely to escape detention.
State v. Cohen (1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 182
-- Force not proved where defendant and another approached a man sleeping on the
steps of the courthouse, rolled him over and took his watch and wallet. Victim
remained asleep throughout.
State v. Carter (1985), 29 Ohio App. 3d
148 -- Removal of purse from elderly victim's firm grasp was sufficient proof of
force to sustain robbery conviction. Also see State v. Pace (September
16, 1980), Franklin Co. App. No. 80AP-200, unreported (1980 Opinions 2926); State v. Camp (December 23, 1982), Franklin Co. App. No. 82AP-575,
unreported (1982 Opinions 3915, 3918-3919).
State v. Johnson (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d
204 -- Considered along with the rest of the charge, instruction relating force
to purse snatching did not remove the question of force from the jury's
State v. Bush (1997), 119 Ohio App. 3d 146
-- Defendant ignored clerk's demand he return beer to cooler, then returned a
half hour later, made sure the store was empty, then escorted clerk to cash
register, taking cash, food stamps, and on his way out of the store, another
6-pack. (1) Testimony as to first incident was properly admitted as went to
element of force or threat of force. (2) Clerk's state of mind may be relevant
as to proof of force. (3) It was error to instruct the jury "the force element
of robbery is satisfied if the fear of the alleged victim was of such a nature
as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with
property against her will..."
State v. Furlow (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d
146 -- The force element of robbery requires a showing of actual or potential
harm to a person. Simply taking a wallet and bills from the firmer than usual
grip of the victim (who the defendant had asked for change) was insufficient to
establish the element of force. Also see State v. Grubbs (1998), 129 Ohio
App. 3d 730, 733.
State v. McSwain (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d
600 -- (1) In an aggravated robbery prosecution based on violence, it is not
necessary to prove that the victim actually suffered serious physical harm.
Rather it must be proven that the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict
such harm. (2) The mens rea
element of the theft element of aggravated robbery is knowingly. Since no
culpable mental state is specified for the harm element, recklessness applies.
State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 169
-- To prove aggravated robbery, serious physical harm does not have to have been
the actual result. It is sufficient that the jury have a basis for reasonably
concluding that there was an attempt to inflict serious physical harm as defined
by R.C. 2901.01(E).
Return to top of page
State v. Holmes,
181 Ohio App. 3d 397,
2009-Ohio-1241 – Defendant and her cousin were waiting outside a KFC with a
gun to commit a robbery. Evidence did not support aggravated robbery conviction,
because the element of brandishing, display, use or indication of possession had
not yet been committed. Furthermore, the evidence supported a one-year firearm
specification, but not a three-year spec.
State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St. 3d
320, 331 -- Stealing a gun and fleeing with it amounts to aggravated robbery
with a firearm specification.
State v. Vondenberg (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d
285 -- Syllabus: "For purposes of establishing the crime of aggravated robbery,
a jury is entitled to draw all the reasonable inferences from the evidence
presented that the robbery was committed with the use of a gun, and it is not
necessary that the prosecution prove that the gun was capable of firing a
projectile." Also see State v. Jordan
(1987), 31 Ohio App. 3d 187; State v. Price (1989), 52 Ohio App. 3d 49.
State v. Edwards (1976), 50 Ohio App. 2d
63 -- Aggravated robbery conviction upheld where the defendant was shoplifting
with a gun in his pocket.
State v. Meek (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 35 --
Syllabus: "The use of an unloaded gun in the course of a robbery subjects the
robber to conviction for aggravated robbery."
State v. Hicks (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 25
-- Because a toy gun may be used as a bludgeon, it may be a deadly weapon for
purposes of aggravated robbery. Also see
State v. Marshall (1978), 61 Ohio App. 2d 84; State v. Maynard
(June 24, 1976), Franklin Co. App. No. 75AP-676, unreported (1976 Opinions 1887,
1892-1893). Compare State v. Luckey (1974), 69 Ohio Ops. 2d 111 --
Starting pistol held not to be a deadly weapon. No attempt was made to use it to
strike any of the victims.
State v. Green (1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d
644 -- Aggravated robbery conviction upheld where teller did not see gun, but
robber's words and actions suggested a gun was in an envelope covering his hand.
State v. Bonner (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d
815 -- Broken cap pistol was used in a robbery. Defendant struck the defendant
with his fist, but not the gun. Circumstances allowed inference toy was a deadly
State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d --
Defendant was convicted of robbery because he had a gun in his car when he left
a gas station without paying. Syllabus: "(1) The deadly weapon element of
2911.02(A)(1), to wit, '[h]ave a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person
or under his control[,]' does not require the mens rea of recklessness.
(2) To establish a violation of
R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), it is not necessary to prove
a specific mental state regarding the deadly weapon element of the offense of
State v. Davis (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 91 --
Positioning a hand in one's clothing to simulate possession of a weapon is
sufficient to proved the force element of the offense of robbery. Also see
State v. Bentley (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 33 (demand for wallet, raised
fists, reached into shirt as if for weapon).
Return to top of page
State v. Jones,
181 Ohio App. 3d 435,
2009-Ohio-1500 – Motion to certify a conflict denied. Court ruled in the
defendant‘s favor that the mens rea element for the use of a weapon element in
the aggravated robbery statute is recklessness, but against the defense on the
assignment of error involving that claim. Though the court‘s ruling was in
conflict with the decisions of other courts, certification is not in order as
the defendant did not suffer from the court‘s determination of the subordinate
issue. ¶5: "When the conflicting reasons are not dispositive of both cases, a
conflict need not be certified."
State v. Manns,
169 Ohio App. 3d 687,
2006-Ohio-5802, ¶13-14 -- The aggravated robbery statute does not specify a
culpable mental state applicable to the infliction of serious physical harm.
Thus the state must prove recklessness in that regard and the culpable mental
state of the underlying offense, here theft which requires a knowing act.
State v. Wallen (1971), 25 Ohio St. 2d 45
-- Intent to rob following drunken brawl may be inferred from victim being left
tied up with wire when defendant and his girlfriend left apartment, taking $50
from victim's wallet.
State v. Bumphus (1976), 53 Ohio App. 2nd
171 -- Though the aggravated robbery statute does not set forth a culpable
mental state, the reference to a theft offense incorporates the mens rea
requirement of that offense - knowingly in the case of plain theft. To avoid the
issue of which mens rea requirement applies to the possession of a deadly weapon
while committing a theft offense, the court endorses the standard OJI
instruction which simply presents to the jury the issue whether or not the
defendant was in possession of a deadly weapon.
State v. Crawford (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d
207 -- (1) Headnote 1: "Since
R.C. 2911.01(A)(2), aggravated robbery, does not
specify any degree of culpability,
R.C. 2901.21(B) requires that recklessness be
the standard which the prosecution must meet in proving, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict, serious physical
harm on another. However, in proving the theft
element of R.C. 2911.01(A)(2) the prosecution must demonstrate, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that it was done knowingly." Compare State v. Bumphus
(1976), 53 Ohio App. 2nd 171. (2) Assault is a lesser included offense of
aggravated robbery. Felonious assault may be a lesser included offense when
serious physical harm has been inflicted, but not when merely attempted. (But
see State v. Preston (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 64, finding felonious assault
and aggravated robbery not to be allied offenses of similar import based upon on
the facts of that case where the felonious assault took place after the robbery
had been completed, and State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 205.)
Return to top of page
State v. Frost, 164 Ohio App. 3d 61,
2005-Ohio-5510 -- Though the defendant did not have a weapon, he was culpable as
an aider and abettor, even though the indictment charged him as a principal.
There was ample evidence to sustain conviction, but the court instructed the
jury the defendant must be found to have had a weapon, and declined to instruct
on aiding and abetting. Reversed, but a new trial is allowed as the basis for
reversal was trial error, not insufficiency.
State v. Ballard (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d
59 -- The elements of robbery must occur simultaneously. Conviction reversed
where defendant grabbed former girlfriend's hand bag so she would remain and
talk to him. After finding a gun inside, the defendant returned the purse but
kept the gun.
State v. Perkins (1994), 93 Ohio App. 3d
672 -- Robbery conviction upheld where victim was forced to reveal combination
to a safe containing cash. The combination to a safe constitutes property for
purposes of establishing a theft offense.
State v. Furlow (1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d
699 -- Court of appeals reversed a robbery conviction and remanded for
resentencing on the lesser included offense of theft. At the resentencing, the
trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant for grand theft, since the
element of value, necessary to elevate the degree of the offense, had not been
submitted to the jury at the robbery trial.
Return to top of page
Lesser included offenses
State v. Evans,
122 Ohio St. 3d 381,
2009-Ohio-2974 – Syllabus: "(1) Robbery as defined in
is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery as defined in
2911.019(A)(1). (2) In determining whether an offense is a lesser included
offense of another, a court shall consider whether one offense carries a greater
penalty than the other, whether some element of the greater offense is not
required to prove commission of the lesser offense, and whether the greater
offense as statutorily defined cannot be committed without the lesser offense as
statutorily defined also being committed. (State v. Deem
(198), 4 Ohio St. 3d 205, 533 N.E. 2d 294, clarified."
Smith, 117 Ohio St. 3d 1260,
2008-Ohio-1260 – Syllabus: "(1) In determining whether an
offense is a lesser included offense of another when a statute
sets forth mutually exclusive ways of committing the greater
offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the
test established in State v. Deem
(1988), 40 Ohio St. 3d 205, 533 N.E. 2d 294, paragraph three of
the syllabus, to each alternative method of creating the greater
offense. (2) Theft, as defined in
2913.02, is a lesser included offense of robbery, as defined
R.C. 2911.02." From the body of the opinion it appears this
does not apply to robbery premised on attempted theft which is a
mutually exclusive way of committing the greater offense. The
degree of the theft conviction is not limited to M-1 theft as
the court views value as a special finding to determine the
degree of the offense and not a part of the definition of the
v. Jones, 193 Ohio App. 3d 400,
2011-Ohio-1717 – Defendant was indicted for F-2 robbery
premised on the threat of harm, but the jury was instructed only
on F-3 robbery premised on force. The F-3 offense is a
lesser-included. Instructing on only the lesser offense
constitutes a partial acquittal. This was the apparent
understanding of the parties. Conviction may be entered only on
the F-3. Ineffective assistance for trial counsel not to
recognize the problem. Defendant was not entitled to an
instruction on petty theft by force.
State v. Watson, 154 Ohio App. 3d 150,
2003-Ohio-4664 -- Robbery premised on the threat or use of immediate force is a
lesser included offense to some, but not all, alternative theories of
culpability for robbery premised on threat, infliction or threat of physical
harm. Applying Whalen v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 684 to preempt
stricter Ohio views on lesser-included offenses and allied offenses of similar
import, court applies analysis to individual theories of culpability. Result
here is conclusion defendant was properly convicted of a lesser included
offense, but same analysis might undermine Rance analysis concerning
allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Merriweather (1980), 64 Ohio St.
2d 57 -- Robbery is not a lesser-included offense to aggravated robbery premised
on the use of a deadly weapon. [Former version of statutes.] Also see State
(1978), 56 Ohio App. 2d 129.
State v. Washington (1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d
314 -- Robbery is a lesser included offense to aggravated robbery premised on
harm to the victim. [Former version of statutes.]
State v. Johnson (1988), 61 Ohio App. 3d
693, 696-700 -- Where the prosecutor has proceeded to trial on counts of
aggravated robbery predicated on the use of a deadly weapon, it is error to
reduce the offense to plain robbery at the time a Rule 29 motion for acquittal
is made as robbery is not a lesser included offense to aggravated robbery
premised on the use of a deadly weapon. Note that reduction would be proper if
trial proceeded only on claim defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict
serious physical harm. [Former version of statutes.]
State v. Gates (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 485
-- Attempted theft by threat is a lesser-included offense of robbery.
Return to top of page
State v. Barkley, 185 Ohio App. 3d
2009-Ohio-5549 – Keeping victims taped to chairs in their hotel room while
the defendant waited for his ride meant risk to them was prolonged and
kidnapping counts did not merge with robberies.
State v. Harris,
122 Ohio St. 3d 373,
2009-Ohio-3323 – Paragraph one of the syllabus: "Robbery defined in
and aggravated robbery defined in
are allied offenses of similar import, and therefore a defendant cannot be
convicted of both offenses when both are committed with the same animus against
the same victim." Remanded for determination whether the offenses were committed
Palmer, 178 Ohio App. 3d 192,
2008-Ohio-4604 – In 2002 the First District affirmed the
imposition of consecutive sentences for related counts of
robbery and aggravated robbery, relying on State v. Rance. In the wake of
Cabrales the court grants a motion for consideration
though the time prescribed by rule has long passed, and rules
the counts merge.
Winn, 121 Ohio St. 3d 413,
2009-Ohio-1059 – Syllabus: "The crime of kidnapping, defined
R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), and the crime of aggravated robbery,
2911.01(A)(1), are allied offenses of similar import
2941.25." Strict textual comparison of elements is not
required. Majority and dissenting justices split on how narrowly
"necessarily" is to be interpreted when comparing elements.
Also see State v. Sidibeh,
192 Ohio App. 3d 256,
Winn, 173 Ohio App. 3d 202,
2007-Ohio-4327 – Aggravated robbery and kidnapping merge
where restraint was incidental to the robbery and the victim
remained in her bedroom.
Stevenson, 181 Ohio App. 3d 292,
2009-Ohio-901 – Complicity to commit robbery and receiving
stolen property are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Lee, 190
Ohio App. 3d 581,
2010-Ohio-5672 – In a pre-Johnson home invasion case the
court concludes aggravated robbery and felonious assault counts
were committed separately regardless of whether they were allied
offenses of similar import. For one defendant, kidnapping and
aggravated robbery counts did merge.
State v. Howard, Hamilton App. No.
2003-Ohio-1365 -- Defendant took money from a safe in a flower shop
office and ran from the store pursued by three employees. Consecutive sentences
for three counts of robbery reversed. Counts merged. There was not a separate
act of force against each employee. Nor was there more than one animus.
State v. Philpot (2001), 145 Ohio App.
3d 231, 239-240 -- Theft is an allied offense of similar import to aggravated
State v. Parker (1986), 31 Ohio App. 3d
128 -- Robbery and kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import and only a
single sentence may be imposed when the restraint of the victim is merely
incidental to the robbery.
State v. Gore (1999), 131 Ohio App. 3d 197
-- Aggravated robbery and kidnapping did not merge where victim was transported
to a different location to facilitate escape.
State v. Parker (1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d
456, 461-463 -- Aggravated robbery premised on the use of a deadly weapon and
kidnapping are not allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Johnson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 420
-- Aggravated robbery and theft are allied offenses of similar import. Also see
State v. Parson (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 442, 446; State v. Nelson
(1977), 51 Ohio App. 2d 31 (robbery and petty theft). State v. Harris
(1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d 257 -- Grand theft and robbery merge. (Decided as a
double jeopardy case.)
State v. Lundy (1987), 41 Ohio App. 3d 163
-- Aggravated robbery and theft of drugs are allied offenses of similar import.
State v. Bickerstaff (1984), 10 Ohio St.
3d 62 -- Aggravated robbery and aggravated murder are not allied offenses of
State v. Frazier (1979), 58 Ohio St. 2d
253 -- Aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery are committed separately and
do not merge.
State v. Houston (1985), 26 Ohio App. 3d
26 -- Headnote 2: "Aggravated robbery, possession of criminal tools, and
unlawful possession of a dangerous ordinance are allied offenses of similar
import within the contemplation of
R.C. 2941.25, where a shotgun was used to
commit an aggravated robbery and the shotgun was the subject of the possession
of dangerous ordinance charges."
State v. Byrd (1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 79,
84-85 -- Robberies of clerk and cash register were separate acts committed each
requiring a separate animus.
State v. Fields (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d
337 -- Out of a single incident, defendants were convicted of the aggravated
robbery of a fast food outlet and for robbery of the restaurant and an employee.
(2) Offense with regard to the employee did not merge. (2) Robbery and
aggravated robbery of the restaurant did merge. (3) Though the issue was not
raised before the trial court, reversed as plain error. Error is prejudicial
even though concurrent sentences had been imposed. (4) Plain error reversal
moots ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Also see State v. Lang
(1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 243.
State v. Gest (1995), 108 Ohio App. 3d
248, 261-263 -- Aggravated robbery, theft, and receiving stolen property charges
arising from the same carjacking merged.
State v. Rance (1999), 85 Ohio St. 3d 632
-- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "Involuntary manslaughter and aggravated
robbery are not allied offenses of similar import."
State v. Ferguson (1991), 71 Ohio App. 3d
342, 346-357 -- Felonious assault and aggravated robbery are not allied offenses
of similar import.
State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d
239, 197-198 -- When separate death penalty specifications are based on
aggravated robbery and kidnapping, and those offenses would merge, the
specifications should be merged to be considered as a single aggravating factor
at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Compare State v. Rogers (1985),
17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 180-181 where the rape and kidnapping specifications did not
Return to top of page
State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St. 3d 466,
2010-Ohio-3830 – Syllabus: “(1) An indictment that charges an offense by
tracking the language of the criminal statute is not defective for failure to
identify a culpable mental state when the statute itself fails to specify a
mental state. (State v. Buehner, 110 Ohio St. 3d 403,
2006-Ohio-4707, 843 N.E.2d 1162, reaffirmed; State v. Colon, 118
Ohio St. 3d 26,
2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E. 2d 917, overruled; State v. Colon, 119
Ohio St. 3d 204,
2008-Ohio-3749, 893 N.E. 2d 169, overruled in part.) (2) When the General
Assembly includes a mens rea element in one discrete clause, subsection, or
division of a statute but not in another discrete clause, subsection, or
division of that statute, courts must apply the analysis in State v. Wac
(1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 84, 22 O.O. 3d 299, 428 N.E. 2d 428, and State v.
Maxwell, 95 Ohio St. 3d 254,
2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E. d 242, to determine the mental state when none is
specified. (3) By failing to timely object to a defect in an indictment, a
defendant waives all but plain error on appeal. (Crim. R. 12(C)(2) and 52(B)
followed; State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26,
2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E. 2d 917, overruled)” The “serious physical harm”
version of aggravated robbery is a strict liability offense.
State v. Colon,
118 Ohio St. 3d 26,
2008-Ohio-1624 – Syllabus: "When an indictment fails to charge a mens rea
element of a crime and the defendant fails to raise that defect in the trial
court, the defendant has not waived the defect in the indictment." Robbery
indictment failed to allege recklessness as the culpable mental state with
regard to the harm element. State conceded this made it defective. Majority
opinion turns on the constitutional importance of the grand jury and
indictments, notwithstanding Crim.R. 12(C)(2) stating defects are waived if not
raised before trial. Moreover, the court finds structural error. But see State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St. 3d 204,
2008-Ohio-3749 backing away from structural error to plain error and
declaring Colon 1 applies prospectively. As to
application of Colon see State
v. Robertson, 180 Ohio App. 3d 365,
2008-Ohio-6909. For cases where Colon I and II
were followed and conviction reversed, see State v. Buford,
178 Ohio App. 3d 640,
2008-Ohio-5505; State v. Summers, 182 Ohio App.
Lester, 123 Ohio St. 3d 396,
2009-Ohio-4225 – Strict liability is the culpable mental
state within the crime of aggravated robbery for the element of
brandishing, displaying, using, or indicating possession of a
deadly weapon. Indictment was not defective.
State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St.
3d 375, followed. ¶8 reiterates Colon
II‘s limitation of Colon I to
pervasive failure to address mens rea. See concurring opinion
for further discussion of Colon,
calling those cases "aberrant."
Smith, Lucas App. No. L-07-1346,
2009-Ohio-48 – Colon I does not
apply to guilty pleas. Also see cases cited at
State v. Mickens, Franklin App. Nos.
08AP-743, 744, 745,
Jones, 182 Ohio App. 3d 183,
2009-Ohio-1742 – Colon doesn‘t
apply where the error does not permeate the entire course of
proceedings. Here the court instructed the jury with respect to
the culpable mental state for the underlying theft offense.
Haney, 180 Ohio App. 3d 554,
2009-Ohio-149 – Colon does not
apply to aggravated robbery indictments. Applying
State v. Wharf (1999), 86 Ohio St.
3d 375, the state must prove the culpable mental state of the
underlying theft offense, but the deadly weapons element is a
matter of strict liability. Accord: State
v. Lee, 180 Ohio App. 3d 739,
2009-Ohio-299 of guilt or innocence. Also see
State v. Mickens, Franklin App. Nos.
08AP-743, 744, 745,
2009-Ohio-2554, ¶61-69 reaching the same conclusion with
respect to aggravated robbery and burglary, further noting that
the mens rea element of a predicate offense need not be alleged
in the indictment, citing State v. Buehner,
110 Ohio St. 3d 403,
Rogers, 178 Ohio App. 3d 332,
2008-Ohio-4867 – Applying State v.
Colon, 118 Ohio St. 3d 26,
2008-Ohio-1624, robbery counts premised on inflicting
physical harm was defective for failing to allege recklessness.
But counts premised on the use of a deadly weapon are not. The
culpable mental state for theft was included in the indictment
and the added deadly weapon element is a matter of strict
liability. Court also concludes a hammer qualifies as a deadly
State v. Philpot (2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d
231, 239-240 -- Theft is an allied offense of similar import to aggravated
State v. Mullins (1986), 34 Ohio App. 3d
192 -- Sentencing both for aggravated robbery committed with a firearm and a
related firearm specification is neither double jeopardy nor cruel and unusual
punishment. Also see State v. Vasquez
(1984), 18 Ohio App. 3d 92; State v. Hughley (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d 77.
State v. Chapman (1986), 21 Ohio St. 3d 41
-- Syllabus: "An individual indicted for and convicted of
aggravated robbery, and
R.C. 2941.141, a firearm specification, is subject to a
mandatory three-year term of actual incarceration under
R.C. 2929.71, regardless
of whether he was the principle offender or an unarmed accomplice. (State v.
Moore , 16 Ohio St. 3d 30, followed.) Also see State v. Sims
(1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d 287.
State v. Hughley (1984), 20 Ohio App. 3d
77 -- Robbery of multiple victims in a single incident may lead to multiple
State v. Gartrell (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d
588 -- Double jeopardy did not bar prosecution for robbery following M-4
disorderly conduct conviction arising from the same incident. Though minor
misdemeanor disorderly might have barred subsequent prosecution, M-4 violation
had the additional element of persistence. See concurring opinion on bumbling
bifurcation of prosecutions.
Return to top of page