Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
Allen V. Adair and the Franklin County Public Defender Office
COMMUNITY CONTROL (039)
Also see Sentencing;
Terms and Conditions
Extension; Modification of terms
Conditional probation of a drug dependent person
Revocation, adjudicatory hearing issues
Revocation, other issues
R.C. 2929.15 -- Community control.
R.C. 2929.16 -- Residential sanctions.
Chapter 2951 -- Probation
Criminal Rule 32.3 -- Presentence
Criminal Rule 32.3 -- Revocation of probation.
State v. Jacobs, 189 Ohio App. 3d
2010-Ohio-4010 – For a felony a court may not impose both a prison term and
community control. Upon remand, if the defendant has completed the prison term,
he may not be sentenced to community control. A court may not impose a lifetime
ban from the premises of a shopping mall as community control sanctions are
limited to five years. While an indigent may be fined, the record must
demonstrate the court considered ability to pay.
State v. Walton (2000), 137 Ohio App.
3d 450, 457 -- "...(A) misdemeanor offender has no right to refuse probation and
to demand to serve her sentence of imprisonment." Unlicensed driver was headed
to prison for eight months and wanted six month traffic sentence served
concurrently. Instead, the judge put her on probation. Outcome might have been
different if conditions of probation were onerous. Dissent would limit duration
of "suspended" sentence to prison term.
State v. Preston, 155 Ohio App. 3d 367,
2003-Ohio-6187 -- A felon may not be placed on community control without the
completion of a presentence investigation, even when community control is
State v. Ramsey, Wood App. No.
2004-Ohio-5677 -- Blended sentences are permitted. Defendant received
prison on one count, community control on another.
State v. Smith (1989), 42 Ohio St. 3d
60 -- Syllabus: "(1) The courts of common pleas do not have inherent power to
suspend execution of a sentence in a criminal case and may order such suspension
only as authorized by statute. (Municipal Court v. State, ex rel. Platter
(1935), 126 Ohio St. 103...paragraph three of the syllabus, approved and
followed.) (2) The unequivocal prohibition contained in
precludes the trial court from granting probation where actual incarceration is
a mandated aspect of the defendant's sentence."
State v. Roberts (1986), 33 Ohio App 3d
201 -- In felony cases,
R.C. 2929.51(A) permits the court to suspend the
sentence and place the offender on probation at any time prior to when he is
delivered into the custody of the institution, even when the defendant has been
released for an extended period while his appeal was pending.
State v. Ervin (1994), 93 Ohio App. 3d 178
-- If the defendant is found guilty of an offense committed with a firearm, he
is ineligible for probation, even though the jury has acquitted him on a firearm
specification. See dissent. Also see State v. Nowlin (1996), 115 Ohio
App. 3d 778 (non-probationable though pleaded to offense without specification);
State v. Hawk (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 296; State v. Jones (1989), 65
Ohio App. 3d 282; State v. Theiss
(1988), 48 Ohio App. 3d 251. Different result under post 1996 sentencing laws.
State v. Barnett (1999), 131 Ohio App. 3d
137 -- CCW exception did not make defendant also convicted of weapon under a
disability eligible for probation. Pre 7-1-96 case.
State v. Luckett (1995), 101 Ohio App. 3d
330 -- The provision in
R.C. 3719.70(B) that when a person is convicted of a
drug abuse offense, the court shall take into consideration whether he
cooperated with the authorities in furnishing information in making its
determination whether to grant probation, does not mean that a person becomes
ineligible for probation when such information is not forthcoming.
State v. Smith (1986), 31 Ohio App. 3d 26
-- A conviction for a prior offense is only prima facie evidence that a person
is a "repeat offender" and ineligible for probation. Other factors may be
considered and such a person is not automatically disqualified from receiving
State v. Cole (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 288
-- Court committed plain error by finding defendant a "dangerous offender,"
ineligible for probation under former
2929.01(B), relying on two offenses
arising from a single incident and an arrest record, unsupported by underlying
North Olmstead v. Cipiti (1996), 114 Ohio
App. 3d 549, 553 -- Where defendant has already served time in excess of the
maximum sentence awaiting trial, he may not be sentenced to probation.
State v. Shainoff (1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d
129 -- Attempted rape is a probationable offense. Also see State v. Long
(1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 663.
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State v. Andrasak, 194 Ohio App. 3d
2011-Ohio-3425 – Defendant was sentenced to five years of community control
on drug charges. In court she was ordered to have no contact with two men, one
of whom she claimed was her husband. Initial entry stated she was to have no
contact with “codefendants.” Purported nunc pro tunc entry stated she was to
have no contact with three individuals designated as codefendants. One was the
purported husband, the other her son. (1) As to the husband, there was no
objection in court, and the Court of Appeals refuses to reverse as plain error
as it is not convinced the individual named is a husband. (2) As to the son,
generally no contact with a spouse or child is not an acceptable term of
probation. Basis for reversal though is failure to mention no contact with the
son when sentence was pronounced. Late addition is not an appropriate use of a
nunc pro tunc entry.
State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App. 3d 162,
2010-Ohio-951 – Defendant was indicted for gross sexual imposition of a
mentally impaired person. Victim was his former stepdaughter who claimed sexual
intercourse took place. Plea was to misdemeanor child endangerment. Terms of
community control included supervision by a sex offender specialist and
participation in a program for male sex offenders. Court rejects claim this was
an abuse of discretion because of the non-sexual nature of the offense pled to.
A court may broadly consider the underling facts. Nor do the conditions violate
substantive due process.
State v. Eversole,
182 Ohio App. 3d 290,
2009-Ohio-2174 – As a condition of judicial release the defendant was
required to have potential sex partners come to the probation department with
him and obtain "court approval" upon providing a notarized statement they were
aware the defendant had HIV/AIDS. Majority declines review of the
appropriateness of this condition as the defendant failed to appeal when it was
imposed. Dissent finds it inappropriate. Defendant was claimed to have engaged
in sexual relations with another couple. Only the woman had been to the
probation office. Man may or may not have been credible and allegedly came
forward when the woman left him for the defendant. Majority finds revocation was
State v. Aberegg, 191
Ohio App. 3d. 345,
2010-Ohio-6502 – Defendant was convicted of
telecommunications harassment based on calls to city hall. As a
condition of community control defendant was ordered to stay off
the property of the City of Wadsworth. Condition was overly
broad. App.R. 26(B) case.
In re D.S., 111
Ohio St. 3d 361,
2006-Ohio-5851 -- A full disclosure polygraph examination is not a
reasonable term of juvenile community control absent evidence it is particularly
suited to the facts of the offense. ¶19: "The Fifth Amendment prohibits
compelling a person on community control who claims privilege to give answers
that might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy
(1984), 465 U.S. 420, 426." Reverses In re D.S., 160
Ohio App. 3d 552,
Cowen, 167 Ohio App. 3d 233,
2006-Ohio-3191 -- M-4 defendant was given mostly suspended
jail time, but was ordered to serve more than the maximum jail
term under electronic home detention. EHDP is not the equivalent
of jail time. No statutory provision controlling EHDP limits the
State v. Talty 103 Ohio St. 3d 177,
2004-Ohio-4888 -- As a condition of community control the defendant was ordered
to "make all reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving another child." Such an antiprocreational order is overbroad and invalid. The court avoids determining
whether procreation is a fundamental right, adopting a two-step review,
beginning with the reasonableness test stated in State v. Jones (1990),
49 Ohio St. 3d 51. Only if a condition passes this test, and a fundamental right
is involved, will the court apply a strict scrutiny test. For reasonableness
review, community control is no different from probation. Citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 782, community control is not an "act of
grace" permitting restrictions comparable to imprisonment.
State v. Lake, 150 Ohio App. 3d 408,
2002-Ohio-6484 -- Defendant was convicted of domestic violence. Court found he
was an alcoholic and as a community control sanction ruled he should not have
driving privileges. (1) No appeal was taken from the initial order, but the
court allowed a delayed appeal and granted relief. (2) The court was without
authority to terminate the license pursuant to
R.C. 4507.08(D)(1). For such
suspensions the controlling definition requires three or more OMVI convictions
within the immediate three year period. The defendant had none. (3) Denial of
driving privileges was not reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the
offender. (4) The court incorrectly determined it was without authority to
modify the conditions of community control previously imposed. (5) The
Department of Motor Vehicles does not have authority to modify the terms of
Geiger, 169 Ohio App. 3d 374,
2006-Ohio-5642 -- Defendant convicted of personating an
officer was unhappy about an order that he stay off the grounds
of a retirement home where a relative had become a resident.
Order was improper because it did not meet the requirement that
a community control sanction have a specified duration not
exceeding five years.
State v. King, 151 Ohio App. 3d 346,
2003-Ohio-208 -- Maintaining a conventional haircut and remaining clean-shaven
were not appropriate conditions of community control. Community service was
appropriate in view of acknowledgment it would have to be suitable for a
State v. Robinson, Greene App. No. 2003
2004-Ohio-5984 -- Record did not demonstrated curfew and drug testing
conditions were reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender and had some
relationship to the protection order violation offense he was convicted of.
State v. Craft, Greene App. No.
2002-Ohio-5127 -- Conditions of community control banning even
fleeting, unintended, contact with juvenile females and frequenting any park
where a minor might be present are overbroad. Compare Lakewood v. Dorton,
Cuyahoga App. No. 81043,
2003-Ohio-1719 where it was held proper to bar only
unsupervised contact with children under 18.
State v. Jahnke, 148 Ohio App. 3d 77,
2002-Ohio-371 -- Defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle. As a condition of probation he was ordered to have no contact with his
pregnant fiance for five years. Condition had no relationship to the crime, was
not reasonably related to rehabilitation, did not serve the statutory ends of
probation, and encroached upon the defendant's fundamental rights.
State v. Thompson, 150 Ohio App. 3d
2002-Ohio-7098 -- As a condition of community control, defendant was to
have no contact with minors without the approval of the probation department. He
was found a violator after marrying a sixteen-year old. Condition held to have
unlawfully interfered with a lawful relationship. Marriage is a fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clause. See dissent finding the violation lay
in failing to notify the probation department he was seeing someone in a
proscribed manner before the marriage.
State v. Paxton (2000), 139 Ohio App. 3d
48 -- Defendant was sentenced to community control including orders to serve
sixty days in jail and up to sixty additional days at the discretion of the
probation officer in the event of minor infractions. Delegation to the probation
officer in this manner is a denial of due process. Court sidesteps determining
whether it also violates separation of powers.
State v. Sturgeon (2000), 138 Ohio App.
3d 882 -- Community control sanction that defendant have no contact with his
children for four years is invalid, amounting to a termination of parental
rights without due process. Also see State v. Burton, Hamilton App. Nos.
State v. McClure, Hamilton
App. No. C-040099,
2005-Ohio-777 where a mother included her children in her
attempt to commit suicide.
State v. Robinson (2001), 146 Ohio App. 3d
344 -- Defendant was convicted of interference with custody after travelling to
Indiana with his underage girlfriend. Condition of probation that he stay away
from the victim was valid only until her eighteenth birthday.
State v. Wright (2000), 137 Ohio App. 3d
737 -- Condition that defendant convicted of felony OMVI stay out of places
where alcoholic beverages are sold, distributed, served or given away is vague
United States v. Knights (2001), 122 S.Ct.
587 -- The Fourth Amendment does not limit searches pursuant to a condition of
probation to those undertaken with a probationary purpose. Deputy who was aware
of the condition conducted a warrantless search of the apartment of a person
believed linked to acts of vandalism at utility company facilities. The search
was supported by reasonable suspicion, which is sufficient for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Court does not decide whether consent to the condition by itself would
validate such searches.
State v. Drew, Cuyahoga App. No. 83563,
2004-Ohio-3609 -- A court may not order repayment of attorney fees without
affirmatively determining on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably
may be expected to have, the means to pay some or all of the expense of legal
State v. Owens (November 21, 1978),
Franklin County App. No. 78AP-374, unreported (1978 Opinions 3214) -- At page
3217: "Although a trial court may not impose arbitrary and offensive conditions,
which would significantly burden the defendant in the exercise of his liberty
and those that would bear only a remote relationship to the crime committed, and
bear little or no relationship to the probation objectives of education and
rehabilitation of the defendant, still a court may exact reasonable conditions."
Also see Tabor v. Maxwell
(1963), 175 Ohio St. 373; State v. Maynard (1988), 47 Ohio App. 3d 76;
State v. Livingston (1976), 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 196.
State v. Jackson (1997), 123 Ohio App. 3d
22 -- Defendant was placed on probation and immediately taken for a drug test,
which she flunked. The judge resentenced, still granting probation, but with
additional conditions. Court was without authority to vacate original sentence.
Drugs were taken before sentencing and probation could not be violated until
sentence was journalized.
State v. Shelton (1989), 63 Ohio App. 3d
137 -- A court may not make reimbursement of the cost of appointed counsel a
condition of probation, nor may such expense be taxes as costs. Compare State
v. McLean (1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 392 upholding such a condition and
furnishing some discussion of consequences should failure to pay become an issue
in probation revocation proceedings.
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mestemaker (1997),
78 Ohio St. 3d 92 -- Public reprimand to former judge who made marriage a
condition of probation in several domestic violence cases.
State v. Richard (1996), 113 Ohio App. 3d
141 -- Tubal ligation and birth control are matters beyond the reach of the
judiciary, and may not be made conditions of probation.
State v. Mueller (1997), 122 Ohio App. 3d
482 -- A court may not make it a condition of probation that a defendant
convicted of domestic violence execute a quit claim deed turning over to the
victim his interest in jointly owned real estate.
State v. Conkle (1998), 129 Ohio App. 3d
177 -- Husband convicted of domestic violence was ordered to have no contact
with wife, her residence or property during the term of probation. Affirmed.
Also see State v. Brillhart (1998), 129 Ohio App. 3d 180, decided by the
same panel. -- Same condition upheld with respect to wife, but not as to
children, even though one child saw the assault.
State v. Moine (1991), 72 Ohio App. 3d 584
-- It is improper to make no arrests for OMVI or driving under suspension a
condition of probation. Mere arrest may not be a basis for violation of
State v. Kidwell (February 16, 1995),
Franklin Co. App. No. 94APA06-883, unreported (1995 Opinions 558) -- (1) A court
may not make it a condition of probation that there be no further arrests for
domestic violence. (2) A defendant is not required to immediately appeal
imposition of such a condition. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar
litigation of the validity of the condition following probation revocation
State v. Rigg (1994), 92 Ohio App. 3d 113
-- Adult was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor after
becoming sexually involved with Wireman, a 17 year old friend of her son, who
had been released into her custody under house arrest. As Wireman was now of
age, it was improper to make it a condition of her probation that she have no
contact with him.
Casdorph v. Kohl (1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d
294 -- A condition of probation that the probationer leave the state and not
return for five years is unconstitutional.
State v. Williams (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d
70 -- Former school board member was convicted of theft based on welfare fraud.
Condition of probation that she not hold public office during term of probation
held to have been proper.
State v. Graham (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d
751 -- For a CPA convicted of a securities violation, it was not error to impose
a condition of probation that he cease operation of his accounting business and
not perform general accounting services for the public for five years.
State v. Donnelly (1996), 109 Ohio App. 3d
604 -- It was proper to make it a condition of probation that city finance
official pay costs of an audit related to convictions for theft in office and
tampering with records.
In re Miller (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 81 --
Juvenile was found guilty of domestic violence following an altercation with his
brother. Terms of probation that the defendant not dress as a female, not
associate with Joe Wicks, and not go to Caesar's were invalid as they bore no
relationship to the original charge, did not relate to conduct in itself
criminal, did not serve the statutory ends of probation, and infringed upon
First Amendment freedoms.
State v. Bush (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 717
-- As a term of probation, defendant could be ordered to pay as "restitution"
the cost of counselling for the victims. Court acknowledges this could not be
ordered except as a term of probation.
State v. Demosthene (1992), 78 Ohio App.
3d 421 -- It was not an abuse of discretion to require a defendant who pleaded
guilty to an assault arising from a bar fight to stay out of places serving or
selling intoxicants. (What if second fight had taken place outside a restaurant
with a liquor license?)
State v. Krug (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 595
-- It was improper to suspend the operator's license of a defendant convicted of
domestic violence who in the process of the offense had driven his wife from a
convenience store to their home. (1) Suspension was not authorized under
4507.16(A)(2) allowing suspension when an auto is used in the commission of a
felony as that section only applies where an auto has been used as a weapon, to
transport contraband, or is the subject of the crime charged. The section does
not apply to mere use for transportation. (2) The suspension could not be
justified as a special condition of probation pursuant to
R.C. 2951.01(C). Also
see State v. Watkins (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 195.
Lakewood v. Hartman (1999), 86 Ohio St. 3d
275 -- Installation of an ignition interlock device held to be a proper term of
probation for a defendant convicted for driving without a license in view of
four prior OMVI's and eight convictions for driving under a suspension during
the previous four years.
State v. Pessefall (1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d
222 -- Generally worded requirement that the defendant obtain and use a speed
control device was improperly imposed as a condition of probation.
Columbus v. Harmon (September 27, 1990),
Franklin County App. No. 89AP-1412, unreported (1990 Opinions 4327) --
Suspension of driving privileges and order not to drive are not proper terms of
probation when the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct, reduced from
State v. Maynard (1988), 47 Ohio App. 3d
76 -- Probation condition restricting contact with Department of Corrections and
related agencies on behalf of other prisoners held unreasonable. Also see State v. Bilder
(1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d 135.
Columbus v. Davis (May 30, 1991), Franklin
County App. No. 90AP-1423, unreported (1991 Opinions 2536) -- Court may not
impose a five year driver's rights suspension as a condition of probation when
by statute (R.C. 4507.34) no more than a one year suspension could be imposed
for that offense.
Columbus v. Barnes (April 27, 1989),
Franklin County App. Nos. 88AP-968 through 971, unreported (1989 Opinions 1418)
-- When the court has imposed consecutive jail sentences reaching the eighteen
month limit specified by
R.C. 2929.41(D) and (E)(4), it may not suspend an
additional term of incarceration as a condition of probation.
State v. Jones (1990), 49 Ohio St. 3d 51
-- Probation condition that defendant have no contact with juveniles who are not
relatives was not unreasonable following conviction for multiple counts of
contributing to the delinquency or unruliness of minors.
State v. Friend (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d
241 -- Order that the defendant complete payment on accident settlement
agreement from an tangentially related incident was an unreasonable condition of
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Extension; Modification of terms
State v. Shelton, 165 Ohio App. 3d 142,
2006-Ohio-182 -- In resolving revocation proceedings, the court was permitted to
extend the term of community control from three years to five, and to increase
the indicated prison term as well.
State v. Fanti 147 Ohio App. 3d 27,
2001-Ohio-7028 -- In 1989 defendant pled guilty to eight counts. He was sent to
prison on four and granted probation on the rest, to begin after release.
Probation revocation proceedings later on resulted in the defendant being sent
off to serve a prison term, first on two of the remaining counts, and later on
two more. Reversed. R.C. 2951.07 tolls running of probation only during
incarceration for offenses committed after commencement of the probationary
State v. Brooks, 163 Ohio App. 3d 241,
2005-Ohio-4728 -- The version of the sentencing statutes in effect at the time
of the offense remains in effect unless the defendant is entitled to beneficial
amendment pursuant to R.C. 1.58. An amended version of
R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) tolls
time when a person sentenced to community control is in prison. The version
under which the defendant was sentenced did not. Ex parte order tolling running
of community control was an unlawful modification of the sentence, following ex
post facto reasoning.
Davis v. Wolfe 92 Ohio St. 3d 549,
2001-Ohio-1281 -- Habeas relief for inmate who claimed revocation of his
probation came after his term of probation had expired. While the probationary
period was tolled during the time he was in custody on a domestic violence
charge, it began to run again after he was released on bond.
State v. Bolden, Montgomery App. No.
2004-Ohio-2416 -- Due process and double jeopardy violations found in
shift from non- reporting to reporting probation without a hearing and proof
original terms of probation were violated. State conceded as well that courts do
not have absolute authority to revoke probation upon nonpayment of fines and
costs. Also see State v. Mohamed, Cuyahoga App. No. 84615,
(transfer to supervision by the sex-offender unit).
State ex rel. Anderson v. Wichtman, 160
Ohio App. 3d 585,
2005-Ohio-1882 -- Community control violator could not be sent
to prison because the trial court failed to state a potential maximum prison
term at sentencing, but he was subject to being held for up to six months in a
community based correctional facility. Habeas lies to challenge confinement
beyond this term. Writ granted. Petitioner was not challenging the sentence
State v. Daugherty, 165 Ohio App. 3d
2006-Ohio-240 -- Before the expiration of one year of probation, defendant
was jailed for contempt for failure to perform any of the hours of community
service ordered. While the proceedings may have satisfied the requirements for
probation revocation, a failure to perform community service would be indirect
contempt,. The court did not properly charge him with indirect contempt and the
proceedings resembled those punishing direct contempt.
Ham, 170 Ohio App. 3d 38,
2007-Ohio-133 -- Under former misdemeanor probation statutes
courts could not revoke probation, impose jail time, then extend
Cleveland v. Clemons (1993), 90 Ohio App.
3d 212 -- A court may not add a condition of probation without the defendant
being present. In open court a drug test requirement was added to terms of
probation for a number of probationers, none of whom were present. The defendant
submitted to testing and had his probation revoked based upon the results.
Reversed. Condition was not valid.
State v. Hayes (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 110
-- Court is without authority to add conditions of probation, without the
consent of the probationer, after he has begun to serve his sentence.
State v. Griffin (1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d
696 -- Six weeks after imposing a split sentence of jail time, to be served
concurrently with 11 years of prison time, and community control, court ex
parte and without notice to the defendant tolled the period of community
control until after release. Without a violation of the original terms, the
court was without authority to do so.
State v. Hooks (1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d
750 -- After GSI defendant received five years of community control sanctions,
but without any violation of their terms, the court added a requirement that he
vacate his home within seven days, out of concern for the family which had moved
into an upstairs apartment. Reversed.
Columbus v. Todd (1991), 74 Ohio App. 3d
774 -- (1) Probation may not be extended where the defendant has agreed to
perform community service. (2) A court may not extend probation without a
rational basis. Only reason apparent upon the record was the judge's
misunderstanding of the law applicable to the transfer of license plates to a
newly purchased vehicle.
State v. McMullen (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d
244 -- Syllabus: "A judge may, pursuant to
R.C. 2951.09, impose a longer
sentence after revocation of a defendant's probation without violating the
defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy. (United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, followed.)" Also see State v. Emerick
(1995), 108 Ohio App. 3d 401 Same does not apply to shock probation. See State v. Draper (1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 81.
State v. Meyer (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 4
-- When shock probation is revoked, the court may change the original term of
incarceration to one of actual incarceration. State v. Draper (1991), 60
Ohio St. 3d 81, distinguished. See dissent.
State v. Simpson (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d
40, 440 N.E. 2d 617 -- Probationer must be declared an absconder to toll running
of period of probation. Court may not validly extend period of probation without
notice to probationer.
In re Townsend (1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d 136
-- The term "absconds" as used in
R.C. 2951.07 can include a probationer who
willfully fails to report to his probation officer even though he may have
remained within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In order to toll the
running of the probationary period the state need not prove that the defendant
left the jurisdiction.
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Conditional probation of a drug dependent person
Treatment in Lieu of Conviction.
State v. Lampkin (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d
341 -- A hearing on eligibility for conditional probation for treatment is
required when the request is made in a timely manner. Compare State v. Baker
(1995), 99 Ohio App. 3d 718 where passing consideration was given conditional
probation at sentencing, and this was found enough to satisfy the hearing
requirement of R.C. 2951.04(B).
State v. Bush (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 407
-- To be eligible for conditional probation for treatment, an offender must
otherwise be eligible for probation under the terms of
R.C. 2951.04. Numerous
prior convictions and probation violations rendered defendant ineligible as a
State v. Riley (1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 420
-- It was error not to advise a defendant who asked that he be placed on
probation for aggravated trafficking that he had the right to request
conditional probation for treatment. At p. 423: "The trial court has a mandatory
duty to advise an eligible defendant of his right to request conditional
probation under R.C. 2951.04(A) if the court has reason to believe that the
defendant is or may become drug dependent, and there is no statutory limit on
the way a reasonable belief may be engendered." Also see State v. Pruitt
(1984), 18 Ohio App. 3d 50. Compare State v. Boyd (1994), 95 Ohio App. 3d
679 (Harmless error not to advise where D was aware of conditional probation and
it was considered and rejected by the judge.)
State v. Stevens (1978), 58 Ohio App. 2d 6
-- Decision whether or not to grant conditional probation must be made at time
eligibility for regular probation is determined. Also see State v. Wheeler
(1976), 49 Ohio Misc. 41 for the proposition that once the defendant has been
delivered into the custody of the institution, the court's power to suspend
execution of sentence is limited to shock probation.
State v. Ramey (1975), 46 Ohio App. 2d
184, 188 -- While court may not grant conditional probation for treatment once
the defendant has been delivered to the institution, it may utilize shock
probation to accomplish the same objectives.
State v. Cooper (1983), 8 Ohio App. 3d 340
-- Court may impose conditions of probation in addition to enrolling in a
treatment program. Defendant may be found in violation of terms of probation at
the behest of the probation department even absent a complaint by program.
State v. Gledhill (1984), 13 Ohio App. 3d
372 -- No due process or equal protection violation found in denial of reference
for medical and psychiatric evaluation.
State v. Nagle (1986), 23 Ohio St. 3d 185
-- Syllabus: "When a defendant's sentence has been suspended and he has been
placed on conditional probation pursuant to
R.C. 2951.04, and later violates the
terms of such probation, the trial court is not required to credit time spent in
a rehabilitation facility against any sentence originally imposed. [Note:
nothing in the decision precludes credit being given and result might be
otherwise if programs is particularly confining. State, ex rel. Corder, v.
Wilson (1991), 68 Ohio App. 3d 567 holds the APA must accept time spent in
such facilities, if included in time certified by court, or appeal.]
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State v. Malone, Lucas App. No.
2004-Ohio-5246 -- Crim. R. 11 does not apply to community control
State v. McKinney, Fairfield App. No.
2004-Ohio-4035 -- Community control may not be revoked once the term
has run, even if revocation proceedings commence before time has run.
State v. Smith, Mahoning App. No. 01 CA
2002-Ohio-6710 -- Municipal court treated failure to comply with terms of
probation as contempt rather than a violation of probation. The proper action
would have been a motion to terminate probation. Even if contempt proceedings
were appropriate, due process notice and procedural requirements for indirect
contempt of court are comparable to those for probation revocation.
State v. Weaver (2001), 141 Ohio App.
3d 512 -- Defendant was granted community control but never reported. Judge
treated the initial sentence as a nullity and imposed the maximum prison
sentence. (1) Formal revocation proceedings were required. (2) Conventional due
process standards applied. (3) Failure to object did not waive those rights. (4)
Imposition of sentence had to be in accordance with SB 2 standards, including
consideration of statutory factors and findings supporting more than the minimum
sentence and imposing the maximum sentence. Also see State v. Hinton,
Franklin App. Nos. 03AP-473, 474,
State v. McConnell (2001), 143 Ohio App.
3d 219 -- Defendant was given concurrent prison terms and later granted judicial
release. Upon revocation she was given consecutive prison terms. (1) Court was
without authority to do so as granting judicial release suspended original
sentence, and was not the equivalent of an initial grant of community control.
(2) Fleeting inquiry whether an attorney was desired was insufficient compliance
with the Crim R. 32.3(B) and Crim. R. 44(C) requirement there be a written
waiver of counsel.
State v. Young, 154 Ohio App. 3d 609,
2003-Ohio-4501 -- A prosecutor may request a hearing to determine whether there
have been community control violations.
State v. Simpkins, 120 Ohio Misc. 2d
2001-Ohio-4734 -- A prosecutor does not have standing to initiate probation
Kaine v. Marion Prison Warden (2000), 88
Ohio App. 3d 454 -- Probation revocation proceedings must be commenced during
the probationary period, which begins on the date being placed on probation is
State v. Mynhier (2001), 146 Ohio 217 --
Failure to provide probationer with a copy of supplemental rules until after a
violation was charged found to be a statutory violation, but not a violation of
due process as he had previously been advised of the no contact order at the
sentencing hearing and in the judgment entry, and admitted he knew he was to
have no contact with his stepdaughter. Court also excuses a legion of other
omissions before remanding for a new sentencing hearing because findings were
not made in support of consecutive sentences. See dissent.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S.
778 -- A probationer facing revocation, like a parolee, is entitled to both a
preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions set forth in
Morrissey v. Brewer, infra.
Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471
-- Minimum due process standards applicable to parole or probation revocation
are: (1) written notice of the claimed violations; (2) disclosure of the
evidence against the individual; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer finds good cause for
not allowing such confrontation); (5) a neutral and detached hearing officer;
and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and
the reasons for the revocation.
State v. Delaney (1984), 11 Ohio St. 3d
231 -- Counsel's failure to insist on compliance with due process standards may
prevent relief on appeal.
State v. Jones (1997), 123 Ohio App. 3d
144 -- Before the end of the probationary period, an order of arrest was filed
by the probation department, but no judicial warrant was issued. The running of
the probationary period was not tolled, thus the court was without jurisdiction
to conduct a hearing after its expiration.
State v. Murr (1987), 35 Ohio App. 3d 159
-- The judge who initially placed a defendant on probation may preside at
revocation proceedings, absent a showing of undue bias, hostility or absence of
State v. Hamm (October 8, 1992), Franklin
Co. App. No. 92AP-216, unreported (1992 Opinions 4779) -- (1) Judge should have
recused himself from revocation hearing after listening privately to tapes made
by complaining party and presented for ex parte review by probation officer. (2)
Calls to ex wife's home, where children resided, found not to provide basis for
State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v.
Coniglio (1993), 82 Ohio App. 3d 52 -- Under the Interstate Compact for the
Supervision of Parolees and Probationers (R.C. 5149.17), Ohio court lacked
authority to set bond for probationer picked up in Ohio at the request of
State v. Grigsby (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d
291, 303 -- At the time sentence is passed for a subsequent offense, the court
may not summarily reactivate a previously dismissed probation violation claim
and impose sentence. Compare State v. Woods (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 606
finding it was sufficient that the defendant was given the opportunity to speak.
State v. Sanders (1992), 78 Ohio App. 3d
672 -- Improper suspension of execution of sentence following revocation of
probation may deprive court of jurisdiction to pursue later revocation
State v. Frost (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 772
-- Defendant's inability to retain counsel during the twenty-nine day period
leading up to a final probation revocation hearing not construed as an implied
waiver. Defendant was incarcerated after initial appearance and never made an
State v. White (1995). 100 Ohio App. 3d 62
-- Revocation hearing proceeded with appointed counsel, despite references to
"my regular attorney." No error found since record doesn't establish existence
or identity of retained counsel. App. R. 9(C) or (D) statement should have been
State v. Wallace (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d
262 -- If probation revocation proceedings are initiated in a timely manner,
they may be pursued even though the probationer is not arrested until after the
specified period of probation has expired. Also see State v. Cass (1991),
77 Ohio App. 3d 697.
State v. Carreker (1987), 39 Ohio App. 3d
112 -- While probation revocation proceedings must be disposed of with
reasonable diligence, on appeal it must demonstrated that the delay caused
prejudice. Also see United States v. Lee
(7th Cir. 1991), 941 F.2d 571; Simon v. Mosley (10th Cir. 1971), 452 F.2d
306; United States v. Gernie (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 228 F. Supp. 329.
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State v. Dockery, 187 Ohio App. 3d
2010-Ohio-2365 – Community control was terminated after the defendant tested
positive for alcohol and failed to make payments on financial sanctions. His
terms of community control required abstaining from the use of controlled
substances. Alcohol is not a controlled substance, nor was abstention from its
consumption made a condition. As to nonpayment, the trial court did not have
before it sufficient information to determine whether the failure was willful,
nor had it explored alternative punishments such as community service.
State v. Wagner,
179 Ohio App. 3d 165,
2008-Ohio-5765 – At a community control revocation hearing the state has the
burden of proof by preponderance. Basis for violation was failure to comply with
Rule One which required the defendant refrain from committing criminal acts and
to report to P.O. promptly is arrested or questioned. Fact the defendant may
have been charged with DV doesn‘t establish he violated the law. Nor was a
failure to report shown. Evidence did not support revocation.
State v. Toler, 154 Ohio App. 3d 590,
2003-Ohio-5129 -- Court sidesteps the propriety of an indigent's inability to
pay fine, costs and restitution as the basis for revoking community control by
finding failure to report by itself was sufficient basis.
State v. Perkins, 154 Ohio App. 3d 631,
2003-Ohio-5092 -- Court erred by locking defendant up for failure to pay fines
and costs without first conducting a hearing on ability to pay.
Black v. Romano (1985), 471 U.S. 606 --
Basis for revocation need not relate to nature of original charge defendant was
placed on probation for.
Zanders v. Anderson (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d
269 -- Syllabus: "A reversed criminal conviction may serve as the basis for
probation revocation unless the probationer pleads and proves that reversal
removes all factual support for the probation revocation. (State ex rel.
Hickman v. Capots , 45 Ohio St. 3d 324...Flenoy v. Ohio Adult
Parole Authority , 56 Ohio St. 3d 131...and State ex rel. Jackson
v. McFaul , 73 Ohio St. 3d 185...followed. In re Petition of
Mallory , 17 Ohio St. 3d 34...overruled to the extent that it is
inconsistent with this opinion."
In re Petition for Mallory (1985), 17 Ohio
St. 3d 34 -- Probation was revoked on the basis of a CCW conviction which was
reversed on appeal and subsequently dismissed in the trial court. Writ of habeas
corpus granted and defendant ordered released. Once the second conviction was
nullified, revocation was outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
State v. Craig (1998), 130 Ohio App. 3d
639 -- Community control may be revoked though new charges were dismissed.
Reversed nonetheless as defendant was denied his right to confrontation. Victim
of new domestic violence charge did not appear, court made no finding of good
cause for not allowing confrontation and arresting officer's testimony did not
fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule or otherwise carry indicia of
Columbus v. Bickel (1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d
26 -- (1) The required minimum term of probation that the defendant abide by the
law refers to the criminal law. The court need not wait until there has been a
conviction to revoke probation. The condition does not validly extend to
compliance with Domestic Relations Court support orders. (2) Criminal nonsupport
could be the basis for revocation. (3) While the rules of evidence may be
relaxed somewhat in probation revocation cases, evidence admitted must still be
properly authenticated, marked and admitted into evidence in order to be
State v. Whitt (1994), 98 Ohio App. 3d 211
-- Probationer attempted to have doctor phone supposedly lost prescription into
one Wal-Mart after it had already been filled at another. Court concludes that
probation was not revoked because of status as a drug dependent person, but
because of behavior in misrepresenting that prescription had been lost in order
to illegally obtain drugs.
Columbus v. Beuthin (1996), 108 Ohio App.
3d 651 -- "Because appellant's rules of probation did not prohibit him from
being intoxicated, the mere fact that he reported to the work release program
under the influence is an insufficient basis for revoking his probation. Due
process requirements mandate that the trial court identify the probationary rule
which appellant violated and the supporting evidence."
Bearden v. Georgia (1983), 461 U.S. 660 --
Probation may not be revoked solely because defendant was unable to pay fine or
restitution and without consideration of alternative means of punishment. Also
see Tate v. Short
(1971), 401 U.S. 395; State v. Scott (1982), 6 Ohio App. 3d 39; State
v. Crawford (1977), 54 Ohio App. 2d 86.
State v. Woods (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 81
-- Headnote states: "Revocation of probation for failure to pay costs and make
restitution does not constitute a denial of equal protection to a person
claiming to be indigent, who has not sustained her burden of presenting evidence
indicating she has made a good-faith effort within the limits of her ability to
comply with the terms of her probation order."
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Revocation, adjudicatory hearing issues
State v. Frey, 166 Ohio App. 3d 819,
2006-Ohio-2452 -- While probation revocation hearings are not subject to the
rules of evidence, the admission of hearsay may violate the defendant's due
process right to confront adverse witnesses. It is reversible error when such
hearsay is the sole evidence presented and is crucial to the determination of a
probation revocation. Here there was only hearsay to the effect the defendant
violated the requirement he not share a household with children. Consideration
of those statements was error, but not a basis for reversal as there was
acceptable evidence as to other violations.
State v. Mingua (1974), 42 Ohio App. 2d 35
-- Headnote two: "Although the quantum of evidence required to support probation
revocation need not be 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' it must be 'substantial,'
and such evidence must meet the test of competency."
State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole
Authority (1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 82 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus:
"Evidence obtained through an unreasonable or unlawful search and seizure is
generally admissible in probation and/or parole revocation proceedings. (State
v. Burkholder , 12 Ohio St. 3d 205...overruled.)" See dissenting
State v. Cossin (1996), 110 Ohio App. 3d
79 -- Statement made to probation officer without Miranda warnings was
admissible in revocation proceedings. Statements would not be admissible in new
criminal proceedings. Also see Minnesota v. Murphy (1984), 465 U.S. 420.
State v. Qualls (1988), 50 Ohio App. 3d 56
-- Headnote 2: "Insanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation
hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue
is timely raised," Also see State v. Bell (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 52, 57
-- "...(T)he true focus of the probation revocation probation proceeding is
whether a condition of probation has been violated, and if so, what should be
State v. Zeiszler (1984), 19 Ohio App. 3d
138 -- A defendant in revocation proceedings has the right to confront adverse
witnesses, unless there is a finding of good cause not to allow confrontation.
State v. Miller (1975), 42 Ohio St. 2d 102
-- Rights to confrontation and due process denied where the probation officer
who prepared the entries in the records of the probation department relied upon
to revoke probation did not appear and testify.
Columbus v. Lacy (1988), 46 Ohio App. 3d
161 -- Due process standards violated where: (1) Probation officer who prepared
statement of violations did not testify. (2) Court summarily revoked probation
at second hearing, relying only on evidence presented at first hearing. (3)
Court relied on urine test results not properly demonstrated to be trustworthy.
State v. Colvin (April 22, 1993), Franklin
Co. App. No. 92AP-1256, unreported (1993 Opinions 1496) -- Due process denied
where revocation was based on reading of excerpts from letter received from
supervision probation officer in Texas and where it was uncertain whether the
defendant had been advised of additional conditions of probation. While live
testimony of the out of state probation officer might not have been necessary,
affidavits and probation records should have been introduced.
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In re J.F., 121
Ohio St. 3d 76,
2009-Ohio-318 – Syllabus: "A court may order a juvenile to serve a
previously suspended commitment after probation supervision has been terminated
when the juvenile violates a separate, unexpired condition of community
control." In the majority‘s view though probation had ended the juvenile
remained subject to community service and monitored time conditions of community
control. Dissenters believe court‘s termination of probation terminated all
conditions of community control.
State v. Thompson,
193 Ohio App. 3d 44,
2011-Ohio-1606 – In stating the potential prison term faced
in the event community control was revoked, use of the word
“may” was permissible.
State v. Schlecht, Champaign App. No.
2003-Ohio-5336 -- Substantial credit for time served is not
justification for imposition of the maximum sentence upon revocation of
community control. ¶ 24: "(I)f jail credit must be given for time spent in an
alternative facility, the credit cannot be erased through the process of
imposing sentence for a community control violation." First determining that the
maximum sentence was not warranted, the court goes on to conclude no more than
the minimum was justified and modifies the sentence accordingly.
State v. Rice, Hamilton App. No.
2003-Ohio-1016 -- To revoke community control of a felony drug
offender R.C. 2929.13(E)(2)(a) requires finding either (1) the offender has
continued to use drugs after reasonable participation in a drug treatment
program, or (2) imprisonment is consistent with the general purposes of
sentencing set forth in
State v. Saunders (2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d
221 -- Upon revocation of community control the court may impose a prison
sentence. However, it may not impose the maximum sentence without making
findings as required by
State v. Edmonson (1999),
86 Ohio St. 3d 324 applied.
State v. Toner, Greene App. No. 02CA60,
2003-Ohio-1570 -- Consecutive, non-minimum sentences imposed following
revocation of community control require findings, as would have been required in
support of such an initial sentence.
State v. McPherson (2001), 142 Ohio App.
3d 274, 281-283 -- Upon revocation of community control imprisonment is not the
State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St. 3d 134,
2004-Ohio-4746 -- Syllabus: "(1) Pursuant to
R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), a trial court
sentencing an offender to a community control sanction is required to deliver
the statutorily detailed notifications at the sentencing hearing. (State v.
Comer, 99 Ohio St. 3d 463,
2003-Ohio-4165, 703 N.E. 2d 473, applied and
followed.) (2) Pursuant to
R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) and
2929.15(B), a trial court
sentencing an offender to a community control sanction must, at the time of
sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed
for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a prerequisite to imposing
a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation." Pronouncement must be
in court. Inclusion in judgment entry is not enough. A specific term must be
stated, though the court has the option of imposing less time if there is a
State v. Campbell, 162 Ohio App. 3d
2005-Ohio-3980 -- If consecutive sentences may be imposed upon violation of
community control, the defendant must be advised accordingly at the initial
sentencing hearing. Also see State v. Thompson, Fairfield App. No.
State v. Sutton, 162 Ohio App. 3d 802,
2005-Ohio-4589 -- Motorist convicted of OMVI was sentenced to community control
pursuant to R.C. 2929.25. Upon revocation it was claimed the court was obliged
to have stated a presumptive maximum term, thus limiting additional jail time
upon violation. Though that is the rule of State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.
2004-Ohio-4746 in felony cases, in imposing community control for
misdemeanors the court is only required to advise of the possibility of imposing
a term within the range of jail terms authorized for the offense. The court is
also required to advise that it may impose longer or more restrictive community
control sanctions upon a violation, but failure to do so is harmless when this
has not been done.
State v. See, Franklin App. No.
2004-Ohio-7205 -- Applying
Brooks, merely informing the defendant that up to twenty-four months
could be imposed for violation of community control is not enough.
State v. Marvin (1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d
63 -- (1) If at the time of sentencing the court fails to advise the defendant
that he can be imprisoned upon violation of community control sanctions, in the
process mentioning the length of such term, that defendant may not be sent to
prison as the result of revocation proceedings. Also see State v. Carter
(1999), 136 Ohio App. 3d 367; State v. Brown (2000), 136 Ohio App. 3d
816; State v. Virasaychak
(2000), 138 Ohio App. 3d 570; State v. Grodhaus (2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d
615; State v. McPherson (2001), 142 Ohio App. 3d 274. Compare State v.
Nutt (October 19, 2000), Franklin Co. App. No. 00AP-190, unreported
(reference to 1-5 years enough notice); State v. Miller (December 30,
1999), Tuscarawas Co. App. No. 1999AP-02-0010 (reference to "up to the maximum
term" sufficient). (2) Upon revocation, any prison term imposed may not exceed
the term stated at the original sentencing hearing. (3) If the court fails to
make required findings in passing sentence, once the case is on appeal the court
lacks jurisdiction to remedy such error by further action.
State v. Sutherlin, 154 Ohio App. 3d
2003-Ohio-5265 -- (1) Though the court failed to state a presumptive term
at the initial sentencing hearing, at an initial community control revocation
hearing the defendant was told he would get the maximum if there was a further
violation. Since this was by nature a sentencing hearing, imprisonment is
allowed upon subsequent revocation. Followed: State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio
St. 3d 13,
2004-Ohio-7110. (2) Double jeopardy violation found where revocation
was based on testimony of the victim of a subsequent offense the defendant had
been acquitted on at trial.
State v. Hatfield, 164 Ohio App. 3d
2005-Ohio-6259 -- Presumptive prison term was not mentioned at all at the
initial sentencing and only in the entry continuing community control after
violation proceedings. Brooks was not satisfied and defendant is
entitled to its benefit since his case was not resolved until after the Brooks decision was issued.
State v. Baccus, Hamilton App. No.
2004-Ohio-5725 -- The initial terms of community control were
continued following an initial revocation hearing. This did not amount to a
resentencing, though there was reference to possible imprisonment if there was a
further violation. Absent resentencing, the initial failure to advise continues
to preclude imprisonment upon a subsequent violation.
State v. Nutt (October 19, 2000), Franklin
Co. App. No. 00AP-190, unreported -- (1) "If a trial court fails to notify an
offender of the specific prison term that could be imposed, the court may not
sentence an offender to prison following a violation of the terms of a community
control sanction." But the opinion suggests that the duty to notify the
defendant of potential imprisonment upon violation of community control may be
discharged at the guilty plea hearing. (2) Violation of community control need
not itself be a felony for a prison sentence to be imposed. No contact violation
State v. Bradley, 151 Ohio App. 3d 341,
2003-Ohio-216 -- Where the trial court failed to notify a defendant placed on
community control as to the specific term of imprisonment which might be imposed
upon violation, it was without authority to impose any prison sentence as a
sanction upon revocation. Court rejects substantial compliance claim based on
advice as to possibility of imprisonment and maximum term at the time of the
State v. Adams, Champaign App. No.
2004-Ohio-3784 -- Having initially failed to state a prison term in
the event community control was violated, court did so at the resentencing
hearing. Appeal of that order held to be premature, as defendant had not yet
received a sentence for a further violation.
State v. Barnhouse, 102 Ohio St. 3d
2004-Ohio-2492 -- Defendant convicted of multiple counts of nonsupport had
not been notified he faced a term of imprisonment upon violation of community
control. Trial court believed it could not send him to prison, so instead
imposed consecutive jail terms. Syllabus: "R.C. 2929.16(A)(2) does not authorize
a trial court to impose consecutive jail sentences." ¶12: Jail time on a felony
pursuant to 2929.16 qualifies as imprisonment.
Friesel, 168 Ohio App. 3d 198,
2006-Ohio-3870 -- Court did not state a presumptive prison
term at sentencing. Since time in a community based correctional
facility is not the equivalent of prison time, CBCF time was an
option upon violation of the terms of community control.
In re Nowak (1999), 133 Ohio App. 3d 396
-- Juvenile was found in contempt in absentia for what was essentially a
probation violation. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings since there
is no authority for proceeding in contempt in such circumstances, and probation
violation proceedings require the presence of the defendant. Dissenting judge
would find no violation based on the facts of the case.
State v. Curtis (2001), 143 Ohio App. 3d
314 -- In confusing circumstances, court upholds imposition of a 12 month
sentence upon violation of community control, though original sentence was 11
months of imprisonment with six months to be served locally. See dissent.
State ex rel. Gadsden v. Lioi 93 Ohio St.
2001-Ohio-1611 -- Mandamus action properly dismissed where inmate
challenged outcome of probation revocation proceedings. Motion for delayed
appeal (previously denied) or motion to vacate judgment provided adequate
remedies at law.
State v. Bay (2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d 402
-- Community control violator is entitled to credit for time served in jail on
the same charge. Also see State v. Napier
(2001), 93 Ohio St. 3d 646; State v. Murray (2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d 217
reaching the same conclusion as to CBCF time.
State v. Murray (2000), 140 Ohio App.
3d 217 reaching the same conclusion as to CBCF time.
State v. Deener (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 335
-- Probationer may be validly arrested relying on a teletyped order to arrest
based on probation violation.
Carchman v. Nash (1985), 473 U.S. 716 --
Art. III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R.C. 2963.30) does not apply
to disposition of detainers based on probation revocation charges.
State v. Jackson (1995), 106 Ohio App. 3d
345 -- Even if information furnished the judge at the revocation hearing proves
to have been false, once probation is terminated, the court may not rescind that
order and revoke probation. When a period of probation ends, the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court terminates. Also see State v. Jackson (1988),
56 Ohio App. 3d 141; Lakewood v. Davies (1987), 35 Ohio App. 3d 107;
State v. O'Leary (1987), 43 Ohio App. 3d 107.
State v. Hummer (1995), 107 Ohio App.
3d 296 -- Defendant was sentenced to the Department of Corrections but referred
for placement in a community based correctional facility and probation. He was
accepted before being transferred to a state facility. Since he had not been
transported to the state facility, upon revocation, his sentences could be
ordered served consecutively instead of concurrently. State v. Draper
(1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 81, applied. Also see State v. Grujicic (1996),
116 Ohio App. 3d 289 where same court finds no error in making sentences
consecutive upon revocation of probation and shock probation in separate cases.
Bowling Green v. Luda (1992), 81 Ohio App.
3d 799 -- A court may not separately fine a defendant for violation of the terms
of probation. Payment of any additional amount is limited to the amount of the
fine initially imposed and suspended, conditioned on probation.
State v. Smith (May 15, 1979), Franklin
Co. App. No. 78AP-661 (1979 Opinions 1293) -- Credit for time served calculated
upon revocation of probation must include time previously spent in jail as a
condition of probation.
State v. Gregory (1996), 108 Ohio App. 3d
264 -- Defendant absconded during probation, then spent time in jail awaiting
disposition of new charges and probation revocation. Following acquittal on new
charge, defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in jail against sentence
imposed on probation revocation. In view of acquittal, court could not allocate
all of that time to the new charge. (2) It is the duty of the court and not the
Department of Corrections to calculate jail time credit.
State v. Jones (1978), 60 Ohio App. 2d 178
-- Defendant's agreement to extension of probation defeats later claim that
hearing did not comply with full due process standards.
State v. Zorns (1997), 120 Ohio App. 3d
360 -- Postconviction is not available to attack probation revocation
proceedings as irregularities is such proceedings do not affect the validity of
the original judgment of conviction. Also see State v. Armstrong (1988),
56 Ohio App. 3d 105.
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