Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
David L. Strait and the Franklin County Public Defender Office
Last Updated 3/3/2015
Also see Guilty
Pleas; No Contest Pleas.
Consequences when no agreement is reached
Role of the judge
to fulfill obligations
Criminal Rule 11(C) and (D) -- permit court to
refuse to accept guilty or no contest plea in both felony and
Criminal Rule 11(F) -- requires plea agreement
in a felony case be stated on the record.
Criminal Rule 11(H) -- when court refuses to
accept guilty or no contest plea, it is to enter not guilty plea on
behalf of the
R.C. 2941.33 -- Nolle prosequi may not be
entered without leave of the court.
State v. Gilbert, ___ Ohio St.3d ___,
2014-Ohio-4562, ___ N.E.3d ___-- Once a defendant has been sentenced by a
trial court, that court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion by the
state to vacate the defendant’s guilty plea and sentence based upon the
defendant’s alleged violation of a plea agreement.
State v. Fitzgerald, 188 Ohio App. 3d
2010-Ohio-3721 – A judge’s blanket policy of not accepting plea bargains
once a trial date has been set constitutes an abuse of discretion.
State v. Aponte (2001), 145 Ohio App. 3d
607 -- "Defendant's agreement" provided for the defendant to plead guilty to
first degree felonies, then if he fulfilled his obligations the pleas could be
withdrawn and pleas entered to less serious offenses. Since the court, not the
prosecutor, had the authority to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas, the plea
bargain was illusory and unenforceable. Pleas were voidable. Trial and appellate
counsel were ineffective. Application of res judicata would be unjust.
State v. Georgakopoulos, 152 Ohio App.
2003-Ohio-1531 -- The court is not required to impose the sentence
jointly recommended by the prosecution and defense as part of a plea bargain
where it was not a party to that agreement.
Weatherford v. Bursey (1977), 429 U.S.
545, 560-561 -- There is not constitutional right to a plea bargain. Prosecutor
need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.
Akron v. Ragsdale (1978), 61 Ohio App. 2d
107, 109 -- The trial court may reject a plea bargain if it within the sound
exercise of its discretion to do so. State v. Ridgeway (1990), 66 Ohio
App. 3d 270.
State v. Hughes (December 30, 1982),
Franklin Co. App. No. 82AP-695, unreported (1982 Opinions 4027) -- When there
has been an express plea bargain agreement entered into, the court may accept or
reject the agreement, but it is not the court's prerogative to change the terms
of the plea bargain without the consent of both parties.
State v. Menucci (1986), 33 Ohio Misc. 2d
15 -- While the trial court has the final authority to accept or reject a plea
bargain, it should not summarily reject the prosecutions recommendation in a
plea bargain. Also see Akron v. Ragsdale (1978), 61 Ohio App. 2d 107,
North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S.
25 -- A guilty plea may be voluntary, knowing and understanding, where entered
to avoid a greater penalty, though the defendant denies guilt.
State v. Darmour (1987), 38 Ohio App. 3d
160, 161 -- "No abuse of discretion is present when the trial court forewarns a
defendant that it will not consider itself bound by any sentencing agreement and
defendant fails to change his plea."
State v. Childress (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d
258 -- As a part of a plea bargain, an indictment may be amended to add a
physical harm specification pursuant to
R.C. 2941.143, thus requiring an
indeterminate sentence, without submitting the specification to a grand jury.
State v. Dilley (1989), 47 Ohio St. 3d 20, distinguished. Also see State
v. Fryling (1992), 85 Ohio App. 3d 557.
United States, ex rel. Caruso, v. Zelinski
(3rd Cir. 1982), 689 F. 2d 435, 438 -- Counsel's failure to communicate plea
offer to defendant was a gross deviation from accepted professional standards
and may be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Consequences when no agreement is reached
State v. Cardinal, Franklin App. Nos.
04AP-229 through 233,
2004-Ohio-6605 -- Sua sponte order of competency
evaluation was not warranted. Defense counsel did not question competency and
the defendant's behavior in court was not erratic. Grounds cited after the fact
by the prosecutor are commonplace. Evaluation appears to have been a stall to
provide more time to work out a plea bargain in a case involving numerous
State v. Tillman (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d
464, 467-468 -- It is improper for a prosecutor to assert in closing argument
that he refused to plea bargain with the defendant.
State v. Davis (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 48
-- After plea bargaining broke down and case proceeded to trial, held that court
properly kept out testimony that defendant had not pleaded guilty be cause he
was not guilty.
State v. Mitchell (1997), 117 Ohio App. 3d
703 -- Defendant rejected plea bargain and received a substantially longer
sentence after being convicted at trial. Though some aspects of the court's
action may be criticized, there is no presumption of vindictiveness in these
circumstances, and the defendant's record and attitude following conviction
reflected poorly on his "prospects for rehabilitation." See dissent.
State v. Robertson (1995), 108 Ohio App.
3d 173 -- The presumption of vindictiveness which applies when a defendant has
won on appeal, then been convicted when retried and given a greater sentence,
does not apply when the greater sentence follows an appeal from a guilty plea,
and conviction at trial.
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State v. Sawyer,
183 Ohio App. 3d 65,
2009-Ohio-3097 – Judge took a very active role in promoting a plea bargain
that netted the defendant maximum consecutive sentences in a plea to aggravated
assault, reduced from felonious assault. Negotiations were already underway, the
judge is said to have been seeking clarification, and his conduct is not deemed
coercive to the extent the defendant would have feared she could not receive a
State v. Stafford, 158 Ohio App. 3d
2004-Ohio-3893 -- After opening statements the judge pressed the defendant
to plead guilty, saying even though the facts merited more time, he would
probably be given an eleven year sentence. If convicted he would probably get
twenty-three years. Upon conviction, the sentence was twenty years. Reversed. It
was a denial of due process to punish the defendant for asserting his right to
jury trial. The record demonstrates actual vindictiveness, or at least the state
has failed to overcome the presumption of vindictiveness.
In re Steinmetz, Montgomery App. No.
2002-Ohio-4685 -- Magistrate coaxed an admission by threatening stacked
sentences if a juvenile wasted the court's time and went to trial and there were
multiple convictions, versus six months on an admission. Coercion found even
absent a statement by the juvenile that he felt coerced, since the record
indicates he came to court intending to reject the state's plea offer.
Columbus v. Bee (1979), 67 Ohio App. 2d 65
-- When the judge has taken an active role in plea bargaining, and a tentative
sentence has been discussed, if negotiations break down and the case goes to
trial and a harsher sentence is imposed in the end, the record must show that
improper weight was not given to the defendant's failure to accept the plea
bargain and that the sentence was based solely on the facts of the case and the
defendant's individual history.
State v. Byrd (1980), 63 Ohio St. 2d 288,
293-294 -- "(W)e hold that a trial judge's participation in the plea bargaining
process must be carefully scrutinized to determine if the judge's intervention
affected the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea. Ordinarily, if the
judge's active conduct could lead a defendant to believe he cannot get a fair
trial because the judge thinks that a trial is a futile exercise or that the
judge would be biased against him at trial, the plea should be held to be
involuntary and void under the Fifth Amendment and Section 10, Article I of the
Ohio Constitution." Also see State v. Ball (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 224.
State v. Walker (1989), 61 Ohio App. 3d
768 -- It was improper for a judge to encourage the defendant to plead guilty by
telling him trial was futile because of the number of his prior convictions and
weakness of his defense.
State v. Harper (1988), 47 Ohio App. 3d
109 -- Headnote 1: "In deciding whether to accept a no contest plea, a trial
court abuses its discretion by considering such inappropriate matters as plea
bargaining and defendant's expressed desire to preserve his right to appeal; by
repeatedly advising defendant that any plea agreement must be based upon a
guilty plea, the court adversely affects the voluntariness of defendant's
eventual decision to plead guilty."
United States, ex rel. Elksnis, v. Gilligan
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), 256 F. Supp. 244 -- "The unequal positions of the judge and the
accused...at once raise a question of fundamental fairness. When a judge becomes
a participant in plea bargaining he brings to bear the full force and majesty of
his office.... A defendant needs no reminder that if he rejects the proposal,
stands upon his right to trial and is convicted, he faces a significantly longer
sentence.... Intentionally or otherwise, and no matter how well motivated the
judge may be, the accused is subjected to a subtle but powerful influence."
State v. Filchock (1996), 116 Ohio App. 3d
572 -- Court erred in accepting no contest plea to OMVI and other charges
without informing the defendant of the effect of his plea, apprising him of his
right to counsel and obtaining a waiver of counsel, and making certain that the
plea was knowing and voluntary in the constitutional sense. Judge faulted for
having proposed the plea bargain, promised what sentence he would give, and
implied things would come out worse otherwise. Due process violation found. Also
see State v. Filchock
(1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d 66.
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State v. Gilroy, 195 Ohio App. 3d
2011-Ohio-4163 – Defendant with a long record was promised probation if she
(1) went for a PSI, (2) retuned for sentencing, and (3) stayed out of trouble
until then. During the time between hearings she tested positive for marijuana
and cocaine. Second condition wasn’t met, thus the court property imposed a
State v. Arde, 190 Ohio App. 3d 196,
2010-Ohio-5274 – Financial manger embezzled almost $350,000. Plea agreement
was a three year sentence provided she showed up for reporting dates and
sentencing and stayed out of trouble. A week before sentencing the judge
scheduled a hearing and asked where the embezzled money had gone. Defendant
responded that her husband was an addict who had bounced checks she paid back,
and that money was spent on living expenses. Judge claimed the failure to be
more specific breached he plea deal and gave her nine years. Reversed. Applying
contract principles, greater candor was not a part of the agreement, and the
defendant had met all of the other terms.
State v. Dumas, Fairfield App. No.
2003-Ohio-4117 -- A county prosecutor is an agent of the state of Ohio
only with respect to crimes committed in the home county. The Franklin County
Prosecutor's agreement to limit prosecution did not bind the Fairfield County
prosecutor as to a crime the defendant confessed to committing in that county.
State v. Roberts (2001), 141 Ohio App.
3d 578 -- Student who agreed to be a snitch won a new trial after state called
him to testify, which it was claimed ratified the initial agreement. Reversed as
motion for a new trial was not timely. Also see State v. Roberts, Wood
App. Nos. WD-03-001. WD-02-66,
2003-Ohio-5689 where the award of new trial on
remand is affirmed. ¶ 11: "...(W)hen a motion for new trial is granted, we
conclude that it is within the trial court's discretion whether or not to reopen
factual determinations which have already been fully litigated."
State v. Burks, Franklin App. No.
2005-Ohio-1262 -- Court did not initially release defendant on shock
probation as agreed, then balked at outright release when it turned out he was
ineligible for a CBCF placement the court deemed necessary. Specific performance
was impossible. Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S.
257 -- When prosecutor has failed to live up to his end of plea bargain (here to
make no recommendation as to sentence) available remedies are specific
performance of the original agreement or to allow the defendant to vacate his
plea. Case stands for the principle that the prosecutor must negotiate plea
bargains in good faith.
Mabry v. Johnson (1984), 467 U.S. 504 --
Though prosecution may have reneged on initial plea offer which defendant had
agreed to, defendant may not be able to have vacated subsequent agreement if it
was knowingly and voluntarily entered into.
State v. Johnson (June 23, 1981), Franklin
Co. App. No. 80AP-449, unreported (1981 Opinions 1807) -- Once plea offer had
been accepted by the defendant, it could not be withdrawn by the prosecutor,
though it was still subject to acceptance by the court. Also see State v.
Reynolds (February 27, 1973), Franklin Co. App No. 72AP-287, unreported
(1973 Opinions 477, 483)
State v. Carpenter (1993, 68 Ohio St. 3d
59 -- Syllabus: "The state cannot indict a defendant for murder after the court
has accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense and the victim later
dies of injuries sustained in the crime, unless the state expressly reserves the
right to file additional charges on the record at the time of the defendant's
State v. Burchfield (1997), 118 Ohio App.
3d 53 -- Parties seemingly reached a plea bargain during early phase of
prosecution in Municipal Court, but it was not enforceable because it was not
put into written form, signed by the parties, and because it was not stated on
the record in open court as required by Crim. R. 11(F). Had these things been
done, the agreement between the defendants and the city-designated special
prosecutor would have been enforceable notwithstanding an intervening indictment
obtained by the county prosecutor.
State v. Barnett (1998), 124 Ohio App. 3d
746 -- Defendant maintained plea bargain in Warren County bound the Montgomery
County Prosecutor, barring prosecution on additional charges. (1) State v.
Urvan (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 151, is limited to situations where different
counties attempt to prosecute allied offenses of similar import. (2) Though
county prosecutors all represent the State of Ohio, they do so only within their
own locale, and do not act under supervision of a broader authority such as the
state Attorney General of the federal Department of Justice. Whatever the Warren
County Prosecutor may have agreed to was done without apparent authority to bind
the Montgomery County Prosecutor.
State v. Matthews (1982), 8 Ohio App. 3d
145, 146 -- "Police officers have no authority to enter into plea-bargain
negotiations with a person accused of a crime, and such a plea-bargain agreement
is unenforceable and of no effect except upon motion to suppress evidence if
wrongfully obtained by promises made during the improper plea bargaining, which
is later repudiated by the prosecutor who has the authority to enter into plea
bargaining, subject to the ultimate review and approval by the court." Also see
State v. Cramer
(December 21, 1982), Franklin Co. App. No. 82AP-458, unreported (1982 Opinions
State v. Butts (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d
683 -- After guilty verdict, defendant agreed not to appeal in exchange for
dismissal of a specification alleging a prior aggravated felony conviction. The
right to appeal may be voluntarily waived. The agreement could be specifically
In re Leonhardt (1993), 62 Ohio Misc. 2d
783 -- Federal and state due process guarantees bar the refiling of a charge in
juvenile court which has previously been dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement.
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Failure to fulfil obligations
State v. Ross, 179
Ohio App. 3d 48,
2008-Ohio-5388 – As a part of plea bargain prosecutor agreed to stand mute
at sentencing. Agreement was not breeched by making a statement at the
sentencing hearing that at the time the agreement was struck the state was not
aware of offenses the defendant was alleged to have committed after that date in
a different county.
State v. Bethel,
110 Ohio St. 3d 416,
2006-Ohio-4853 -- In a capital homicide a plea agreement involved a proffer
inculpating the defendant and his agreement to testify against the codefendant.
He failed to do so. Court applies contract law to sort out language of the
agreement to determine whether statement could be used against the defendant at
his own trial. Court cites a 1911 civil case for the proposition that contracts
are to be construed to give effect to every provision therein. Death penalty
State v. Thompson, Adams App. No. 03 CA
2004-Ohio-2413 -- A plea bargain is contractual in nature, and was breached
when the prosecutor followed to follow through on his promise to recommend a
two-year sentence. It is within the discretion of the trial court whether to
require specific enforcement of the agreement or withdrawal of the plea, but it
must order one or the other.
State v. Scheer, 158 Ohio App. 3d 432,
2004-Ohio-4792 -- By silence at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor breached
the agreement to recommend a one year sentence if the judge did not grant
community control. But the error was harmless in view of the judge's recitation
of the agreement at the time the plea was entered.
State v. Lewis, Allen Case No. 1-02-10,
2002-Ohio-3950 -- Court acted within its discretion in overruling motion to
withdraw guilty plea made before sentencing. But prosecutor breached agreement
to stand mute at sentencing except as to restitution by stating that the
confidential informant had been assaulted by the defendant. Agreement to stand
mute was not limited to not recommending a sentence. Remanded to trial court to
fashion a remedy, suggestions being a new sentencing hearing in front of a
different judge, or further consideration of motion to withdraw guilty plea.
State v. Vega, Hamilton App. No. C-020486,
2003-Ohio-1548 -- Defendant paid for construction equipment auctioned by the
county with a check on a closed account. Plea bargain involved reduction of
charges, payment, return of seized machinery to the defendant, and a
recommendation of community control. Prosecutor found in breech as equipment was
sold by the county though defendant eventually came up with the money. Remedy is
remand with instructions defendant be allowed to withdraw his plea.
State v. Patrick, 163 Ohio App. 3d 666,
2005-Ohio-5332, ¶23-29 -- Agreement was that the defendant would get five years,
but the court gave six. Remedy is remand for resentencing. Though the defendant
also sought to withdraw his guilty pleas, the failure to impose the agreed upon
sentence did not invalidate the pleas.
State v. Price, Hamilton App. No.
2003-Ohio-7109, ¶ 1 -- "A trial court is not bound by an agreed
sentence where a defendant absconds before sentence and, after his arrest, the
court overrules his motion to withdraw his guilty plea."
State v. Adkins, 161 Ohio App. 3d 114,
2005-Ohio-2577 -- Defendant claimed the state breached its side of the plea
bargain which would have led to placement in a treatment program. The court held
defendant was in breach by failing to present himself for evaluation or appear
for hearings. At ¶9: Appearance at all scheduled court dates is an implied
covenant in any plea agreement.
State v. Yarborough, 165 Ohio App. 3d
2006-Ohio-270 -- Agreement was kept insofar as the aggregate sentence was
four years, but it was breached with respect to the promise of one year
concurrent mandatory sentences on some of the charges, Since this had an impact
on eligibility for judicial release, sentence is vacated.
State v. Walton (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d
117 -- When a defendant declines to testify against a codefendant, as agreed in
plea bargaining, and moves to withdraw the guilty plea, the court abuses its
discretion by allowing the plea to stand and imposing a sentence greater than
that agreed to. The court's options are to impose sentence according to the
agreement or to allow withdrawal of the plea.
Ricketts v. Adamson (1987), 483 U.S. 1 --
No double jeopardy violation found in the following circumstances: Defendant
pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for agreement to testify
against codefendants, did so and was sentenced. Codefendants' conviction was
reversed and defendant refused to testify at their retrial. As a result, his
conviction was vacated and he was tried and convicted of first degree murder.
Columbus v. Wolfinger (February 8, 1996),
Franklin Co. App. No. 95APC07-859, unreported (1996 Opinions 439) -- Pursuant to
a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to a defective complaint, which failed
to allege a culpable mental state. Since by appealing, and by prevailing
rendering the plea void, the defendant did not perform his part of the
agreement, upon remand, the original charges may be reinstated.
United States v. Benchimol (1985), 471
U.S. 453 -- U.S. Attorney's failure to explain reasons for agreed recommendation
of probation with restitution, or to make that recommendation "enthusiastically"
did not breach plea agreement.
State v. Murnahan (1996), 117 Ohio App. 3d
71 -- Prosecutor breached agreement to stand silent at sentencing by asking for
the maximum. Though this conduct was reprehensible, record indicates sentencing
decision was based on the judge's own assessment. See dissent.
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State v. Jeffries,
119 Ohio St. 3d 265,
2008-Ohio-3865 – Prior to plea negotiations the defendant took and passed a
polygraph. As part of a cooperation agreement with the prosecutor, the results
of the test were made known and a copy of her statement turned over. She failed
a subsequent polygraph and the deal fell apart. Nonetheless, her statement to
the first polygraphist was admissible since it was made prior to the
commencement of plea negotiations. Syllabus: "Statements that were not made in
the course of plea discussions are not protected by Evid. R. 410, even if the
statements were later provided to the state in the course of plea discussions."
Rohrbach, 178 Ohio App. 3d 211 – As a part of a plea bargain a
count alleging breaking and entering was amended to F-5
receiving stolen property. The defendant did not object, but
reversed as plain error because the amendment violated the
constitutional right to indictment by a grand jury. Court noted
that the plea agreement failed to include a recitation that the
defendant waived his right to indictment by a grand jury.
Reversed by State v. Rohrbaugh, 126 Ohio St. 3d 421,
2010-Ohio-3286 – Syllabus: “A defendant may plead guilty to
an indictment that was amended to change the name and identity
of the charged crime when the defendant is represented by
counsel, has bargained for the amendment, and is not prejudiced
by the change.”
State v. Chapman, 190
Ohio App. 3d 528,
2010-Ohio-5924, ¶19-21 – At the first trial a codefendant
testified the prosecutor offered to reduce his sentence from 51
to 13 years if his testimony secured a conviction. The 9th
District reversed as this amounted to an invitation o perjury.
Codefendant testified again at the retrial. This time a copy of
his plea agreement was admitted, showing it did not make
benefits contingent on conviction. Assignment of error
overruled. Earlier case was State v. Chapman, 9th Dist.
State v. Perkins, 191 Ohio App. 3d 263,
2010-Ohio-5161 – Fight between cement contractor and site
foreman was originally indicted as aggravated assault, but
before trial the prosecutor advised defense counsel that the
case would be reindicted if a plea wasn’t entered to the
aggravated assault. Ultimately the defendant received the
maximum sentence for felonious assault. On appeal the defendant
claimed vindictive prosecution, relying on a summary judgment
reversal in a postconviction action appeal. Court is of the view
the state need not begin with a comprehensive indictment and
that it is common for a prosecutor’s understanding of a case to
change with preparation for trial.
Layne v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 97
Ohio St. 3d 456,
2002-Ohio-6719 -- In the determination of parole eligibility,
defendants are entitled to the benefit of the plea bargains they struck. APA
rating system looked to original charges instead. APA still retains discretion
to consider relevant circumstances in making ultimate decision. Syllabus: "In
any parole determination involving indeterminate sentencing, the Adult Parole
Authority must assign an inmate the offense category score that corresponds to
the offense or offenses of conviction."
Ankrom v. Hageman, Franklin App. Nos.
04AP-984 et. seq.,
2005-Ohio-1546 -- Broad relief granted pre-S.B. 2 inmates in
challenge of the guideline system adopted by the APA which frequently led to a
range of months to be served before parole that was well beyond the minimum
sentence. Adherence to the guidelines meant for many there was not meaningful
consideration of parole upon serving the minimum sentence, among other things
violating the contractual basis of the plea agreements struck when an earlier
system, the "matrix," was is use. Ankrom v. Hageman, 118 Ohio Misc. 2d
State v. Stephens, Hamilton App. No.
2003-Ohio-6193 -- The remedy for a Layne
violation is a declaratory judgment action against the Adult Parole Authority
and the county prosecutor, not a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Also see
State v. Davis, 158 Ohio App. 3d 478,
State v. Palmer 148 Ohio App. 3d 246,
2002-Ohio-3536, ¶4 -- "When a co-defendant has pleaded guilty, but has not yet
been sentenced, he may properly assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, as the
plea-bargaining process has not yet been completed."
State v. Walker, 161 Ohio App. 3d 745,
2005-Ohio-3026 -- In implementing a negotiated plea the court nolled one too
many charges. The judge believed that having done so he could not "reactivate
the indictment." Without legal analysis this is said to be a correctable
State v. Simms (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 302
-- The purpose of cross-examination concerning witness' plea bargain is not to
demonstrate that it was illegal. The important consideration is to show motive
to fabricate in order to have the benefit of the plea bargain.
State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d
323 -- Syllabus: "In determining admissibility of statements made during alleged
plea discussions, the trial court must first determine whether, at the time of
the statements, the accused had a subjective expectation that a plea was being
negotiated. The trial court must then determine whether such an expectation was
reasonable under the circumstances. (Evid. R. 410, analyzed."
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), 434 U.S.
357 -- Prosecutor's open presentation of choice between accepting plea bargain
offered or be reindicted as a recidivist found not to be a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Also see State v. Collier
(1984), 22 Ohio App. 3d 25, 29; Williams v. Missouri (8th Cir. 1981), 640
F. 2d 140, 142-143; State v. Collier
(1984), 22 Ohio App. 3d 25.
Blackledge v. Perry (1974), 417 U.S. 21 --
Due Process violation found where prosecutor indicted defendant on felony
assault charge after defendant had taken advantage of state procedure which
allowed appeal, in the form of a trial de novo
in the Superior Court, from a misdemeanor conviction arising from the same
State v. Ball (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 224
-- State may not negotiate out the mandatory fine in certain drug cases. (But
would seem accommodation could be reached through finding of indigency, if
applicable, or plea to a different offense.)
Harman v. Mohn (4th Cir. 1982), 683 F. 2d
834, 838 -- "Plea bargains, which include adverse or lenient treatment for some
person other than the accused, are not per se invalid, but these situations
demand that prosecutors exercise a high degree of good faith in negotiating such
pleas and that courts accepting such pleas examine them carefully to insure that
the accused understands the plea agreement and the consequences not only to
himself, but to such third persons as may be affected by the plea bargain."
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