Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
Allen V. Adair and the Franklin County Public Defender Office
FORFEITURE
(ME042)
Also see
Nuisance Abatement Actions; Racketeering.
Adherence to procedural requirements
Proportionality; Innocent owners
As related to other proceedings
Criminal forfeiture cases in general
Criminal forfeiture cases - vehicles
Criminal forfeiture cases - money
Criminal forfeiture cases - guns
Criminal forfeiture cases - other property
Civil
forfeiture cases
Federal forfeiture provisions which may also
be used when prosecution is in state court
21 U.S.C. 853 -- Criminal forfeiture.
21 U.S.C. 881 -- Civil forfeiture.
Forfeiture of property relating to felony drug
offenses - Ohio
R.C. 2925.41 -- Definitions.
R.C. 2925.42 -- Forfeiture of property in
connection with felony drug abuse offense or act.
R.C. 2945.43 -- Civil forfeiture action prior
to prosecution.
R.C. 2925.44 -- Rights of law enforcement
agency seizing property; disposition off or forfeited property.
R.C. 2925.45 -- Motion alleging seizure was
unlawful; return of property.
Forfeiture of property, criminal cases
generally - Ohio
R.C. 2901.01(A)(13) -- "Contraband" defined.
R.C. 2925.13 -- Permitting drug abuse.
R.C. 2933.41 -- Disposition of property held
by law enforcement agency.
R.C. 2933.42 -- Offenses involving contraband;
forfeiture of property used in committing violation.
R.C. 2933.43 -- Procedure for seizure and
forfeiture of contraband; law enforcement agency authorized to use,
destroy, or
sell forfeited contraband; distribution of proceeds of sale.
Chapter 2969 -- Recovery of Offender's
Profits.
Adherence to procedural requirements
In re Forfeiture of $11,250 in Currency,
121 Ohio Misc. 2d 111,
2002-Ohio-7452 -- Forfeiture action fails for defects in
notice and lack of proof property was involved in a felony. But since both
driver and owner of car disavowed an interest in the property, it was subject to
disposition of lost or abandoned property pursuant to
R.C. 2933.41.
State v. Woodbridge, 153 Ohio App. 3d 121,
2003-Ohio-2931 -- State sought seizure of a truck involved in a drug case, but
the trial court did not dispose of that claim in the judgment entry. Remand
required. Court provides a primmer for the defendant's mother to assert her
rights as the vehicle owner.
State v. Thompson, Fairfield App. No.
03CA87,
2004-Ohio-7269 -- Money seized during raid on gambling premises was
improperly ordered forfeited during sentencing on a misdemeanor charge of
operating a gambling house. Forfeiture requires a petition and proceedings in
accordance with R.C. 2933.43(C) unless it has been made part of a plea bargain.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property (1993), 510 U.S. 43 -- When the government seizes property not to
preserve evidence of criminal wrongdoing, but in order to assert ownership and
control, proceedings must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Except in extraordinary circumstances, property may not be seized in
forfeiture proceedings without first giving notice to the owner and affording
him a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Hamilton v. Callon (1997), 119 Ohio App.
3d 759 -- Car was ordered forfeited on prosecutor's oral motion after defendant
pleaded guilty to misdemeanor soliciting. (1) Procedural requirements of the
statute must be strictly adhered to. (2) Forfeiture under
R.C. 2933.43 requires
a felony conviction.
State v. Conley (July 15, 1991), Preble
County No. CA90-11-023, unreported -- (1) Forfeitures are not favored in law or
equity, therefore, statutes providing for a forfeiture of property must be
strictly construed. Also see State v. Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 23,
25; State v. Abboud (1985), 27 Ohio App. 3d 209, 210. Consequently,
failure of indictment to allege extent of property subject to forfeiture, and of
court to find could that it could not reasonably be foreseen that property was
subject to forfeiture, fails to meet notice requirement of
R.C.
2923.32(B)(4)(a). (2) Even when there has been a guilty plea, in addressing the
issue of forfeiture the court must ascertain that property is in fact subject to
forfeiture, notwithstanding any agreement entered into by the defendant. Also
see United States v. De Ortiz (7th Cir. 1990), 910 F.2d 376, 384;
United States v. Reckmeyer (4th Cir. 1986), 786 F.2d 1216, 1222; United
States v. Roberts (7th Cir. 1984), 749 F.2d 404, 409-410; United States
v. Spilotro (9th Cir. 1982), 680 F. 2d 616, 617-618).
State v. Sutherlin (1996), 111 Ohio Ap. 3d
287 -- Forfeiture reversed as defendant was not present for hearing.
State v. Burkitt (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d
214, 222-226 -- Seizure of assets related to the defendant having engaged in a
pattern of corrupt activity is (or should ordinarily be) controlled by the date
of the earliest predicate act charged in the indictment.
Erie County Drug Task Force v. Essian
(1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 27 -- Amended forfeiture statute which expanded time
available to conduct hearing on petition held not to apply to pending cases,
absent language to that effect in the statute. Presumption of prospective
application can only be overcome where the statute states it is to apply to
pending cases.
Ohio Department of Liquor Control v. Sons of
Italy Lodge 0917 (1992), 65 Ohio St. 3d 532 -- Since forfeitures are not
favored by the law, strict compliance with notice provisions is mandatory. Also
see Akron v. Turner (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 595 where city's claim that
the defendant had actual notice was not sufficient to excuse noncompliance with
R.C. 2933.43(C).
State v. Mateo (1991), 57 Ohio St. 3d 50
-- The forfeiture provision of the permitting drug abuse statute (R.C. 2925.13)
is independent of other forfeiture provisions and establishes its own procedural
rules. For other cases on forfeiture of vehicles in such circumstances see In
re Forfeiture of 1979 Mazda (1989), 48 Ohio App. 3d 51 (does not apply to
juveniles); State v. 1974 Chevrolet Camaro (1983), 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 39.
State v. Golston (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d
423 -- (1) Delays of seven and eighteen months in seeking forfeiture were
unreasonable and contrary to statute. (2) The mere possession of cash, video
cassette recorders and other electronic items is not legal, and by itself
insufficient to establish it is more probable than not that they are contraband.
(3) Error to order the Public Defenders Office to bear the expense of the
defendant being brought to court for a forfeiture hearing.
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Proportionality; Innocent owners
Bennis v. Michigan (1996), 516 U.S. 442 --
Wife's half interest in car was forfeited under Michigan law after her husband
used the vehicle to entertain a prostitute. Forfeiture of wife's interest held
not to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Austin v. United States (1993), 509 U.S.
602 -- In rem civil forfeitures are punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment and are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. Sale of two ounces of
cocaine had led to forfeiture proceedings against defendant's place of business
and mobile home. Also see Akron v. Turner (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 595,
where on remand the trial court was directed to consider the appropriateness of
the possible forfeiture of a auto and its stereo under an Akron loud music
ordinance.
U.S. v Bajakajian (1998), 523 U.S. 321 --
A non-in rem forfeiture is a fine within the reach of the Excessive Fines
Clause. The touchstone of constitutional inquiry under the clause is the
principle of proportionality. The amount of the forfeiture must bear some
relationship to the gravity of the offense. Review is by application of the
gross disproportionality standard articulated in cruel and unusual punishment
cases. Forfeiture of the entire $357,000 in cash defendant failed to report upon
leaving the country was grossly disproportionate to the relatively minor
violation he was convicted of.
State v. Ziepfel (1995), 107 Ohio App. 3d
646 -- Court upholds forfeiture of an expensive motorcycle in a fourth offense
OMVI. Opinion discusses excessive fines cases, in personam and in rem
forfeitures, and instrumentality and proportionality standards.
State v. Harold (1996), 109 Ohio App. 3d
87 -- Forfeiture of half interest in a $15,000 house upon conviction of two
counts of trafficking, involving $60 worth of crack, did not violate the
Excessive Fines Clause. Court declined to follow instrumentality test, choosing
proportionality standards adopted in United States v. Millbrand (2nd Cir
1995), 58 F. 3d 841 and United States v. ...6380 Little Canyon Rd... (9th
Cir. 1995), 59 F. 3d 974. For a Sixth Circuit case see United States v.
...11869 Westshore Drive... (6th Cir. 1995), 70 F. 3d 923.
State v. Hill (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 25,29
-- Syllabus: "Forfeiture of property, pursuant to
R.C. 2925.42, is a form of
punishment for a specified offense and, therefore, is a 'fine' for purposes of
Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Accordingly, prior to entering an order of
forfeiture, the trial court must make an independent determination whether
forfeiture of that property is an 'excessive fine' prohibited by the Excessive
Fine Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions."
State v. Shimits (1984), 10 Ohio St. 3d 83
-- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "Where a vehicle used in violation of
R.C.
2925.13(A) is seized by law enforcement authorities, and a motion is made by the
state to order the vehicle forfeited pursuant to either
R.C. 2933.41 or
2925.13,
and third parties enter the action claiming to be 'innocent owners' of the
vehicle, the trial court has two options: the court may order the vehicle
'forfeited' and follow the dispositional alternatives provided in
R.C. 2933.41,
or the court may find the third parties to be 'innocent owners' of the vehicle,
in which case the forfeiture provisions 'shall not apply' and the vehicle shall
be returned to the innocent owners."
State v. Shin (1997), 118 Ohio App. 3d 637
-- State sought forfeiture of a Mercedes driven by husband following his third
conviction for driving under an FRA suspension. Car was registered to wife who
claimed to be an innocent owner. State focused on wife's knowledge that use of
the car was beyond scope of husband's driving privileges, and on her consent to
its use, but failed to prove the husband's lack of compliance with FRA laws, nor
did it address wife's knowledge of his lack of compliance.
State v. Thrower (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d
15 -- Spouse of owner of property subject to RICO forfeiture may not interpose
dower as basis for sharing in proceeds of judicial sale. Also see State v.
Thrower (1993), 85 Ohio App. 3d 729; United States v. Schifferli (4th
Cir. 1990), 895 F.2d 987, 989 fn., United States v. Marx (7th Cir. 1988),
844 F.2d 1303, 1305-1306.
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As
related to other proceedings
United States v. Ursery (1996), 518 U.S.
267 -- Settlement of an in rem forfeiture action against property held not to
have constituted a punishment for purposes of baring subsequent prosecution for
manufacturing marijuana on the premises. Marijuana cultivation had also been the
basis for the forfeiture action.
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Criminal forfeiture cases in general
State v. Markusic, 136 Ohio Misc. 2d
31,
2003-Ohio-7372 -- As long as the defendant is enrolled in an intervention in
lieu of conviction program, his property may not be forfeited. If he completes
the program and charges are dismissed the property cannot be forfeited. If he
fails, conviction may be entered on the guilty plea and the property may be
forfeited.
State v. Casalicchio (1991), 58 Ohio St. 3d
178 -- Syllabus: "Where property is ruled contraband pursuant to
R.C.
2933.42(B), forfeiture of that property pursuant to R.C.
2933.43 constitutes a
separate criminal penalty in addition to the penalty the defendant faces for
conviction of the underlying felony." Import is that since state failed to seek
forfeiture before sentencing, and forfeiture was criminal in nature, further
penalty was a double jeopardy violation. Also see State v. DePue (1994),
96 Ohio App. 3d 513.
Chagrin Falls v. Loveman (1986), 34 Ohio App.
3d 212 -- Headnotes: "(1) Property must be lost, abandoned, stolen, seized
pursuant to a search warrant, or lawfully seized or forfeited to trigger
disposition pursuant to
R.C. 2933.41(D)...(3) It is the circumstances of the
person that convert an otherwise lawful possession into one that costs the
penalty of forfeiture upon either its acquisition or possession. Personal
circumstances include, e.g., a person under a firearm restriction, a person
under some sort of legal disability, or a person unfit to possess the property
in question. (R.C. 2933.41[C][2], construed.)
State v. Gaines (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 467 --
For property to be ordered forfeited pursuant to
R.C. 2933.41, there must be
competent, credible evidence relating the property to the underlying offense.
State v. Burge (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 244 --
(1) Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard for
determining whether property listed in
2923.32 indictment is subject to
forfeiture. (2) Treble damage fine must be based on evidence linking amount
levied to wrongdoing and not merely funds passing through the defendant's bank
account.
State v. Adams (1995), 105 Ohio App. 3d 492 --
Double jeopardy violation found where state pursued criminal forfeiture action
against a bobcat carcass after related criminal charges had been dismissed on
speedy trial grounds. At p. 498: "...(T)he dismissal of a criminal complaint for
speedy trial violations amounts to a dismissal with prejudice, or an acquittal,
and bars any further punitive actions by the state based on the same act or
omission." Civil forfeiture would not have been banned, though opinion does not
address whether it would have been available.
State v. Wegmiller (1993), 88 Ohio App. 3d 68
-- (1) No double jeopardy problem where forfeiture petition was filed after plea
was entered but before sentencing. State v. Casaliccio (1991), 58 Ohio
App. 3d 178, distinguished. (2) Forfeiture was proper where defendant was found
to be the actual owner of car titled in his father's name in order to save on
insurance. Compare In re Forfeiture of Certain Real Property (1994), 99
Ohio App. 3d 565 finding a double jeopardy violation where petition seeking
forfeiture was filed after guilty verdict, but before sentencing, though house
in question was otherwise subject to forfeiture.
State v. Lawson (1992), 79 Ohio App. 3d 228 --
Though R.C. 2933.43 refers to an underlying felony offense as a prerequisite for
forfeiture, a felony conviction is required for property to be forfeited.
Forfeiture is unavailable where defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor.
Also see State v. Horton
(1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 464.
State v. Smith (1997) 117 Ohio App. 3d 656 --
By entering into an agreement to plead no contest, and voluntarily relinquishing
the forfeited property, the defendant waived any procedural or due process right
with respect to the forfeiture order.
State v. Gladden (1993), 86 Ohio App. 3d 287
-- Under plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and agreed to
forfeiture of his auto. Forfeiture upheld as statutes do not provide that the
property involved in illegal drug activities may only be forfeited according to
their provisions.
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Criminal forfeiture cases - vehicles
State v. Posey (1999), 135 Ohio App. 3d 751 --
Defendant's car was seized upon repeat arrest for OMVI within a six year period.
When he pled guilty, the car was ordered forfeited, but before he was sentenced
he was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. At trial he was found not guilty.
Court ordered car returned conditioned upon payment of more than $4,000 in
towing storage and repair costs. (1) Vacating the guilty plea voided the
forfeiture. (2) There was no authority for requiring defendant to pay costs of
repairs city undertook before putting car to use as an undercover police
vehicle. (3) As applied to owners who have been acquitted of OMVI,
R.C. 4511.195
violates due process. Car must be returned without payment of any costs.
In re Forfeiture of Property of Williams
(2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 606 -- Motorist was charged with OMVI and having weapon
under disability. Prosecutor sought forfeiture of the car citing only the OMVI
charge, which did not provide a proper basis for forfeiture. As time went on,
motorist pled to the weapons charge, and this fact was included in the
stipulated facts filed in lieu of a hearing. After this the prosecutor amended
the petition to cite the weapons charge as the basis for forfeiture. No due
process violation found. Amendment was allowed. City gets 15-year old station
wagon.
State v. Teman, Van Wert App. No.
15-03-13,
2004-Ohio-1949 -- Defendant told officer she had been driving around
smoking crack. Indictment for drug abuse included a specification as to
forfeiture. Vehicle properly forfeited as having been used to facilitate the
commission of a felony drug offense.
State v. Jones (1993), 90 Ohio App. 3d 456 --
Defendant was convicted of possession of an open container of beer, a minor
misdemeanor, and his $10,000 pickup was ordered forfeited. Forfeiture under a
bootlegging statute, R.C. 4301.45 was precluded as a minor misdemeanor is not an arrestable offense. Forfeiture under
R.C. 2933.41(C) was not possible as the
defendant's possession of the truck was lawful.
In re Forfeiture of One 1986 Buick Somerset
(1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 558 -- (1) Time limit for holding forfeiture hearing
runs from date of guilty plea or verdict and not date of sentencing. (2) The
defendant has a right to be present at the forfeiture hearing. (3) Car which the
defendant used to transport a weapon, which he was under a disability to
possess, was subject to forfeiture.
State v. Lilliock (1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 64 --
Van used to transport stolen property not subject to forfeiture. Compare
State v. 1974 Chevrolet Camaro
(1983), 7 Ohio Misc. 2d where drug sale was made from car ordered forfeited;
State v. Conroy (1988), 50 Ohio Misc. 2d 15.
State v. Vitanovich (1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d
494 -- Forfeiture of Chevy Blazer rebuilt from wrecks upheld. Highway Patrol
officer inspecting vehicle when new title was sought saw signs of tampering with
VIN plates. Shop owner was not entitled to recover parts added to the vehicle.
State v. Knox (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 147 --
Defendant was convicted of felony drug abuse and auto was forfeited pursuant to
R.C. 2933.43, the general forfeiture statute. Though forfeiture would not have
been possible under the drug offense forfeiture statute (R.C. 2933.42), language
in that statute excluding felony drug abuse offenses is not contained in the
general forfeiture statute. Eighth Amendment excessive fine issue found not ripe
for review.
State v. Garcia (1993), 89 Ohio App. 3d 161 --
Car used by the defendant to drive elsewhere and arrange for delivery of five
pounds of marijuana was subject to forfeiture, even though it was never used to
transport drugs or drug money.
State v. Barker (1983), 8 Ohio St. 3d 39 --
West Virginia Chevrolet salesman used dealership's car while jacklighting deer
in Meigs County. Car forfeited under
R.C. 1533.161.
Thurber v. Ohio State Highway Patrol (1985),
27 Ohio App. 3d 311 -- Headnote "In an action for replevin against the state for
an automobile seized as evidence in a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is
only entitled to those parts of the vehicle to which he can prove ownership.
(R.C. 4505.11[D] and
R.C. 2933.41[A] and [C][2], applied.)
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Criminal forfeiture cases - money
State v. Clark (1989), 63 Ohio App. 3d 52 --
Resident entitled to return of cash seized in unsuccessful drug raid, even
though he had been convicted of a weapons charge arising from the same raid.
Also see State v. Gaines (1990), 64 Ohio App. 3d 231 (cash and
prosecution relating to dog fighting).
State v. Roberts (1995), 102 Ohio App. 3d 514
-- Defendant was entitled to return of $24,000 found in trunk of his car at time
of arrest as the money was not shown to be linked to any of the crimes for which
he was convicted.
State v. Ali (1997), 119 Ohio App. 3d 766 --
$15,000 cash was found in car of person initially stopped for having a suspended
license. Efforts of dope dog led to discovery of minute quantities of crack and
marijuana and a narcotic odor on the money. Forfeiture held improper. Defendant
was charged with drug abuse and PCT, not trafficking. Even if he had been
charged with trafficking, there was not enough evidence linking money to
trafficking. Testimony was that the cash had been loaned for purchase of second
hand clothing for resale.
State v. Argea (1989), 60 Ohio Misc. 2d 11 --
Headnote: "Money in the pockets of persons who are either playing poker or are
in the proximity of a poker game may not be confiscated by the state and
forfeited pursuant to
R.C. 2933.41(C) unless the state proves by a preponderance
of the evidence (1) that the money was being used in the commission of an
offense, or (2) that the nature of the money or the circumstances of any of the
defendants were such as to conclude that possession of the money was illegal."
Eastlake v. Lorenzo (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d
740 -- Defendant did not claim possessory interest in $32,000 found in the trunk
of her car. Therefore she is not entitled to return of money. Third party
claimant failed to show possessory interest. Police are not entitled to the
money since it was not proved to be contraband. City should claim funds
according to opinion.
State v. Keith (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 192 --
Mom pleaded to RICO charge premised on promoting prostitution and agreed to
forfeiture, including a custodial savings account opened in daughter's name.
Applying the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (R.C. 1339.32), the account was not
opened with the necessary donative intent.
In re Forfeiture of $10,030 in U.S. Currency
(1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 536 -- Applying
R.C. 2933.43(C), contraband subject to
forfeiture must be returned if charges are not filed within 30 days of seizure.
In re $37,000 (May 23, 1988), Greene County
No. 87-CA-85, unreported -- Motion for return of cash seized during execution of
search warrant should have been sustained when link between claimed owner and
criminal activity was not established, not was link between cash and other
residents allegedly involved in criminal activity.
United States v. Smith (8th Cir. 1981), 659
F.2d 97 -- Defendant not entitled to return of $25,000 advanced on purchase of
phone books he thought were hashish.
State v. Adams (1984), 14 Ohio App. 3d 341 --
Headnote: "Public policy dictates that money used in a bribe not be returned to
the briber regardless of whether the bribe is successful or unsuccessful."
State v. Penrod (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 654 --
Defendant not entitled to interest on seized funds for time they remained in the
hands of the prosecutor after court ordered they be returned.
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Criminal forfeiture cases - guns
State v. Whitmore, 162 Ohio App. 3d
659,
2005-Ohio-4018 -- Gun was seized when the defendant was arrested for use of
a weapon while intoxicated and other offenses. Charges were later dismissed.
Court denied motion for release of the weapon. State claimed there had been an
agreement to dismiss in exchange for surrender of the weapon. Absent an
acknowledgment that this was the case or a signed plea agreement, the gun must
be returned.
State v. King (1999), 137 Ohio App. 3d
172 -- Though a police report indicated that one of defendant's six guns may
have been used during an incident of domestic violence, due process required the
court to conduct a hearing before ordering the weapons forfeited.
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms
(1984), 465 U.S. 354 -- Acquittal on charge of dealing in firearms without a
license did not collaterally estop government from seeking forfeiture of weapons
seized during search of defendant's house.
State v. Acoff (1998), 131 Ohio App. 3d 657 --
Since improper handling of a weapon in a motor vehicle is not a traffic offense,
the weapon may not be returned to the owner.
State v. Kennedy (1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 221
-- Defendant convicted of trafficking in marijuana sought return of $305 and a
gun collection which were not the subject of a forfeiture action. Court
sidesteps trial judge's desire to have defense counsel find out what federal
authorities had in mind and remands for hearing on whether guns were "firearms"
defendant was entitled to possess in view of his convictions, and to determine
whether cash was contraband.
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Criminal forfeiture cases - other property
State v. Keith (1991), 81 Ohio App. 3d 279 --
Contractor had performed work on a building forfeited in a RICO prosecution
premised on promoting prostitution. Mechanics lien was filed after indictment,
hence did not have priority over corrupt activity lien notice. Nor was
contractor an "innocent victim" within the meaning of the RICO statutes.
Rice v. Logan County Board of Commissioners
(1996), 114 Ohio App. 3d 198 -- Wife signed over her interest in property in
exchange for dismissal of a drug trafficking indictment, but later filed suit to
block sale of property by the county, claiming the transfer was fraudulently
obtained. Trial court properly blocked sale. Transfer was a part of criminal
proceedings, and the court had before it competent credible evidence that the
absence of the procedural safeguards of
R.C. 2925.42 warranted relief.
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Civil
forfeiture cases
Thomas v. Cleveland (2000), 140 Ohio App. 3d
136 -- Forty-five day delay in instituting
R.C. 2933.43 forfeiture proceedings
is reasonable.
Baxter v. Jones (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 314 --
A guilty plea or verdict for violation of the criminal racketeering statute is
not a prerequisite for the filing of a civil forfeiture action by a county
prosecutor pursuant to
R.C. 2923.34.
In re Forfeiture of $2,367 U.S. Currency
(1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 384 -- Once felony drug abuse charges have been filed,
related civil forfeiture proceedings must be stayed.
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency
(9th Cir. 1994), 33 F.3d 1210, amended on denial of rehearing en banc, (9th Cir.
1995), 56 F.3d 41, cert. granted, (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996), 64 U.S.L.W. 3161, 58
Cr.L. 3133 -- Double jeopardy violation found where criminal prosecution and
civil forfeiture action arising from the same offense were not brought in a
single proceeding. Compare United States v. Milan (2d Cir. 1993), 2 F.3d
17; United States v. Smith (8th Cir. 1996), 58 Cr.L. 1417 (both cases commenced and resolved within a few
days of each other).
State v. One Harley Davidson Motorcycle
(1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d 132 -- Civ. R. 41(A)(1) required notice to state of
intention to dismiss forfeiture action following nonappearance at a hearing.
Simmons v. Dayton (1992), 82 Ohio App. 3d 385
-- Cash was seized by city police officers at the airport and the person
carrying it was advised it would be turned over to the feds for forfeiture.
Failure to make timely claim for return of money under federal statutes barred
civil action to recover money from the city.
In re Forfeiture of 1988 Ford Tempo AWD
(1994), 97 Ohio App. 398 -- Passenger had a crack pipe. State sought forfeiture
of the vehicle. Whether vehicle was subject to forfeiture hinged on whether
there was a felony drug abuse offense. Possession of the pipe was at most a
misdemeanor. Though the pipe might be deemed a criminal tool, a charge of
possessing criminal tools still would not have constituted a felony drug abuse
offense within the meaning of
R.C. 2925.01(H).
In re Forfeiture of 1986 Renault (1992), 79
Ohio App. 3d 469 -- Since even a felony drug abuse offense is excluded from the
statutory definition of "felony drug abuse offense," car defendant was sitting
in at time of drug purchase was not subject to forfeiture.
In re Forfeiture of 363 Durfee Drive (1996),
111 Ohio App. 3d 89 -- Newspaper publisher used money stolen from his employer
to renovate his residence. House and adjacent vacant lot were subject to
forfeiture. Related case: State v. Lake (1996), 111 Ohio App. 3d 127.
In re Forfeiture of Certain Real Property by
Action in Rem (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 249 -- Prosecutor sought civil forfeiture
of office building of physician whose Ohio license had been suspended, but who
continued to practice and write prescriptions. Though wife sometimes worked as
receptionist, state failed to prove complicity, thus her interest in the
building was protected as an innocent owner.
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