Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
Allen V. Adair and the Franklin County Public Defender Office

ARREST (ME007)

For cases on searches incident to an arrest see Search and Seizure/Warrantless searches/Search incident to an arrest.

For cases on OMVI arrests, see OMVI/Detention and arrest issues.

Also see Investigative Detention; Law Enforcement Officers; Resisting Arrest; Informants; Law Enforcement  Officers/Territorial jurisdiction; Search and Seizure topics including The Exclusionary Rule.

Probable cause

When an arrest has been completed

Warrantless arrests

Arrests with a warrant

Miscellaneous

Criminal Rule 4(E) -- Person arrested with or without a warrant must be brought before court without

unnecessary delay.

R.C. 2921.33 -- Resisting arrest.

R.C. 2935.03 -- Officer's authority to arrest without warrant; pursuit outside jurisdiction.(Also see R.C.

2935.05, 2935.07, 2935.03, 2963.12, 2935.08.)

R.C. 2935.04 -- When any person may arrest. (Including citizen's arrest.  Also see R.C. 2935.06 and 2935.07.)

R.C. 2935.041 -- Detention, arrest of shoplifters; protection of library, museum and archival institution

property.

R.C. 2935.12 -- Forcible entry in making arrest or executing warrant.

R.C. 2935.14 -- Rights of person arrested.

R.C. 2935.26 -- Issuance of citation for minor misdemeanor.

R.C. 2941.36 -- Warrant for arrest of accused. (Also see R.C. 2941.37, 2941.38, 2963.07, 2963.19.)

R.C. 2941.46 -- Arrest of convict or prisoner violating pardon or parole.

R.C. 2951.08 -- Arrest of person on probation or under community control sanction.

Probable cause defined

Also see Search and Seizure/Probable cause

State v. Graves, 173 Ohio App. 3d 526, 2007-Ohio-4904 – Informant reported someone matching the defendant‘s description had a large bag of marijuana. Officers approached the defendant, who was standing outside the informant‘s apartment. He was highly intoxicated and placed under arrest for disorderly conduct. The marijuana was found during the search incident to arrest. Motion to suppress should have been granted. The focus of the disorderly ordinance is not intoxication but the subject‘s conduct while intoxicated. Here the defendant was not a nuisance and had not placed himself at risk.

State v. Lynn (2000), 137 Ohio App. 3d 402, 405 -- "(P)robable cause becomes a sequential consideration. Chronological events can enhance or diminish the reasonable perception leading to probable cause...Taking events in a chronological sequence, an investigation may become the possibility of criminal conduct, which becomes suspicion of criminal conduct (as a purely subjective gut feeling), which becomes articulable suspicion (capable of being factually articulated), which becomes probable cause to believe a crime has been committed."

State v. Featherstone, 150 Ohio App. 3d 24, 2002-Ohio-6028 -- While pretextual arrests are permitted, they are unlawful when not supported by probable cause. A stakeout team arrested defendant for littering 30 seconds after a garter flew off his head and landed on the ground. This did not provide adequate probable cause.

State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "In order for the results of a field sobriety test to serve as evidence of probable cause to arrest, the police must have administered the test in strict compliance with standardized testing procedures." But other circumstances, such as erratic driving and observation of physical condition, may still constitute probable cause for arrest. Also see <State v. Shepard 2002-Ohio-1817>; State v. Wieland, 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 138, 2004-Ohio-2240.

State v. Smith 162 Ohio App. 3d 1, 2005-Ohio-2103 -- Motion to suppress based on Homan and lack of probable cause faulted for failing to address the issue with specificity. Motion should have made specific claims with respect to the testing and identified related sections in the manual.

State v. Robinson, 160 Ohio App. 3d 802, 2005-Ohio-2280 -- The opinion addresses the reach and constitutionality of post-Homan amendment of R.C. 4511.19 to require only substantial compliance with standards for administering field sobriety tests. Applying Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution and Evidence Rule 702, this amendment is only of limited benefit to the state, in particular with regard to the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.

State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37 -- At trial an officer may testify as to the defendant's performance during improperly administered field sobriety testing as lay opinion. Court notes that in response to Homan R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) has been amended to require only substantial compliance with standardized procedures. Syllabus: "A law enforcement officer may testify at trial regarding observations made during a defendant's performance of unscientific standardized field sobriety tests."

State v. Bing (1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 443 -- Gas station employee reported to the police a woman had been in the restroom for 45 minutes, leaving her child in the car in 20 degree weather. Police did not have probable cause to arrest woman for child endangerment as 8-10 year old child was covered by a blanket and not at risk. Police did not have probable cause to arrest mother for drug offenses based on circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause. These included suspicious conduct and past drug activities known to the officer.

State v. Hummel, 154 Ohio App. 3d 123, 2003-Ohio-4602 -- There was probable cause to arrest an injured motorcyclist for DUI where the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speed and glassy eyes, was told there had not been a passenger, and the circumstances of the single vehicle accident suggested impaired control.

State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d 122, at 127 -- "To have probable cause, the arresting officer must have sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source, to warrant a prudent man in believing that a felony has been committed and that it has been committed by the accused. Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160; Henry v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 98; Beck v. Ohio, (1964), 379 U.S. 89; and State v. Fultz (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 79."

State v. Rose (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d 656, 659 -- "Probable cause for arrest has been defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautions man in believing the accused to be guilty...Most questions of probable cause address the officer's knowledge of the circumstances...What facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a question of law, but whether they exist in any particular case is a question of fact." Also see Bock v. Cincinnati (1931), 43 Ohio App. 257.

State v. Congeni (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d 726, 732 -- "A stop and warrantless arrest of an individual must be based on articulable and reasonable suspicion that the arrested individual is himself engaged or about to be engaged in a crime. It cannot be based on the actions of his associates."

State v. Fultz (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 79 -- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "Where a police officer has received information over the police radio and that information is such as to give the officer reasonable grounds to believe a felony has been committed, such officer has probable cause to make an arrest." Also see State v. Holden (1985), 23 Ohio App. 3d 5; United States v. Hensley (1985), 469 U.S. 604 (As to when investigative stop based on flyer is valid.)

Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 307 -- Probable cause is determined by factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.

State v. McCaig (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d 94 -- Probable cause may be based on a combination of circumstances, even though none standing alone would be sufficient.

Columbus v. Lenear (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 466, 468 -- For an officer to make a valid warrantless misdemeanor arrest he need not have absolute knowledge that an offense is being committed, such as would be required to support conviction at trial. Also see Westlake v. Vilfroy (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 26.

State v. Coppick (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d 405 -- If an officer testifies that he contemporaneously excused a particular act of the defendant as providing probable cause for arrest, the state may not later attempt to resurrect that same act in an effort to establish probable cause.

Taylor v. Alabama (1982), 457 U.S. 687 -- No probable cause for arrest where the tip that the defendant committed a robbery came from a jail inmate who provided no further details and whose reliability was unknown.

State v. Congeni (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d 392 -- Tip from informant corroborated by police surveillance established probable cause for arrest.

State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d 1, 13-14 -- Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for leaving the scene of an accident, even though shots were being fired at him as he fled.

State v. Newell (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 623 -- Probable cause did not exist to arrest an adult found in motel room with juveniles and alcohol, where the actual basis for the officers' action was general request from the juvenile court that adults be arrested in such circumstances.

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When an arrest has been completed

Kaup v. Texas (2003), 123 S.Ct. 1843 -- Teenager was taken from his bedroom to police headquarters in the middle of the night, in hand cuffs and wearing only his underwear. Absent probable cause, this was an illegal arrest. Notwithstanding Miranda warnings, subsequent confession was fruit of the poisonous tree. Opinion summarizes prior case law regarding when a seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Carroll, 162 Ohio App. 3d 672, 2005-Ohio-4048 -- Officer thought defendant might have an outstanding warrant. Defendant fled when asked to place his hands behind his back, without being told he was under arrest. Fleeing may have been obstructing official business but it was not resisting arrest. Defendant ran into officer's partner. But she did not know why her partner had approached the defendant and did not tell him he was under arrest until after he was subdued. Resisting conviction reversed.

Columbus v. Galang, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1441, 2003-Ohio-4506 -- (1) The remedy for an illegal arrest is generally suppression of evidence, not dismissal of charges. (2) Looking to the circumstances, arrest was not completed prior to the defendant's incriminating statements. The officer testified he only intended to detain the defendant and guided him to the cruiser without the use of force.

Michigan v. Chesternut (1988), 486 U.S. 567 -- A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if in view of all of the circumstances a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. It is the reasonable man's interpretation of police conduct that matters and not the intention of the police.

Alter v. Paul (1955), 101 Ohio App. 139, 141 -- "An arrest occurs when the following four requisite elements are involved: (1) An intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested." Adopted, State v. Darrah (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 22, 26.

State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 135 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "The existence of an arrest is dependent not upon the fact that a suspect who voluntarily comes in for questioning concerning possible involvement in a murder is immediately given the Miranda warnings, nor upon the period of questioning, but upon the existence of four requisite elements: (1) An intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested."

State v. Miller (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 270 -- Investigative contact with the defendant began at his place of employment and continued through search of his house and interrogation at the police station. Looking at the record for indications as to the defendant's freedom of movement, court concludes arrest did not come until after he had made incriminating statements and was detained at the jail.

State v. Gorey (1994), 68 Ohio Misc. 2d 44 -- At the hospital, motorist involved in an accident was told by an officer that he was under arrest for OMVI, but was not actually taken into custody. For purposes of the implied consent law and an administrative license suspension for refusing to furnish a blood sample, he was not under arrest and not was subject to the ALS.

State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App. 3d 328 -- Trooper grabbed keys belonging to motorist found asleep behind the wheel. This facilitated investigative detention (which the court goes on to find was unjustified), but did not convert detention to arrest.

State v. Darrah (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 22, 26 -- The issuance of a traffic citation, without any effort being made to take the defendant into custody, is not an unlawful arrest for an offense not committed in the presence of the officer. See R.C. 2935.03.

State v. Finch (1985), 24 Ohio App. 3d 38 -- An arrest has occurred when an officer instructs a driver to pull to the side of the road and removes the keys to the drivers vehicle.

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 435-442 -- Time at which roadside detention becomes custodial for purposes of Miranda depends on when the motorist is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for all practical purposes.

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Warrantless arrests

Virginia v. Moore (2008), 128 S.Ct. 1598 – State statute required issuance of a summons for driving on a suspended license but officer arrested the defendant and found drugs during a search incident to arrest. State court ordered suppression based on the Fourth Amendment. Reversed. The extent of Fourth Amendment protection is not tied to statutes as may have been adopted by the various states.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001), 121 S.Ct. 1536 -- The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless custodial arrest for a minor offense punishable only by a fine.

State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323, 2003-Ohio-3931 -- Syllabus: "Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors. (State v. Jones [2000], 88 Ohio St. 3d 430, 727 N.E. 2d 886, followed in part and modified in part.)

State v. Anderson, 153 Ohio App. 3d 374, 2003-Ohio-3970 -- Officer thought an injured bicyclist might have been drinking, and exploited the inability to provide for safety exception under R.C. 2935.26(A) to make an arrest for a minor misdemeanor equipment violation. At headquarters further investigation led to the filing of a DUI. Officer's admission he used the safety exception as a pretense, combined with other circumstances means arrest was unconstitutional.

Middletown v. Flinchum 95 Ohio St. 3d 43, 2002-Ohio-1625 -- Syllabus: "When officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the offender is being arrested is a misdemeanor." See dissent citing the lack of exigent circumstances and characterizing the chase as the "lukewarm amble" of a "mere tire-spinner."

State v. Stuber, 150 Ohio App. 3d 200, 2002-Ohio-6309 -- Defendant fled into his house when officers arrived to arrest him on a bench warrant. Presumed failure to comply with knock and announce requirement before making forcible entry doesn't matter, as officers deemed to have been in hot pursuit.

State v. Karle (2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 125 -- Officers following broadcast information establishing probable cause to arrest the defendant for failure to obey a lawful order went to his home where they made a warrantless arrest, notwithstanding the defendant's order they leave his property. (1) Location outside the home was within the curtilage. (2) Warrantless arrest was illegal absent exigent circumstances. None existed. (3) Motion to suppress should have been sustained, but as the only fruit of the illegal arrest was the non-inculpatory order to leave, the defendant was not prejudiced. But since the arrest was illegal, his resisting arrest conviction is reversed.

United States v. Watson (1976), 423 U.S. 411 -- The Fourth Amendment does not bar warrantless arrests, nor are exigent circumstances required for such arrests, which are commonly authorized by statute.

Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91 -- Whether an arrest without a warrant is constitutionally valid depends upon: "...whether at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it - whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (individual) had committed or was committing an offense."

Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 -- Absent exigent circumstances, police may not make a warrantless, non consensual, entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest.

Steagald v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 204 -- Police may not enter home of a third party without a search warrant in order to execute an arrest warrant for someone else. Also see State v. Wilson (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 151.

Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), 466 U.S. 740 -- The government must demonstrate exigent circumstances in order to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness which attaches to all warrantless home entries. Warrantless home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is only probable cause that a minor offense has been committed. Also see Middleburg Heights v. Theiss (1985), 28 Ohio App. 3d 1. But see Illinois v. McArthur

(2001), 121 S.Ct. 946 holding police could prevent resident from entering home unattended while warrant was being obtained.

Scott v. Maggio (5th Cir. 1983), 695 F. 2d 916 -- Defendant lacks standing to complain of warrantless but consensual entry to home of third party to effect his arrest.

United States v. Acevedo (7th Cir. 1980), 627 F. 2d 68 -- Exigent circumstances for warrantless entry to apartment to effect arrest established by unfamiliarity with premises and possibility suspect in a drug deal could escape by an unknown route during time needed to procure warrant. Also see Dorman v. United States (C.A.D.C. 1970), 435 F. 2d 385; United States v. Stubblefield (9th Cir. 1980), 621 F. 2d 980; United States v. Albert (8th Cir. 1980), 630 F. 2d 1292; United States v. Robertson (9th Cir. 1979), 606 F. 2d 853; State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 281.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991), 500 U.S. 44 -- A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a prompt determination whether there was probable cause for the arrest. A delay of more than forty-eight hours is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Also see Powell v. Nevada (1994), 511 U.S. 79 holding McLaughlin applicable to all actions pending at the time the decision was announced and raising the question whether the exclusionary rule is applicable when there has been a McLaughlin violation; United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez (1994), 511 U.S. 350.

Cleveland v. Shields (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d 118 -- Suspect fled in a car, then on foot, after officers observed cocaine being handled. After a four minute chase, officers followed him into an apartment and placed him under arrest. The immediate, continuous chase fell within the hot pursuit exception to the Fourth Amendment warrants requirement.

State v. Lewis (1893), 50 Ohio St. 179 -- If an officer was not present when a breach of the peace occurred and public order had been restored and the parties had departed the area, and all the information he had of the affray and the parties to it was from bystanders, he may not pursue the persons charged with the offense without first obtaining an arrest warrant.

State v. Stacy (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 55 -- Where an officer has observed a suspect committing a misdemeanor offense, but the suspect is able to evade immediate arrest, a warrantless arrest pursuant to R.C. 2935.01(A) may still be made one and a half hours later.

State v. Reymann (1989), 55 Ohio App. 3d 222 -- Warrantless arrest is invalid when based on statements by witnesses and not supported by the officer's personal observations.

State v. Miller (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d 270, 274-274 -- The written statement requirement, set forth in R.C. 2935.03(A) for warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in an officer's presence, does not apply to felonies.

State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 84 -- Paragraph three of the syllabus: "R.C. 2935.04 authorizes the warrantless arrest of a person for a misdemeanor when the arresting officer knows that the person has a previous conviction which will enhance the misdemeanor to a felony. (R.C. 2935.02, applied.)"

Blanchester v. Hester (1992), 81 Ohio App. 3d 815 -- Minor traffic offense did not justify warrantless entrance to defendant's home. Resulting disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charges dismissed as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, the traffic charges should not have been dismissed.

Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 248 -- "The authority granted in R.C. 2935.01 to a police officer to 'arrest and detain a person found violating a law of this state' does not confer authority upon a municipal police officer to arrest without a warrant outside the geographical boundaries of his municipality for traffic offenses observed by the officer to have been committed outside such municipal limits." (syllabus). The court reserved ruling on whether the exclusionary rule is available as a remedy following such an illegal arrest. (p. 255, fn. 6). For other cases on territorial jurisdiction see Law Enforcement Officers/Territorial jurisdiction.

State v. Clark (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d 308 -- Headnote 1: "An auxiliary police officer, who has been duly appointed and conferred full 'police powers' by his municipality, has the power, regardless of 'duty status,' to make misdemeanor arrests without a warrant pursuant to R.C. 2935.03." Also see State v. Darga (1985), 30 Ohio App. 3d 54 (township constable).

State v. Henderson (1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d 54 -- Syllabus: "Information supplied by officers or agencies engaged in a common investigation with an arresting officer may be used to establish probable cause for a warrantless arrest. (United States v. Ventresca [1965], 380 U.S. 102, and Whitley v. Warden [1971], 401 U.S. 560, applied and followed; State v. Lewis [1893], 50 Ohio St. 179, 33 N.E. 405 distinguished." Also see State v. Holmes (1985), 28 Ohio St. 3d 12; United States v. Butler (5th Cir. 1980), 611 F. 2d 1066, 1070, fn. 11.

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Arrests with a warrant

Whitley v. Warden (1971), 401 U.S. 560 -- Where an arrest warrant had been obtained from a magistrate without the necessary showing of probable cause, arrest by other officers who executed the warrant was illegal and evidence seized had to be suppressed.

Hill v. California (1971), 401 U.S. 797, 802-804 -- Good faith arrest, pursuant to warrant, of the wrong person does not render arrest illegal. Also see United States v. McEachern (4th Cir. 1981), 675 F. 2d 618.

Arizona v. Evans (1995), 514 U.S. 1 -- Defendant was stopped for a minor traffic offense. Computer showed an outstanding arrest warrant, which in fact had been recalled. Error appears to have been made by the clerk's office. Defendant dropped a hand rolled cigarette when ordered out of his car, leading to discovery of marijuana under a seat. Exclusionary rule held not to apply as in these circumstances would not deter illegal police conduct. Though not directly characterizing this as an extension of the good faith doctrine, court follows the Leon rationale. Compare State v. Gough (1986), 35 Ohio App. 3d 81; Ashland v. Dailey (1999), 105 Ohio Misc. 2d 1.

Fairborn v. Munkus (1971), 28 Ohio St. 3d 207 -- A municipal police officer may make an arrest for a violation of a municipal ordinance, upon a properly issued warrant, anywhere within the jurisdictional limits of the issuing court, even though that location may be outside the territorial jurisdiction of the department the officer is employed by.

Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325, 333 -- "We also hold that as an incident to the arrest (at a residence with a warrant), the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which...would warrant a reasonably prudent police officer in believing the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." Also see State v. Lyons (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 525, 532-534; State v. Davis (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 277, 288.

State v. Campana (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d 297 -- The knock and announce rule applies to the execution of arrest warrants. Absent exigent circumstances, officers must identify themselves and wait for response by occupant. Compare State v. Davis (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 277, 286-287 -- The announce portion of the knock and announce rule set forth in R.C. 2935.12(A) does not apply when entry is not forcible. See Wilson v. Arkansas (1995), 514 U.S. 927 and Richards v. Wisconsin (1997), 520 U.S. 385 pertaining to the knock and announce rule in the context of search warrants.

Steagald v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 204 -- Absent consent or exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant does not authorize search of subject's home. A separate search warrant for the subject's person must be obtained.

State v. Tolbert (1996), 116 Ohio App. 3d 86 -- Defendant was arrested at a girlfriend's house on a valid capias warrant. Arrest and search incident to arrest upheld. Steagald v. U.S. (1981), 451 U.S. 204 distinguished as having required a search warrant for entry into the home of another to make an arrest where the homeowner, and not the arrestee, was asserting a privacy interest. Also see State v. Wilson (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 151; United States v. Underwood (9th Cir. 1983), 717 F.2d 482.

State v. Deener (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 335, 338 -- "We believe that a teletyped arrest order requested by probation authorities provides an adequate basis for a police officer to make a valid arrest of a probationer." (Notwithstanding failure to comply with R.C. 2951.08.)

State v. Pierson (1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d 255, 258 -- An arrest warrant clothes the police with the authority to take the subject into custody, whether or not the officer are aware of the existence of the warrant.

Maynard v. Smith (1975), 47 Ohio Misc. 2d 47 -- Headnote 1: "Under Crim. R. 4(A)(1), a clerk of courts, before ruling on a request for a warrant, may require the complainant to appear personally and be examined under oath to determine whether there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by public officials (or anyone else)."

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Miscellaneous

Cleveland v. Washington Mutual Bank, 179 Ohio App. 3d 692, 2008-Ohio-6956 – Bank was sent a summons for building and housing code violations, but did not respond. Court devised a stratagem for trial in absentia. Court finds that while there is a procedure for enforcing a response to indictments, none is provided with respect to summons sent corporations, as opposed to individuals. Nor is there a procedure provided for trial in absentia in these circumstances.

Kirk v. Louisiana (2002), 122 S.Ct. 2458 -- Police with probable cause to arrest defendant for a drug offense unlawfully detained and searched him at his home without first obtaining a warrant. Remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances were, in fact, present. Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, followed.

United States v. Crews (1979), 445 U.S. 463, 474 -- "An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution., nor as a defense to a valid conviction."

State v. Lloyd (1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d 95, 100 -- Ohio law makes no provision for a motion to dismiss based on a lack of probable cause. The proper remedy for any Fourth Amendment violation is a motion to suppress evidence.

State v. Jones (1974), 37 Ohio St. 2d 21 -- Footnote one, p. 24: "R.C. 2935.14 and 2935.20 require, generally, that a person arrested or confined be provided facilities with which to obtain counsel, or communicate with his attorney. Since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, does not insure counsel to defendants who are not subjected to custodial interrogation, these statutes provide a right beyond those guaranteed by the federal Constitution."

Dayton v. Nugent (1970), 25 Ohio Misc. 31 -- A policy of not allowing calls during the four hours immediately following arrest is invalid.

State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 65, 69-70 -- Exclusionary rule does not apply to alleged violation of R.C. 2935.14 which confers certain rights upon an arrestee before removal from the county where he has been arrested.

State v. Sampson (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 287 -- Failure to promptly take person arrested without a warrant before a magistrate, as required by R.C. 2935.05, does not invalidate subsequent conviction.

State v. Slatter (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d 452 -- Syllabus: "R.C. 2935.26, insofar as it creates a substantive right of freedom from arrest for one accused of a minor misdemeanor, and Crim. R. 4.1, which provides a procedure for disposition of minor misdemeanor cases where citations have been issued, are not unconstitutionally in conflict. (Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, approved and followed.)" Also see State v. Bronaugh (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 237; State v. Peay (1991), 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 92; State v. Pender (1980), 66 Ohio Misc. 23.

Kear v. Hilton (4th Cir. 1983), 699 F. 2d 181 -- The extraordinary powers given bail bondsmen to use force in this country to return bail jumpers without resort to public authorities does not protect bounty hunter from extradition to Canada to face kidnapping charges base on abduction of bail jumper.

State v. Pecora (1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d 687 -- Citizen's arrest does not permit the use of deadly force in circumstances where police would not have been allowed to use deadly force.

State v. Carter (1985), 28 Ohio App. 3d 61 -- Passenger may challenge validity of his arrest based on stop of vehicle he was in and basis for removal from it. Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128 distinguished on the basis that that case involved mere presence in the vehicle which was searched.

Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 359 -- R.C. 2935.041, permitting shopkeepers to detains shoplifters until the police may be summoned, applies to hospital.

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