Franklin County Criminal Law Casebook
Reproduced with permission from
Allen V. Adair and the Franklin County Public Defender Office
For cases on searches incident to an arrest
see Search and Seizure/Warrantless searches/Search incident
to an arrest.
For cases on OMVI arrests, see
OMVI/Detention and arrest issues.
Investigative Detention; Law
Enforcement Officers; Resisting Arrest;
jurisdiction; Search and Seizure
topics including The Exclusionary Rule.
When an arrest has been completed
Arrests with a
Criminal Rule 4(E) -- Person arrested with or
without a warrant must be brought before court without
R.C. 2921.33 -- Resisting arrest.
R.C. 2935.03 -- Officer's authority to arrest
without warrant; pursuit outside jurisdiction.(Also see
R.C. 2935.04 -- When any person may arrest.
(Including citizen's arrest. Also see
R.C. 2935.06 and
R.C. 2935.041 -- Detention, arrest of
shoplifters; protection of library, museum and archival institution
R.C. 2935.12 -- Forcible entry in making
arrest or executing warrant.
R.C. 2935.14 -- Rights of person arrested.
R.C. 2935.26 -- Issuance of citation for minor
R.C. 2941.36 -- Warrant for arrest of accused.
(Also see R.C. 2941.37,
R.C. 2941.46 -- Arrest of convict or prisoner
violating pardon or parole.
R.C. 2951.08 -- Arrest of person on probation
or under community control sanction.
Search and Seizure/Probable cause
State v. Graves,
173 Ohio App. 3d 526,
2007-Ohio-4904 – Informant reported someone matching the defendant‘s
description had a large bag of marijuana. Officers approached the defendant, who
was standing outside the informant‘s apartment. He was highly intoxicated and
placed under arrest for disorderly conduct. The marijuana was found during the
search incident to arrest. Motion to suppress should have been granted. The
focus of the disorderly ordinance is not intoxication but the subject‘s conduct
while intoxicated. Here the defendant was not a nuisance and had not placed
himself at risk.
State v. Lynn (2000), 137 Ohio App. 3d
402, 405 -- "(P)robable cause becomes a sequential consideration. Chronological
events can enhance or diminish the reasonable perception leading to probable
cause...Taking events in a chronological sequence, an investigation may become
the possibility of criminal conduct, which becomes suspicion of criminal conduct
(as a purely subjective gut feeling), which becomes articulable suspicion
(capable of being factually articulated), which becomes probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed."
State v. Featherstone, 150 Ohio App. 3d
2002-Ohio-6028 -- While pretextual arrests are permitted, they are unlawful
when not supported by probable cause. A stakeout team arrested defendant for
littering 30 seconds after a garter flew off his head and landed on the ground.
This did not provide adequate probable cause.
State v. Homan (2000), 89 Ohio St. 3d
421 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "In order for the results of a field
sobriety test to serve as evidence of probable cause to arrest, the police must
have administered the test in strict compliance with standardized testing
procedures." But other circumstances, such as erratic driving and observation of
physical condition, may still constitute probable cause for arrest. Also see <State
2002-Ohio-1817>; State v. Wieland, 127 Ohio Misc. 2d 138,
State v. Smith
162 Ohio App. 3d 1,
2005-Ohio-2103 -- Motion to suppress based on Homan
and lack of probable cause faulted for failing to address the issue with
specificity. Motion should have made specific claims with respect to the testing
and identified related sections in the manual.
State v. Robinson, 160 Ohio App. 3d
2005-Ohio-2280 -- The opinion addresses the reach and constitutionality of
post-Homan amendment of
R.C. 4511.19 to require only substantial
compliance with standards for administering field sobriety tests. Applying
Article IV, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution and Evidence Rule 702, this
amendment is only of limited benefit to the state, in particular with regard to
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test.
State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St. 3d 79,
2004-Ohio-37 -- At trial an officer may testify as to the defendant's
performance during improperly administered field sobriety testing as lay
opinion. Court notes that in response to Homan
R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) has
been amended to require only substantial compliance with standardized
procedures. Syllabus: "A law enforcement officer may testify at trial regarding
observations made during a defendant's performance of unscientific standardized
field sobriety tests."
State v. Bing
(1999), 134 Ohio App. 3d 443 -- Gas station employee reported to the police a
woman had been in the restroom for 45 minutes, leaving her child in the car in
20 degree weather. Police did not have probable cause to arrest woman for child
endangerment as 8-10 year old child was covered by a blanket and not at risk.
Police did not have probable cause to arrest mother for drug offenses based on
circumstances amounting to reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause. These
included suspicious conduct and past drug activities known to the officer.
State v. Hummel, 154 Ohio App. 3d 123,
2003-Ohio-4602 -- There was probable cause to arrest an injured motorcyclist for
DUI where the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speed and
glassy eyes, was told there had not been a passenger, and the circumstances of
the single vehicle accident suggested impaired control.
State v. Timson (1974), 38 Ohio St. 2d
122, at 127 -- "To have probable cause, the arresting officer must have
sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source, to warrant
a prudent man in believing that a felony has been committed and that it has been
committed by the accused. Brinegar v. United States (1949), 338 U.S. 160;
Henry v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 98; Beck v. Ohio, (1964), 379
U.S. 89; and State v. Fultz
(1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 79."
State v. Rose (1991), 75 Ohio App. 3d
656, 659 -- "Probable cause for arrest has been defined to be a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautions man in believing the accused to be guilty...Most questions
of probable cause address the officer's knowledge of the circumstances...What
facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a question of law, but
whether they exist in any particular case is a question of fact." Also see
Bock v. Cincinnati
(1931), 43 Ohio App. 257.
State v. Congeni (1995), 104 Ohio App. 3d
726, 732 -- "A stop and warrantless arrest of an individual must be based on
articulable and reasonable suspicion that the arrested individual is himself
engaged or about to be engaged in a crime. It cannot be based on the actions of
State v. Fultz (1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 79
-- Paragraph two of the syllabus: "Where a police officer has received
information over the police radio and that information is such as to give the
officer reasonable grounds to believe a felony has been committed, such officer
has probable cause to make an arrest." Also see State v. Holden (1985),
23 Ohio App. 3d 5; United States v. Hensley (1985), 469 U.S. 604 (As to
when investigative stop based on flyer is valid.)
Draper v. United States (1959), 358 U.S.
307 -- Probable cause is determined by factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act.
State v. McCaig (1988), 51 Ohio App. 3d
94 -- Probable cause may be based on a combination of circumstances, even though
none standing alone would be sufficient.
Columbus v. Lenear (1984), 16 Ohio App.
3d 466, 468 -- For an officer to make a valid warrantless misdemeanor arrest he
need not have absolute knowledge that an offense is being committed, such as
would be required to support conviction at trial. Also see Westlake v.
Vilfroy (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 26.
State v. Coppick (1995), 103 Ohio App. 3d
405 -- If an officer testifies that he contemporaneously excused a particular
act of the defendant as providing probable cause for arrest, the state may not
later attempt to resurrect that same act in an effort to establish probable
Taylor v. Alabama (1982), 457 U.S. 687 --
No probable cause for arrest where the tip that the defendant committed a
robbery came from a jail inmate who provided no further details and whose
reliability was unknown.
State v. Congeni (1981), 3 Ohio App. 3d
392 -- Tip from informant corroborated by police surveillance established
probable cause for arrest.
State v. Williams (1997), 79 Ohio St. 3d
1, 13-14 -- Officer had probable cause to arrest defendant for leaving the scene
of an accident, even though shots were being fired at him as he fled.
State v. Newell (1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d
623 -- Probable cause did not exist to arrest an adult found in motel room with
juveniles and alcohol, where the actual basis for the officers' action was
general request from the juvenile court that adults be arrested in such
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When an arrest has been completed
Kaup v. Texas (2003), 123 S.Ct. 1843 --
Teenager was taken from his bedroom to police headquarters in the middle of the
night, in hand cuffs and wearing only his underwear. Absent probable cause, this
was an illegal arrest. Notwithstanding Miranda warnings, subsequent
confession was fruit of the poisonous tree. Opinion summarizes prior case law
regarding when a seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
State v. Carroll, 162 Ohio App. 3d 672,
2005-Ohio-4048 -- Officer thought defendant might have an outstanding warrant.
Defendant fled when asked to place his hands behind his back, without being told
he was under arrest. Fleeing may have been obstructing official business but it
was not resisting arrest. Defendant ran into officer's partner. But she did not
know why her partner had approached the defendant and did not tell him he was
under arrest until after he was subdued. Resisting conviction reversed.
Columbus v. Galang, Franklin App. No.
2003-Ohio-4506 -- (1) The remedy for an illegal arrest is generally
suppression of evidence, not dismissal of charges. (2) Looking to the
circumstances, arrest was not completed prior to the defendant's incriminating
statements. The officer testified he only intended to detain the defendant and
guided him to the cruiser without the use of force.
Michigan v. Chesternut (1988), 486 U.S.
567 -- A person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if in
view of all of the circumstances a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave. It is the reasonable man's interpretation of police
conduct that matters and not the intention of the police.
Alter v. Paul (1955), 101 Ohio App. 139,
141 -- "An arrest occurs when the following four requisite elements are
involved: (1) An intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended authority, (3)
accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, and
(4) which is so understood by the person arrested." Adopted, State v. Darrah
(1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d 22, 26.
State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d
135 -- Paragraph one of the syllabus: "The existence of an arrest is dependent
not upon the fact that a suspect who voluntarily comes in for questioning
concerning possible involvement in a murder is immediately given the Miranda
warnings, nor upon the period of questioning, but upon the existence of four
requisite elements: (1) An intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended
authority, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of
the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested."
State v. Miller (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d
270 -- Investigative contact with the defendant began at his place of employment
and continued through search of his house and interrogation at the police
station. Looking at the record for indications as to the defendant's freedom of
movement, court concludes arrest did not come until after he had made
incriminating statements and was detained at the jail.
State v. Gorey (1994), 68 Ohio Misc. 2d
44 -- At the hospital, motorist involved in an accident was told by an officer
that he was under arrest for OMVI, but was not actually taken into custody. For
purposes of the implied consent law and an administrative license suspension for
refusing to furnish a blood sample, he was not under arrest and not was subject
to the ALS.
State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App. 3d
328 -- Trooper grabbed keys belonging to motorist found asleep behind the wheel.
This facilitated investigative detention (which the court goes on to find was
unjustified), but did not convert detention to arrest.
State v. Darrah (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d
22, 26 -- The issuance of a traffic citation, without any effort being made to
take the defendant into custody, is not an unlawful arrest for an offense not
committed in the presence of the officer. See
State v. Finch (1985), 24 Ohio App. 3d 38
-- An arrest has occurred when an officer instructs a driver to pull to the side
of the road and removes the keys to the drivers vehicle.
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420,
435-442 -- Time at which roadside detention becomes custodial for purposes of
Miranda depends on when the motorist is subjected to treatment that renders
him in custody for all practical purposes.
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Virginia v. Moore (2008), 128 S.Ct. 1598 – State statute required
issuance of a summons for driving on a suspended license but officer
arrested the defendant and found drugs during a search incident to arrest.
State court ordered suppression based on the Fourth Amendment. Reversed. The
extent of Fourth Amendment protection is not tied to statutes as may have
been adopted by the various states.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001),
121 S.Ct. 1536 -- The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless
custodial arrest for a minor offense punishable only by a fine.
State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323,
2003-Ohio-3931 -- Syllabus: "Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors. (State v.
Jones , 88 Ohio St. 3d 430, 727 N.E. 2d 886, followed in part and
modified in part.)
State v. Anderson, 153 Ohio App. 3d 374,
2003-Ohio-3970 -- Officer thought an injured bicyclist might have been drinking,
and exploited the inability to provide for safety exception under
2935.26(A) to make an arrest for a minor misdemeanor equipment violation. At
headquarters further investigation led to the filing of a DUI. Officer's
admission he used the safety exception as a pretense, combined with other
circumstances means arrest was unconstitutional.
Middletown v. Flinchum
95 Ohio St. 3d 43,
2002-Ohio-1625 -- Syllabus: "When officers, having
identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house
in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, regardless
of whether the offense for which the offender is being arrested is a
misdemeanor." See dissent citing the lack of exigent circumstances and
characterizing the chase as the "lukewarm amble" of a "mere tire-spinner."
State v. Stuber, 150 Ohio App. 3d
2002-Ohio-6309 -- Defendant fled into his house when officers arrived
to arrest him on a bench warrant. Presumed failure to comply with knock and
announce requirement before making forcible entry doesn't matter, as
officers deemed to have been in hot pursuit.
State v. Karle
(2001), 144 Ohio App. 3d 125 -- Officers following broadcast information
establishing probable cause to arrest the defendant for failure to obey a
lawful order went to his home where they made a warrantless arrest,
notwithstanding the defendant's order they leave his property. (1) Location
outside the home was within the curtilage. (2) Warrantless arrest was
illegal absent exigent circumstances. None existed. (3) Motion to suppress
should have been sustained, but as the only fruit of the illegal arrest was
the non-inculpatory order to leave, the defendant was not prejudiced. But
since the arrest was illegal, his resisting arrest conviction is reversed.
United States v. Watson (1976), 423 U.S.
411 -- The Fourth Amendment does not bar warrantless arrests, nor are exigent
circumstances required for such arrests, which are commonly authorized by
Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91 --
Whether an arrest without a warrant is constitutionally valid depends upon:
"...whether at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause
to make it - whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (individual) had
committed or was committing an offense."
Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573
-- Absent exigent circumstances, police may not make a warrantless, non
consensual, entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest.
Steagald v. United States (1981), 451
U.S. 204 -- Police may not enter home of a third party without a search warrant
in order to execute an arrest warrant for someone else. Also see State v.
Wilson (1981), 2 Ohio App. 3d 151.
Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), 466 U.S. 740
-- The government must demonstrate exigent circumstances in order to overcome
the presumption of unreasonableness which attaches to all warrantless home
entries. Warrantless home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is only
probable cause that a minor offense has been committed. Also see Middleburg
Heights v. Theiss (1985), 28 Ohio App. 3d 1. But see Illinois v. McArthur
(2001), 121 S.Ct. 946 holding police could prevent resident from entering home
unattended while warrant was being obtained.
Scott v. Maggio (5th Cir. 1983), 695 F.
2d 916 -- Defendant lacks standing to complain of warrantless but consensual
entry to home of third party to effect his arrest.
United States v. Acevedo (7th Cir. 1980),
627 F. 2d 68 -- Exigent circumstances for warrantless entry to apartment to
effect arrest established by unfamiliarity with premises and possibility suspect
in a drug deal could escape by an unknown route during time needed to procure
warrant. Also see Dorman v. United States
(C.A.D.C. 1970), 435 F. 2d 385; United States v. Stubblefield (9th Cir.
1980), 621 F. 2d 980; United States v. Albert (8th Cir. 1980), 630 F. 2d
1292; United States v. Robertson (9th Cir. 1979), 606 F. 2d 853; State
v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 281.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991),
500 U.S. 44 -- A person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a prompt
determination whether there was probable cause for the arrest. A delay of more
than forty-eight hours is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Also see Powell v. Nevada
(1994), 511 U.S. 79 holding McLaughlin applicable to all actions pending
at the time the decision was announced and raising the question whether the
exclusionary rule is applicable when there has been a McLaughlin
violation; United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez (1994), 511 U.S. 350.
Cleveland v. Shields (1995), 103 Ohio
App. 3d 118 -- Suspect fled in a car, then on foot, after officers observed
cocaine being handled. After a four minute chase, officers followed him into an
apartment and placed him under arrest. The immediate, continuous chase fell
within the hot pursuit exception to the Fourth Amendment warrants requirement.
State v. Lewis (1893), 50 Ohio St. 179 --
If an officer was not present when a breach of the peace occurred and public
order had been restored and the parties had departed the area, and all the
information he had of the affray and the parties to it was from bystanders, he
may not pursue the persons charged with the offense without first obtaining an
State v. Stacy (1983), 9 Ohio App. 3d 55
-- Where an officer has observed a suspect committing a misdemeanor offense, but
the suspect is able to evade immediate arrest, a warrantless arrest pursuant to
R.C. 2935.01(A) may still be made one and a half hours later.
State v. Reymann (1989), 55 Ohio App. 3d
222 -- Warrantless arrest is invalid when based on statements by witnesses and
not supported by the officer's personal observations.
State v. Miller (1993), 91 Ohio App. 3d
270, 274-274 -- The written statement requirement, set forth in
for warrantless arrests for misdemeanors not committed in an officer's presence,
does not apply to felonies.
State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio St. 2d 84 --
Paragraph three of the syllabus: "R.C. 2935.04 authorizes the warrantless arrest
of a person for a misdemeanor when the arresting officer knows that the person
has a previous conviction which will enhance the misdemeanor to a felony. (R.C.
Blanchester v. Hester (1992), 81 Ohio
App. 3d 815 -- Minor traffic offense did not justify warrantless entrance to
defendant's home. Resulting disorderly conduct and resisting arrest charges
dismissed as fruit of the poisonous tree. However, the traffic charges should
not have been dismissed.
Cincinnati v. Alexander (1978), 54 Ohio
St. 2d 248 -- "The authority granted in
R.C. 2935.01 to a police officer to
'arrest and detain a person found violating a law of this state' does not confer
authority upon a municipal police officer to arrest without a warrant outside
the geographical boundaries of his municipality for traffic offenses observed by
the officer to have been committed outside such municipal limits." (syllabus).
The court reserved ruling on whether the exclusionary rule is available as a
remedy following such an illegal arrest. (p. 255, fn. 6). For other cases on
territorial jurisdiction see Law Enforcement Officers/Territorial jurisdiction.
State v. Clark (1983), 10 Ohio App. 3d
308 -- Headnote 1: "An auxiliary police officer, who has been duly appointed and
conferred full 'police powers' by his municipality, has the power, regardless of
'duty status,' to make misdemeanor arrests without a warrant pursuant to
2935.03." Also see State v. Darga (1985), 30 Ohio App. 3d 54 (township
State v. Henderson (1990), 51 Ohio St. 3d
54 -- Syllabus: "Information supplied by officers or agencies engaged in a
common investigation with an arresting officer may be used to establish probable
cause for a warrantless arrest. (United States v. Ventresca , 380
U.S. 102, and Whitley v. Warden , 401 U.S. 560, applied and
followed; State v. Lewis
, 50 Ohio St. 179, 33 N.E. 405 distinguished." Also see State v. Holmes
(1985), 28 Ohio St. 3d 12; United States v. Butler (5th Cir. 1980), 611
F. 2d 1066, 1070, fn. 11.
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with a warrant
Whitley v. Warden (1971), 401 U.S. 560 --
Where an arrest warrant had been obtained from a magistrate without the
necessary showing of probable cause, arrest by other officers who executed the
warrant was illegal and evidence seized had to be suppressed.
Hill v. California (1971), 401 U.S. 797,
802-804 -- Good faith arrest, pursuant to warrant, of the wrong person does not
render arrest illegal. Also see United States v. McEachern (4th Cir.
1981), 675 F. 2d 618.
Arizona v. Evans (1995), 514 U.S. 1 --
Defendant was stopped for a minor traffic offense. Computer showed an
outstanding arrest warrant, which in fact had been recalled. Error appears to
have been made by the clerk's office. Defendant dropped a hand rolled cigarette
when ordered out of his car, leading to discovery of marijuana under a seat.
Exclusionary rule held not to apply as in these circumstances would not deter
illegal police conduct. Though not directly characterizing this as an extension
of the good faith doctrine, court follows the Leon rationale. Compare
State v. Gough (1986), 35 Ohio App. 3d 81; Ashland v. Dailey (1999),
105 Ohio Misc. 2d 1.
Fairborn v. Munkus (1971), 28 Ohio St. 3d
207 -- A municipal police officer may make an arrest for a violation of a
municipal ordinance, upon a properly issued warrant, anywhere within the
jurisdictional limits of the issuing court, even though that location may be
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the department the officer is employed
Maryland v. Buie (1990), 494 U.S. 325,
333 -- "We also hold that as an incident to the arrest (at a residence with a
warrant), the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately
launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts
which...would warrant a reasonably prudent police officer in believing the area
to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."
Also see State v. Lyons (1992), 83 Ohio App. 3d 525, 532-534; State v.
Davis (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 277, 288.
State v. Campana (1996), 112 Ohio App. 3d
297 -- The knock and announce rule applies to the execution of arrest warrants.
Absent exigent circumstances, officers must identify themselves and wait for
response by occupant. Compare State v. Davis (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d 277,
286-287 -- The announce portion of the knock and announce rule set forth in
2935.12(A) does not apply when entry is not forcible. See Wilson v. Arkansas
(1995), 514 U.S. 927 and Richards v. Wisconsin (1997), 520 U.S. 385
pertaining to the knock and announce rule in the context of search warrants.
Steagald v. United States (1981), 451
U.S. 204 -- Absent consent or exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant does not
authorize search of subject's home. A separate search warrant for the subject's
person must be obtained.
State v. Tolbert (1996), 116 Ohio App. 3d
86 -- Defendant was arrested at a girlfriend's house on a valid capias warrant.
Arrest and search incident to arrest upheld. Steagald v. U.S. (1981), 451
U.S. 204 distinguished as having required a search warrant for entry into the
home of another to make an arrest where the homeowner, and not the arrestee, was
asserting a privacy interest. Also see State v. Wilson (1981), 2 Ohio
App. 3d 151; United States v. Underwood (9th Cir. 1983), 717 F.2d 482.
State v. Deener (1980), 64 Ohio St. 2d
335, 338 -- "We believe that a teletyped arrest order requested by probation
authorities provides an adequate basis for a police officer to make a valid
arrest of a probationer." (Notwithstanding failure to comply with
State v. Pierson (1998), 128 Ohio App. 3d
255, 258 -- An arrest warrant clothes the police with the authority to take the
subject into custody, whether or not the officer are aware of the existence of
Maynard v. Smith (1975), 47 Ohio Misc. 2d
47 -- Headnote 1: "Under Crim. R. 4(A)(1), a clerk of courts, before ruling on a
request for a warrant, may require the complainant to appear personally and be
examined under oath to determine whether there is probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed by public officials (or anyone else)."
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Cleveland v. Washington
Mutual Bank, 179 Ohio App. 3d 692,
2008-Ohio-6956 – Bank was sent a summons for building and housing code
violations, but did not respond. Court devised a stratagem for trial in
absentia. Court finds that while there is a procedure for enforcing a response
to indictments, none is provided with respect to summons sent corporations, as
opposed to individuals. Nor is there a procedure provided for trial in absentia
in these circumstances.
Kirk v. Louisiana (2002), 122 S.Ct.
2458 -- Police with probable cause to arrest defendant for a drug offense
unlawfully detained and searched him at his home without first obtaining a
warrant. Remanded to determine whether exigent circumstances were, in fact,
present. Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, followed.
United States v. Crews (1979), 445 U.S.
463, 474 -- "An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to
subsequent prosecution., nor as a defense to a valid conviction."
State v. Lloyd (1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d
95, 100 -- Ohio law makes no provision for a motion to dismiss based on a lack
of probable cause. The proper remedy for any Fourth Amendment violation is a
motion to suppress evidence.
State v. Jones (1974), 37 Ohio St. 2d 21
-- Footnote one, p. 24: "R.C. 2935.14 and
2935.20 require, generally, that a
person arrested or confined be provided facilities with which to obtain counsel,
or communicate with his attorney. Since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
474, does not insure counsel to defendants who are not subjected to custodial
interrogation, these statutes provide a right beyond those guaranteed by the
Dayton v. Nugent (1970), 25 Ohio Misc. 31
-- A policy of not allowing calls during the four hours immediately following
arrest is invalid.
State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 65,
69-70 -- Exclusionary rule does not apply to alleged violation of
which confers certain rights upon an arrestee before removal from the county
where he has been arrested.
State v. Sampson (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d
287 -- Failure to promptly take person arrested without a warrant before a
magistrate, as required by
R.C. 2935.05, does not invalidate subsequent
State v. Slatter (1981), 66 Ohio St. 2d
452 -- Syllabus: "R.C. 2935.26, insofar as it creates a substantive right of
freedom from arrest for one accused of a minor misdemeanor, and Crim. R. 4.1,
which provides a procedure for disposition of minor misdemeanor cases where
citations have been issued, are not unconstitutionally in conflict. (Krause
v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, approved and followed.)" Also see State v.
Bronaugh (1984), 16 Ohio App. 3d 237; State v. Peay (1991), 62 Ohio
Misc. 2d 92; State v. Pender (1980), 66 Ohio Misc. 23.
Kear v. Hilton (4th Cir. 1983), 699 F. 2d
181 -- The extraordinary powers given bail bondsmen to use force in this country
to return bail jumpers without resort to public authorities does not protect
bounty hunter from extradition to Canada to face kidnapping charges base on
abduction of bail jumper.
State v. Pecora (1993), 87 Ohio App. 3d
687 -- Citizen's arrest does not permit the use of deadly force in circumstances
where police would not have been allowed to use deadly force.
State v. Carter (1985), 28 Ohio App. 3d
61 -- Passenger may challenge validity of his arrest based on stop of vehicle he
was in and basis for removal from it. Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S.
128 distinguished on the basis that that case involved mere presence in the
vehicle which was searched.
Ashcroft v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center
(1990), 68 Ohio App. 3d 359 --
R.C. 2935.041, permitting shopkeepers to detains
shoplifters until the police may be summoned, applies to hospital.
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